An ultimatum wage bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency
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Otros documentos de la autoría: Andreou, Adamos; Andreou, Sofia N.; García-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantzis, Nikolaos
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Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
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Título
An ultimatum wage bargaining experiment on trade union efficiencyFecha de publicación
2011Editor
Blackwell PublishingISSN
0307-3378Cita bibliográfica
Bulletin of Economic Research (2011)Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x/abstractVersión
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the ... [+]
We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency. [-]
Derechos de acceso
© 2011 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research.
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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