Learning and Applying Cooperative Solutions: A Classroom Experiment on Transportation Games
![Thumbnail](/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10234/202214/georgantzis_2022_Lea.pdf.jpg?sequence=4&isAllowed=y)
Ver/ Abrir
Impacto
![Google Scholar](/xmlui/themes/Mirage2/images/uji/logo_google.png)
![Microsoft Academico](/xmlui/themes/Mirage2/images/uji/logo_microsoft.png)
Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONMetadatos
Título
Learning and Applying Cooperative Solutions: A Classroom Experiment on Transportation GamesFecha de publicación
2022Editor
MDPIISSN
2075-1680Cita bibliográfica
GEORGANTZIS, Nikolaos; GUTIÉRREZ-HITA, Carlos; SÁNCHEZ-SORIANO, Joaquín. Learning and Applying Cooperative Solutions: A Classroom Experiment on Transportation Games. Axioms, 2022, vol. 11, núm. 8, p. 397Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
https://www.mdpi.com/2075-1680/11/8/397Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
In a trade experiment, groups of students were taught how to bargain over a pie generated in a transportation game. Data collection and detailed group reports of the bargaining process allowed us to identify the type ... [+]
In a trade experiment, groups of students were taught how to bargain over a pie generated in a transportation game. Data collection and detailed group reports of the bargaining process allowed us to identify the type of bargaining followed and its correspondence with cooperative game theory concepts. Explicit coalitions were rather scarce (17%), although coalition stability was implied by 47.8% of the agreements. Efficiency was achieved in the vast majority (82%) of cases, whereas in 34.8% of the agreements, students used a lexicographic ordering of multiple solutions before choosing among them. Regarding the bargaining procedure, in 40% of the agreements, quantities traded were decided before profit sharing rules were negotiated, whereas in 16% of the cases they were simultaneously agreed upon. Our findings suggest that bargaining procedures often do not imply explicit coalitions. Moreover, efficiency can be achieved even in the absence of bargaining processes. [-]
Publicado en
Axioms, 2022, vol. 11, núm. 8, p. 397Entidad financiadora
Gobierno de España | Generalitat Valenciana | Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades | Universitat Jaume I | Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte | Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Código del proyecto o subvención
PGC2018-097965-B-I00 | MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 | PROMETEO/2021/063 | RTI2018-096927-B-100 | AICO/2018/036 | UJI-B2018-76/77 | FPU14/02966 | ANR-18-CE26-0018
Derechos de acceso
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Aparece en las colecciones
- ECO_Articles [694]
Excepto si se señala otra cosa, la licencia del ítem se describe como: © 2022 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).