• openAccess   Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems 

      Behnk, Sascha; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora Elsevier (2018-10)
      We use a repeated sender-receiver game in which sender behavior is revealed to future counterparts either by (i) standardized computer reports or (ii) individual reports composed by the receivers. Compared to our baseline, ...
    • openAccess   Punishing liars—How monitoring affects honesty and trust 

      Behnk, Sascha; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora Public Library of Science (2018)
      Previous experiments have shown that the possibility to punish liars does not per se increase honesty in principal-agent relationships. In this study, we first establish a punishment mechanism that substantially enhances ...
    • openAccess   Punishment and disclosure probabilities in an experimental deception game 

      Behnk, Sascha; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora Universidad de Navarra (2017-09-07)
      Previous findings have shown tha t punishment does not necessarily reduce deception i n principal agent - relationships . We shed further light on this issue by first identifying a ...
    • openAccess   The role of ex post transparency in information transmission -An experiment 

      Behnk, Sascha; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora (2015-07-01)
      Asymmetric information in economic relationships often provides incentives to deceive. Previous findings show that ex ante disclosure of conflicts of interest not only fails to improve these relationships but also leads ...