Market must be defended: The role of counter-espionage policy in protecting domestic market welfare
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Market must be defended: The role of counter-espionage policy in protecting domestic market welfareFecha de publicación
2022-01-08Editor
ElsevierCita bibliográfica
Barrachina, A., & Forner-Carreras, T. (2022). Market must be defended: The role of counter-espionage policy in protecting domestic market welfare. Information Economics and Policy, 58, 100964.Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624522000014?via%3DihubVersión
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Resumen
Governments of advanced economies are extremely concerned about the illicit acquisition of information on critical technologies employed by their industries, and countering this economic espionage is
quickly becoming ... [+]
Governments of advanced economies are extremely concerned about the illicit acquisition of information on critical technologies employed by their industries, and countering this economic espionage is
quickly becoming one of their top priorities. The present paper advances the theoretical analysis of the
interaction between economic espionage and counter-espionage, and presents a first approximation to an
inquiry into the rationale for the influence of market competition in its dynamics. The proposed model
assumes a country with a one-market economy open to international trade whose product is supplied by
domestic firms. Moreover, successful economic espionage implying market entry of foreign firms would
harm domestic welfare. Considering counter-espionage policy as entry barrier and sufficient efficiency in
espionage and counter-espionage efforts, the analysis of the benchmark case characterized by no foreign
consumer and one foreign firm suggests that demand characteristics play an important role in the complex influence of competition in espionage. Irrespective of this, optimal counter-espionage effort is always
positive although negatively affected by competition [-]
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Information Economics and Policy 58 (2022) 100964Derechos de acceso
© 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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