Qualitative analysis of Bayes–Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions

dc.contributor.author	Momparler Pechuán, Juan
dc.contributor.author	Gregori, Pablo
dc.date.accessioned	2012-10-23T09:44:32Z
dc.date.available	2012-10-23T09:44:32Z
dc.date.issued	2011-03
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10234/49694
dc.description.abstract	We propose a simple qualitative methodology for improving the understanding of the nature of equilibrium strategies in asymmetric first-price sealed-bid auctions when departures from symmetry are weak. We exemplify this methodology through the exposition of three examples already studied in literature (Maskin and Riley, 2000a; Fibich and Gavious, 2003; Bajari, 2001).	ca_CA
dc.format.extent	3 p.	ca_CA
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	ca_CA
dc.language.iso	eng	ca_CA
dc.publisher	Elsevier	ca_CA
dc.relation.isPartOf	Economics Letters, 2011, March, v. 110 (3)	ca_CA
dc.rights.uri	http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/	*
dc.subject	Asymmetric game	ca_CA
dc.subject	Auction	ca_CA
dc.subject	phase plane	ca_CA
dc.subject.lcsh	Auctions	ca_CA
dc.subject.lcsh	prices	ca_CA
dc.subject.other	subastes	ca_CA
dc.subject.other	preus	ca_CA
dc.title	Qualitative analysis of Bayes–Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions	ca_CA
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	ca_CA
dc.identifier.doi	http://dx.doi.org/10.106/j.econlet.2010.11.030
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess	ca_CA
dc.type.version	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Ficheros en el ítem

Ficheros	Tamaño	Formato	Ver
No hay ficheros asociados a este ítem.