Experimental duopolies under price guarantees
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Scholar |
Otros documentos de la autoría: Fatás, Enrique; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Máñez, Juan A.; Sabater-Grande, Gerardo
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http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/00036846.2011.568398 |
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Título
Experimental duopolies under price guaranteesFecha de publicación
2011-09-14Editor
Taylor & FrancisCita bibliográfica
Applied Economics (2013), vol. 45, no. 1, 15-35Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00036846.2011.568398#tabModulePalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price- ... [+]
In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the ‘aggressive’ price-beating type. [-]
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