Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies
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Altres documents de l'autoria: Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Manasakis, Constantine; Mitrokostas, Evangelos; Petrakis, Emmanuel
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Títol
Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopoliesAutoria
Data de publicació
2016Editor
ElsevierISSN
0264-9993Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999315004241Versió
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on
the strategic choice of firms’ owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment
device ... [+]
Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on
the strategic choice of firms’ owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment
device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly
we experimentally test whether firms’ owners compensate their managers through contracts combining
own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour
in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms’ owners choose relative performance
over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms’ owners successfully induce a more aggressive
behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit
maximization. [-]
Publicat a
Economic Modelling 54 (2016) 205–217Drets d'accés
0264-9993/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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