Experimental duopolies under price guarantees
Impacte
Scholar |
Altres documents de l'autoria: Fatás, Enrique; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Máñez, Juan A.; Sabater-Grande, Gerardo
Metadades
Mostra el registre complet de l'elementcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONAquest recurs és restringit
http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/00036846.2011.568398 |
Metadades
Títol
Experimental duopolies under price guaranteesData de publicació
2011-09-14Editor
Taylor & FrancisCita bibliogràfica
Applied Economics (2013), vol. 45, no. 1, 15-35Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00036846.2011.568398#tabModuleParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price- ... [+]
In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the ‘aggressive’ price-beating type. [-]
Drets d'accés
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
Apareix a les col.leccions
- ECO_Articles [670]