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dc.contributor.authorBarreda-Tarrazona, Iván
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Gallego, Aurora
dc.contributor.authorGeorgantzis, Nikolaos
dc.contributor.authorAndaluz Funcia, Joaquín
dc.contributor.authorGil Sanz, Agustín
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-22T11:18:28Z
dc.date.available2012-10-22T11:18:28Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.02.001
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 29, 1, p. 74-83
dc.identifier.issn1677187
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/49554
dc.description.abstractHotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so far. We report results from experimental spatial duopolies designed to address this issue. The levels of product differentiation observed are systematically lower than predicted in equilibrium under risk neutrality and compatible with risk aversion. The observed prices are consistent with collusion attempts. Our main findings are robust to variations in three experimental conditions: automated vs. human market sharing rule for ties, individual vs. collective decision making, and even vs. odd number of locations. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rights© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/*
dc.subjectPrice competition
dc.subjectProduct differentiation
dc.subjectSharing rules
dc.titleAn experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.02.001
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.relation.publisherVersionhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718710000196
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion


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