Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for Talent
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INVESTIGACIONMetadatos
Título
Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for TalentAutoría
Fecha de publicación
2022-08-19Editor
Society for Financial Studies; Oxford University PressISSN
2046-9128; 2046-9136Cita bibliográfica
FERIOZZI, Fabio. Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for Talent, The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Volume 13, Issue 1, February 2024, Pages 235–263, https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfac028Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rcfs/cfac028/6671859?s ...Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionResumen
This paper studies how the nature of managerial skills affects firms’ governance
decisions. As required skills shift from firm specific toward more general abilities,
replacing an underperforming CEO with an outside ... [+]
This paper studies how the nature of managerial skills affects firms’ governance
decisions. As required skills shift from firm specific toward more general abilities,
replacing an underperforming CEO with an outside hire becomes more profitable for
shareholders. Therefore, firms adopt stronger governance arrangements to limit the
entrenchment of incumbent CEOs and exploit the improved opportunities offered by
the market for talent. The analysis rationalizes the observed trend toward stronger
corporate governance and offers novel empirical predictions concerning the relationship
between managerial entrenchment, firm size, and the nature of managerial skills. (JEL
D83, D86, G34) [-]
Publicado en
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 2023Derechos de acceso
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in The Review of Corporate Finance Studies following peer review. The version of record FERIOZZI, Fabio. Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for Talent, 2022 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rcfs/cfac028/6671859?searchresult=1
[https://doi.org/10.1093)/rcfs/cfac028]
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/NoC-OKLR/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/NoC-OKLR/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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