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dc.contributor.authorArguedas, Carmen
dc.contributor.authorCamacho Cuena, Eva
dc.contributor.authorZofío, José L.
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-07T11:21:13Z
dc.date.available2012-03-07T11:21:13Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationEnvironmental and Resource Economics (2010) vol. 47, no. 2, p. 261-274
dc.identifier.issn0924-6460
dc.identifier.issn1573-1502
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/33096
dc.description.abstractWe study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms’ incentives to invest, whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non-compliance induces a reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both, theoretical and empirical applications.
dc.format.extent21 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag
dc.relation.isFormatOfVersió preprint del document publicat a http://www.springerlink.com/content/b35m524030671545/
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/*
dc.subjectEnvironmental policy
dc.subjectMonitoring
dc.subjectNon-compliance
dc.subjectTechnology adoption
dc.subject.lcshEnvironmental policy
dc.subject.otherPolítica ambiental
dc.titleEnvironmental policy instruments: technology adoption incentives with imperfect compliance
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder© Springer Verlag
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9375-4
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion


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