Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
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Altres documents de l'autoria: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-017-0130-7 |
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Títol
Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutionData de publicació
2017-11-04Editor
SpringerCita bibliogràfica
ALÓS FERRER, Carlos; GARCÍA-SEGARRA, Jaume; GINÉS VILAR, Miguel. Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Economic Theory Bulletin (2017) onlineTipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40505-017-0130-7Versió
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
Many bargaining solutions anchor on disagreement, allocating gains with
respect to the worst-case scenario. We propose here a solution anchoring on utopia
(the ideal, maximal aspirations for all agents), but yielding ... [+]
Many bargaining solutions anchor on disagreement, allocating gains with
respect to the worst-case scenario. We propose here a solution anchoring on utopia
(the ideal, maximal aspirations for all agents), but yielding feasible allocations for any
number of agents. The
negotiated aspirations solution
proposes the best allocation
in the direction of utopia starting at an endogenous reference point which depends
on both the utopia point and bargaining power. The Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
becomes a particular case if (and only if) the reference point lies on the line from
utopia to disagreement. We provide a characterization for the two-agent case relying
only on standard axioms or natural restrictions thereof: strong Pareto optimality, scale
invariance, restricted monotonicity, and restricted concavity. A characterization for
the general (
n
-agent) case is obtained by relaxing Pareto optimality and adding the
(standard) axiom of restricted contraction independence, plus the minimal condition
that utopia should be selected if available. [-]
Publicat a
Economic Theory Bulletin (2017) onlineProyecto de investigación
Financial support from projects ECO2015-68469 Ministerio de Educación, PREDOC/2007/28 Fundación Bancaja, and P1.15-1B2015-48 and E-2011-27 (Pla de Promoció de la Investigació) of the Universitat Jaume IDrets d'accés
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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