Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors
comunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8648
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8649
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONMetadades
Títol
Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional DirectorsData de publicació
2018Editor
WileyISSN
1035-6908; 1835-2561Cita bibliogràfica
PUCHETA‐MARTÍNEZ, María Consuelo; GARCÍA‐MECA, Emma. Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors. Australian Accounting Review, 2018Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/auar.12262Versió
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
Our main objective is to study the effect of institutional directors on firm performance, distinguishing directors according to whether they maintain business relationships (pressure‐sensitive) or not (pressure‐resi ... [+]
Our main objective is to study the effect of institutional directors on firm performance, distinguishing directors according to whether they maintain business relationships (pressure‐sensitive) or not (pressure‐resistant). Our results show that in weak regulatory and low investor protection environments, institutional directors have a negative impact on corporate performance. Our evidence shows that this negative effect is mainly driven by the role of pressure‐resistant directors and not for those directors representing mainly banks and other financial institutions with a long‐term investment horizon. These findings have implications for numerous parties, such as institutional investors, regulators, potential new board members and other corporate governance reform proponents, who frequently examine board characteristics to assess the effectiveness of boards in value‐creation policies. [-]
Descripció
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/auar.12262. This article ... [+]
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/auar.12262. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. [-]
Publicat a
Australian Accounting Review, 2018Proyecto de investigación
Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness / ECO 2017-82259-RDrets d'accés
Copyright © John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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- COFIN_Articles [216]
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