Learning and Applying Cooperative Solutions: A Classroom Experiment on Transportation Games
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INVESTIGACIONMetadata
Title
Learning and Applying Cooperative Solutions: A Classroom Experiment on Transportation GamesDate
2022Publisher
MDPIISSN
2075-1680Bibliographic citation
GEORGANTZIS, Nikolaos; GUTIÉRREZ-HITA, Carlos; SÁNCHEZ-SORIANO, Joaquín. Learning and Applying Cooperative Solutions: A Classroom Experiment on Transportation Games. Axioms, 2022, vol. 11, núm. 8, p. 397Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
https://www.mdpi.com/2075-1680/11/8/397Version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionSubject
Abstract
In a trade experiment, groups of students were taught how to bargain over a pie generated in a transportation game. Data collection and detailed group reports of the bargaining process allowed us to identify the type ... [+]
In a trade experiment, groups of students were taught how to bargain over a pie generated in a transportation game. Data collection and detailed group reports of the bargaining process allowed us to identify the type of bargaining followed and its correspondence with cooperative game theory concepts. Explicit coalitions were rather scarce (17%), although coalition stability was implied by 47.8% of the agreements. Efficiency was achieved in the vast majority (82%) of cases, whereas in 34.8% of the agreements, students used a lexicographic ordering of multiple solutions before choosing among them. Regarding the bargaining procedure, in 40% of the agreements, quantities traded were decided before profit sharing rules were negotiated, whereas in 16% of the cases they were simultaneously agreed upon. Our findings suggest that bargaining procedures often do not imply explicit coalitions. Moreover, efficiency can be achieved even in the absence of bargaining processes. [-]
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Axioms, 2022, vol. 11, núm. 8, p. 397Funder Name
Gobierno de España | Generalitat Valenciana | Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades | Universitat Jaume I | Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte | Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Project code
PGC2018-097965-B-I00 | MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 | PROMETEO/2021/063 | RTI2018-096927-B-100 | AICO/2018/036 | UJI-B2018-76/77 | FPU14/02966 | ANR-18-CE26-0018
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- ECO_Articles [696]
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