Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
Impact
Scholar |
Other documents of the author: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel
Metadata
Show full item recordcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONThis resource is restricted
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-017-0130-7 |
Metadata
Title
Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutionDate
2017-11-04Publisher
SpringerBibliographic citation
ALÓS FERRER, Carlos; GARCÍA-SEGARRA, Jaume; GINÉS VILAR, Miguel. Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Economic Theory Bulletin (2017) onlineType
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40505-017-0130-7Version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAbstract
Many bargaining solutions anchor on disagreement, allocating gains with
respect to the worst-case scenario. We propose here a solution anchoring on utopia
(the ideal, maximal aspirations for all agents), but yielding ... [+]
Many bargaining solutions anchor on disagreement, allocating gains with
respect to the worst-case scenario. We propose here a solution anchoring on utopia
(the ideal, maximal aspirations for all agents), but yielding feasible allocations for any
number of agents. The
negotiated aspirations solution
proposes the best allocation
in the direction of utopia starting at an endogenous reference point which depends
on both the utopia point and bargaining power. The Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
becomes a particular case if (and only if) the reference point lies on the line from
utopia to disagreement. We provide a characterization for the two-agent case relying
only on standard axioms or natural restrictions thereof: strong Pareto optimality, scale
invariance, restricted monotonicity, and restricted concavity. A characterization for
the general (
n
-agent) case is obtained by relaxing Pareto optimality and adding the
(standard) axiom of restricted contraction independence, plus the minimal condition
that utopia should be selected if available. [-]
Is part of
Economic Theory Bulletin (2017) onlineInvestigation project
Financial support from projects ECO2015-68469 Ministerio de Educación, PREDOC/2007/28 Fundación Bancaja, and P1.15-1B2015-48 and E-2011-27 (Pla de Promoció de la Investigació) of the Universitat Jaume IRights
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
This item appears in the folowing collection(s)
- ECO_Articles [696]