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dc.contributorPucheta Martínez, María Consuelo
dc.contributor.authorSabater García, Ángela
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Jaume I. Departament de Finances i Comptabilitat
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-09T07:30:16Z
dc.date.available2016-09-09T07:30:16Z
dc.date.issued2016-07-20
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/162320
dc.descriptionTreball final de Grau en Finances i Comptabilitat. Codi: FC1049. Curs acadèmic 2015-2016ca_CA
dc.description.abstractThe Agency theory supports the payment of dividends as a strategy to reduce the problems of asymmetric information between the directors of a company and the shareholders. In the next study it will be analysed with greater emphasis this theory, given the weight to independent and institutional directors on board and its impact on the dividends payment decision. For them, there are two scenarios: firstly that the independent can have both positive and negative in the payment of dividends, and secondly, that the independent will positively affect the decision of dividends. The results reveal that the institutional directors have an important role in the payment of dividends, while the independent directors do not influence the policy of dividends from the company.ca_CA
dc.format.extent29 p.ca_CA
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca_CA
dc.language.isoengca_CA
dc.publisherUniversitat Jaume Ica_CA
dc.subjectGrau en Finances i Comptabilitatca_CA
dc.subjectGrado en Finanzas y Contabilidadca_CA
dc.subjectBachelor's Degree in Finance and Accountingca_CA
dc.subjectDividend policyca_CA
dc.subjectAgency problemsca_CA
dc.subjectIndependent directorsca_CA
dc.subjectInstitutional directorsca_CA
dc.titleIndependent and institutional directors on board: do they matter in dividend policy?ca_CA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisca_CA
dc.educationLevelEstudios de Gradoca_CA
dc.subject.jelG34ca_CA
dc.subject.jelG35ca_CA
dc.subject.jelG39ca_CA
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccessca_CA


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