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An ultimatum wage bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency

dc.contributor.authorAndreou, Adamos
dc.contributor.authorAndreou, Sofia N.
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Gallego, Aurora
dc.contributor.authorGeorgantzis, Nikolaos
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-08T08:47:36Z
dc.date.available2013-02-08T08:47:36Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationBulletin of Economic Research (2011)ca_CA
dc.identifier.issn0307-3378
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/55562
dc.description.abstractWe present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.ca_CA
dc.format.extent8 p.ca_CA
dc.language.isoengca_CA
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishingca_CA
dc.rights© 2011 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research.ca_CA
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/*
dc.subjectexperimentsca_CA
dc.subjecttrade unionsca_CA
dc.subjectultimatum bargainingca_CA
dc.subjectwagesca_CA
dc.titleAn ultimatum wage bargaining experiment on trade union efficiencyca_CA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleca_CA
dc.subject.jelC92ca_CA
dc.subject.jelC78ca_CA
dc.subject.jelJ51ca_CA
dc.subject.jelJ52ca_CA
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca_CA
dc.relation.publisherVersionhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x/abstractca_CA
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion


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