Communication in a threshold public goods game under ambiguity
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INVESTIGACIONMetadades
Títol
Communication in a threshold public goods game under ambiguityData de publicació
2020-08-30Editor
RoutledgeISSN
0003-6846; 1466-4283Cita bibliogràfica
Marini, M. M., García-Gallego, A., and Corazzini, L. (2020). Communication in a threshold public goods game under ambiguity. Applied Economics,1-22.Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00036846.2020.1776835Versió
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
This paper offers evidence on the impact of communication on the provision of public goods whose quality is uncertain, such as investment in prevention or fundraising in favour of non-governmental organizations (NGO). ... [+]
This paper offers evidence on the impact of communication on the provision of public goods whose quality is uncertain, such as investment in prevention or fundraising in favour of non-governmental organizations (NGO). We run a laboratory experiment with two treatments, where the control variable is pre-play communication via unrestricted text chat. A binary threshold public goods game with four-person groups, threshold of three contributors and provision mechanism with elements of ambiguity is at the core of the design. A private signal linked to the real value of the public good supports the contribution decision. We find that unexpected low-valued public goods can undermine future willingness to contribute, although the benefits of communication still prevail in the form of higher public good provision. We also detect unprecedented inefficiency coming from overcontribution, given that subjects tend to neglect the free-rider problem. Chat analysis reveals that players favour the minimization of ambiguity over the maximization of the group earnings, so that we finally speculate that under uncertainty satisficing is more salient than optimizing. [-]
Descripció
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics on 30 Aug 2020, available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2020.1776835
Publicat a
Applied Economics, 2020Proyecto de investigación
Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades: Grant RTI2018-096927-B-I00; Universitat Jaume I: Grant UJI-B2018-76Drets d'accés
Copyright © Taylor & Francis
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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