An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals
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Otros documentos de la autoría: Attanasi, Giuseppe; García-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Montesano, Aldo
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Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
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Título
An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposalsFecha de publicación
2013Editor
ElsevierISSN
0749-5978Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0749597812001379/1-s2.0-S0749597812001379-main.pdf?_tid=c ...Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication ... [+]
We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one’s bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent. [-]
Publicado en
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2013, Volume 120, Issue 2Derechos de acceso
Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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