Market power, technical progress and financial fragility
Impacto
Scholar |
Otros documentos de la autoría: Delli Gatti, Domenico; GALLEGATI, MARCO; Palestrini, Antonio; Tedeschi, Gabriele; Vidal-Tomás, David
Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.037 |
Metadatos
Título
Market power, technical progress and financial fragilityAutoría
Fecha de publicación
2024Editor
ElsevierISSN
0167-2681; 2328-7616Cita bibliográfica
DELLI GATTI, Domenico, et al. Market power, technical progress and financial fragility. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, 217: 435-452.Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
We explore the nexus of market power, innovation and financial fragility by means of a macroeconomic agent based model whose core is the Dixit-Greenwald-Stiglitz (DGS) theory of firm behaviour, which nests the Green ... [+]
We explore the nexus of market power, innovation and financial fragility by means of a macroeconomic agent based model whose core is the Dixit-Greenwald-Stiglitz (DGS) theory of firm behaviour, which nests the Greenwald-Stiglitz characterization of the firm as a borrower that runs the risk of bankruptcy in the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition setting. The optimal firm's size is increasing with net worth and productivity. Net worth increases with profits while productivity increases through R&D and innovation. Simulations show that in the presence of market power firms are more innovative and financially robust and less prone to bankruptcy. These features have not surfaced so far in standard characterizations of monopolistic competition. [-]
Publicado en
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, 217: 435-452Derechos de acceso
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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