An ultimatum wage bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency
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Títol
An ultimatum wage bargaining experiment on trade union efficiencyData de publicació
2011Editor
Blackwell PublishingISSN
0307-3378Cita bibliogràfica
Bulletin of Economic Research (2011)Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x/abstractVersió
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the ... [+]
We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency. [-]
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© 2011 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research.
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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