Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems
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Otros documentos de la autoría: Behnk, Sascha; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora
Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
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INVESTIGACIONMetadatos
Título
Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systemsFecha de publicación
2018-10Editor
ElsevierCita bibliográfica
BEHNK, Sascha; BARREDA-TARRAZONA, Iván; GARCÍA-GALLEGO, Aurora. Deception and reputation–An experimental test of reporting systems. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2018.Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487017306207#!Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
We use a repeated sender-receiver game in which sender behavior is revealed to future counterparts either by (i) standardized computer reports or (ii) individual reports composed by the receivers. Compared to our ... [+]
We use a repeated sender-receiver game in which sender behavior is revealed to future counterparts either by (i) standardized computer reports or (ii) individual reports composed by the receivers. Compared to our baseline, both reporting systems significantly decrease the rate of deceptive messages chosen by senders. However, we find that computer reports reduce deception to a higher extent than individually written reports. This comparably higher impact can be explained by the senders’ anticipation of a high number of missing or deficient receiver reports that we find. We conclude that the precision of a reporting system has a higher importance for reducing deception than its personal character via individual feedback. Surprisingly, the reliability of computer reports is not correctly anticipated by receivers, who trust individually written reports more in the beginning and hence seem to back the wrong horse initially. [-]
Proyecto de investigación
Universitat Jaume I (P1.1B2015-48) ; Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (ECO2015-68469-R)Derechos de acceso
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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