An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing
![Thumbnail](/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10234/49554/Barreda_Tarrazona_et_al.pdf.jpg?sequence=3&isAllowed=y)
Ver/ Abrir
Impacto
![Google Scholar](/xmlui/themes/Mirage2/images/uji/logo_google.png)
![Microsoft Academico](/xmlui/themes/Mirage2/images/uji/logo_microsoft.png)
Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONConsultad el texto completo
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.02.001 |
Metadatos
Título
An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricingAutoría
Fecha de publicación
2011Editor
ElsevierISSN
1677187Cita bibliográfica
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29, 1, p. 74-83Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718710000196Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
Hotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so ... [+]
Hotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so far. We report results from experimental spatial duopolies designed to address this issue. The levels of product differentiation observed are systematically lower than predicted in equilibrium under risk neutrality and compatible with risk aversion. The observed prices are consistent with collusion attempts. Our main findings are robust to variations in three experimental conditions: automated vs. human market sharing rule for ties, individual vs. collective decision making, and even vs. odd number of locations. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [-]
Derechos de acceso
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Aparece en las colecciones
- ECO_Articles [696]
Referencia a elsevier
![PDF](/xmlui/themes/Mirage2/images/uji/elsevier-pdf.png)