Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
Impacto
Scholar |
Otros documentos de la autoría: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel
Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONEste recurso está restringido
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-017-0130-7 |
Metadatos
Título
Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutionFecha de publicación
2017-11-04Editor
SpringerCita bibliográfica
ALÓS FERRER, Carlos; GARCÍA-SEGARRA, Jaume; GINÉS VILAR, Miguel. Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Economic Theory Bulletin (2017) onlineTipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40505-017-0130-7Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
Many bargaining solutions anchor on disagreement, allocating gains with
respect to the worst-case scenario. We propose here a solution anchoring on utopia
(the ideal, maximal aspirations for all agents), but yielding ... [+]
Many bargaining solutions anchor on disagreement, allocating gains with
respect to the worst-case scenario. We propose here a solution anchoring on utopia
(the ideal, maximal aspirations for all agents), but yielding feasible allocations for any
number of agents. The
negotiated aspirations solution
proposes the best allocation
in the direction of utopia starting at an endogenous reference point which depends
on both the utopia point and bargaining power. The Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
becomes a particular case if (and only if) the reference point lies on the line from
utopia to disagreement. We provide a characterization for the two-agent case relying
only on standard axioms or natural restrictions thereof: strong Pareto optimality, scale
invariance, restricted monotonicity, and restricted concavity. A characterization for
the general (
n
-agent) case is obtained by relaxing Pareto optimality and adding the
(standard) axiom of restricted contraction independence, plus the minimal condition
that utopia should be selected if available. [-]
Publicado en
Economic Theory Bulletin (2017) onlineProyecto de investigación
Financial support from projects ECO2015-68469 Ministerio de Educación, PREDOC/2007/28 Fundación Bancaja, and P1.15-1B2015-48 and E-2011-27 (Pla de Promoció de la Investigació) of the Universitat Jaume IDerechos de acceso
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
Aparece en las colecciones
- ECO_Articles [696]