Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies
Ver/ Abrir
Impacto
Scholar |
Otros documentos de la autoría: Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Manasakis, Constantine; Mitrokostas, Evangelos; Petrakis, Emmanuel
Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONMetadatos
Título
Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopoliesAutoría
Fecha de publicación
2016Editor
ElsevierISSN
0264-9993Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999315004241Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on
the strategic choice of firms’ owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment
device ... [+]
Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on
the strategic choice of firms’ owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment
device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly
we experimentally test whether firms’ owners compensate their managers through contracts combining
own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour
in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms’ owners choose relative performance
over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms’ owners successfully induce a more aggressive
behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit
maximization. [-]
Publicado en
Economic Modelling 54 (2016) 205–217Derechos de acceso
0264-9993/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Aparece en las colecciones
- ECO_Articles [693]