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Institutional shareholding as a corporate governance mechanism that drives ceo pay
dc.contributor.author | Pucheta-Martínez, María Consuelo | |
dc.contributor.author | Chiva-Ortells, Carlos | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-06-20T07:33:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-06-20T07:33:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2340-9436 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10234/182883 | |
dc.description.abstract | We explore the effect of institutional directors on CEO pay (total, fixed and variable compensation). We delve particularly into the impact of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors, who respectively represent institutional investors who maintain and investors who do not maintain a business relationship with the firm whose board they serve on. Focusing on CEO total pay, the findings show that institutional and pressure-resistant directors on boards behave similarly, affecting CEO total pay in a nonlinear way: as the presence of institutional and pressure-resistant directors on boards increases, the monitoring hypothesis prevails, and subsequently, better corporate governance decreases CEO total pay. However, when their presence on boards exceeds a critical point, the entrenchment hypothesis holds, thereby leading to an increase in CEO total pay. Contrary to our predictions, pressure-sensitive directors do not affect CEO total pay. Regarding the CEO's compensation structure (fixed and variable), the results suggest that institutional and pressure-resistant directors increase fixed compensation and reduce variable pay, while pressure-sensitive directors affect neither fixed nor variable compensation. This evidence supports the view that institutional directors should be considered as a heterogeneous collective. | ca_CA |
dc.format.extent | 15 p. | ca_CA |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | ca_CA |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca_CA |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | ca_CA |
dc.relation.isPartOf | BRQ Business Research Quarterly, 2019 | ca_CA |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
dc.subject | institutional directors | ca_CA |
dc.subject | pressure-resistant | ca_CA |
dc.subject | pressure-sensitive | ca_CA |
dc.title | Institutional shareholding as a corporate governance mechanism that drives ceo pay | ca_CA |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | ca_CA |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.03.001 | |
dc.relation.projectID | Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness: ECO 2017-82259-R; University Jaume I: UJI-B2018-15 | ca_CA |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca_CA |
dc.relation.publisherVersion | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2340943618301373#! | ca_CA |
dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | ca_CA |
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