Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.02.004 |
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Títol
Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at workData de publicació
2019-03Editor
ElsevierCita bibliogràfica
REQUATE, Till, et al. Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2019, 95: 133-152.Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618300871Versió
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly ... [+]
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms and the firms' maximal emissions, we find that, in line with the theoretical predictions, firms over-report their maximal emissions under free allocation of permits and under-report these under costly allocation of permits. Under Montero's mechanism, by contrast, firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully. However, in terms of efficiency, the difference between Montero's mechanism and costly allocation disappears with industries including more than one firm. [-]
Proyecto de investigación
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (grant 01LA1102B)Drets d'accés
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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