2024-03-29T15:30:16Zhttps://repositori.uji.es/oai/requestoai:repositori.uji.es:10234/1752792024-03-25T08:48:11Zcom_10234_8643com_10234_9col_10234_146085
Repositori UJI
author
Behnk, Sascha
author
Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván
author
García-Gallego, Aurora
2018-06-21T06:57:23Z
2018-06-21T06:57:23Z
2017-09-07
BEHNK, Sascha Andre; BARREDA TARRAZONA, Iván; GARCÍA GALLEGO, Aurora, (2017). Punishment and disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception game. Ponencia presentada en las XXXII Jornadas de Economía Industrial. Pamplona, 7-8 septiembre, 2017
http://hdl.handle.net/10234/175279
Previous findings have shown tha
t punishment does not
necessarily
reduce deception i
n
principal agent
-
relationships
.
We
shed
further
light on this issue by
first
identifying
a punishment
mechanism that
substantially
decreases
deception
in
a sender
-
receiver game:
the possibility
of imposing
severe sanctions that are cost
-
free for the enforcer. Keeping
this
effective
combination
of
punishment
costs and severity
constant
, we then investigate how a reduction in monitoring affects deception
by
c
ompar
ing
assured revelation
of s
ender behavior
ex post
with a
treatment
in which
it
is disclosed with
just
50% probability
. We
find
a similarly
strong
deterrence effect
in both
treatments
suggesting
that
punishment
works
in a
part
icular
way
in the deception context:
o
nce it is a credible threat,
it
does not
require complete monit
oring
to
be effective
.
We also find
that receivers show
s
imilar
trust level
s
in
senders’ messages for
both
punishment treatments
, which are significantly higher than in the
corresponding
baseline
s
without
sanctions
,
further
support
ing
ou
r conclusion.
eng
Deception
Punishment
Disclosure probability
Experiment
Punishment and disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception game
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
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URL
https://repositori.uji.es/xmlui/bitstream/10234/175279/1/Behnk_2017_Punishment.pdf
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URL
https://repositori.uji.es/xmlui/bitstream/10234/175279/5/Behnk_2017_Punishment.pdf.txt
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Behnk_2017_Punishment.pdf.txt