Punishing liars—How monitoring affects honesty and trust
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Otros documentos de la autoría: Behnk, Sascha; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora
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Título
Punishing liars—How monitoring affects honesty and trustFecha de publicación
2018Editor
Public Library of ScienceISSN
1932-6203Cita bibliográfica
Behnk S, Barreda-Tarrazona I, Garcı´aGallego A (2018) Punishing liars—How monitoring affects honesty and trust. PLoS ONE 13(10): e0205420. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pone.0205420Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0205420Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionResumen
Previous experiments have shown that the possibility to punish liars does not per se
increase honesty in principal-agent relationships. In this study, we first establish a punishment mechanism that substantially ... [+]
Previous experiments have shown that the possibility to punish liars does not per se
increase honesty in principal-agent relationships. In this study, we first establish a punishment mechanism that substantially enhances honest behavior and trust in a sender-receiver
game: the possibility to impose severe sanctions that are cost-free for enforcers. Adopting
this effective mechanism, we investigate how variations in the probability of detecting lies
affect sender and receiver. We find that high honesty levels persist under such punishment
mechanism even when the detection probability is significantly reduced. Furthermore, the
relationship between monitoring and honesty does not follow a linear trend, as a moderate
monitoring level proves to be less effective in enhancing honesty than high or very low levels. The punishment mechanism has an even more robust effect on receivers, showing similarly high levels of trust independently of the detection probability. Our analysis of subjects’
beliefs provides further insights into the mechanics behind these behavioral patterns. [-]
Publicado en
PLoS ONE 13(10)Proyecto de investigación
P1.1B2015-48 ; ECO2015-68469-RDerechos de acceso
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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- ECO_Articles [696]
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