An experimental analysis of the effects of imperfect compliance on technology adoption
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INVESTIGACIONMetadades
Títol
An experimental analysis of the effects of imperfect compliance on technology adoptionData de publicació
2021Editor
SpringerISSN
0924-6460; 1573-1502Cita bibliogràfica
Vidal-Meliá, L., Arguedas, C., Camacho-Cuena, E. et al. An Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Imperfect Compliance on Technology Adoption. Environ Resource Econ (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-021-00634-1Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
We present the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt cleaner
abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. We consider two emission control instruments—emission taxes and ... [+]
We present the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt cleaner
abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. We consider two emission control instruments—emission taxes and tradable permits—as well as diferent combinations of the inspection probability and fne for non-compliance, which can result in
full or weak enforcement scenarios. We review and qualify existing theoretical predictions
in several ways and fnd the main result is that allowing for weak enforcement causes tax
evasion, reductions in permit prices and lower adoption rates of cleaner abatement technologies. As a result, there are increases in aggregate emissions. Finally, treatments with
tradable permits under weak enforcement encounter insufcient trading. [-]
Publicat a
Environmental and Resource Economics (2021)Entitat finançadora
Universitat Jaume I | Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology | Generalitat Valenciana | Spanish Ministry of Economy
Codi del projecte o subvenció
UJI-B2018-77 | RTI2018-096927-B-100 | AICO/2018/036 | ECO2017-82449-P | EIN2020-112260/AEI/10.13039/501100011033
Títol del projecte o subvenció
Managing expectations: Formación de expectativas y diseño de políticas macroeconómicas | Características individuales en entornos estratégicos y formación de expectativas: experimientos y simulaciones (ICSEFE) | El impacto de la información pública en la formación de expectativas en los mercados financieros | Cátedra de Nueva Transición Verde
Drets d'accés
© The Author(s) 2021
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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