Punishment and disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception game
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Otros documentos de la autoría: Behnk, Sascha; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora
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INVESTIGACIONMetadatos
Título
Punishment and disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception gameFecha de publicación
2017-09-07Editor
Universidad de NavarraCita bibliográfica
BEHNK, Sascha Andre; BARREDA TARRAZONA, Iván; GARCÍA GALLEGO, Aurora, (2017). Punishment and disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception game. Ponencia presentada en las XXXII Jornadas de Economía Industrial. Pamplona, 7-8 septiembre, 2017Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectVersión de la editorial
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=jei2017&pap ...Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
Previous findings have shown tha
t punishment does not
necessarily
reduce deception i
n
principal agent
-
relationships
.
We
shed
further
light on this issue by
first
identifying
a ... [+]
Previous findings have shown tha
t punishment does not
necessarily
reduce deception i
n
principal agent
-
relationships
.
We
shed
further
light on this issue by
first
identifying
a punishment
mechanism that
substantially
decreases
deception
in
a sender
-
receiver game:
the possibility
of imposing
severe sanctions that are cost
-
free for the enforcer. Keeping
this
effective
combination
of
punishment
costs and severity
constant
, we then investigate how a reduction in monitoring affects deception
by
c
ompar
ing
assured revelation
of s
ender behavior
ex post
with a
treatment
in which
it
is disclosed with
just
50% probability
. We
find
a similarly
strong
deterrence effect
in both
treatments
suggesting
that
punishment
works
in a
part
icular
way
in the deception context:
o
nce it is a credible threat,
it
does not
require complete monit
oring
to
be effective
.
We also find
that receivers show
s
imilar
trust level
s
in
senders’ messages for
both
punishment treatments
, which are significantly higher than in the
corresponding
baseline
s
without
sanctions
,
further
support
ing
ou
r conclusion. [-]
Descripción
XXXII Jornadas de Economía Industrial. Pamplona, 7-8 septiembre, 2017
Proyecto de investigación
1) Financial support by Universitat Jaume I ( project P1.1B2015 - 48 ); 2) Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness ( project s ECO2013 - 44409 - P and ECO2015 - 68469 - R ) and 3) the Bank of Spain Excellence Chair in Computational Economics ( project 11I229.01/1).Derechos de acceso
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess