Punishment and disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception game
Scholar | Other documents of the author: Behnk, Sascha; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García Gallego, Aurora
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TitlePunishment and disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception game
Publisher versionhttps://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=jei2017&pap ...
PublisherUniversidad de Navarra
Previous findings have shown tha t punishment does not necessarily reduce deception i n principal agent - relationships . We shed further light on this issue by first identifying a ... [+]
Previous findings have shown tha t punishment does not necessarily reduce deception i n principal agent - relationships . We shed further light on this issue by first identifying a punishment mechanism that substantially decreases deception in a sender - receiver game: the possibility of imposing severe sanctions that are cost - free for the enforcer. Keeping this effective combination of punishment costs and severity constant , we then investigate how a reduction in monitoring affects deception by c ompar ing assured revelation of s ender behavior ex post with a treatment in which it is disclosed with just 50% probability . We find a similarly strong deterrence effect in both treatments suggesting that punishment works in a part icular way in the deception context: o nce it is a credible threat, it does not require complete monit oring to be effective . We also find that receivers show s imilar trust level s in senders’ messages for both punishment treatments , which are significantly higher than in the corresponding baseline s without sanctions , further support ing ou r conclusion. [-]
Investigation project1) Financial support by Universitat Jaume I ( project P1.1B2015 - 48 ); 2) Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness ( project s ECO2013 - 44409 - P and ECO2015 - 68469 - R ) and 3) the Bank of Spain Excellence Chair in Computational Economics ( project 11I229.01/1).
Bibliographic citationBEHNK, Sascha Andre; BARREDA TARRAZONA, Iván; GARCÍA GALLEGO, Aurora, (2017). Punishment and disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception game. Ponencia presentada en las XXXII Jornadas de Economía Industrial. Pamplona, 7-8 septiembre, 2017