The role of human and social board capital in driving CSR reporting
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Title
The role of human and social board capital in driving CSR reportingDate
2018Publisher
ElsevierISSN
0024-6301Bibliographic citation
Ramón-Llorens, M.C., Long Range Planning (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2018.08.001Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0024630117305241Version
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionSubject
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of the professional, technical and relational
background (human and social capital) of outside directors on promoting firm CSR disclosure.
Following the Hillman ... [+]
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of the professional, technical and relational
background (human and social capital) of outside directors on promoting firm CSR disclosure.
Following the Hillman et al. (2000) taxonomy of board members, we classify outside directors as
business experts, support specialists and community influential, and examine whether business
and technical expertise or political ties in the boardroom affect CSR disclosure.
This study confirms that not all outside directors are equally effective in improving CSR
disclosure and that only certain kinds of outside directors, those classified as support specialists,
help promote it. On the other hand, our findings also show that directors with previous experience
as politicians affect CSR disclosure negatively, probably due to their interests in safeguarding
their reputation within the company, in avoiding public scrutiny and in protecting their
political connections. In addition, our set of analysis with interaction effects reveals that powerful
CEOs have the incentive to promote CSR-related strategies and to convince business experts and
support specialist directors to enhance profitable sustainability strategies and transparency in
CSR disclosure. Nevertheless, the powerful CEO effect is not enough to compensate the negative
role of political directors on CSR reporting. Therefore, this paper supports the theories in favor of
analyzing the multiple configurations of corporate governance mechanisms by adopting a holistic
approach, and the need to combine these configurations in order to analyze their impact on CSR
behavior. [-]
Is part of
Long Range Planning. Available online 25 August 2018Investigation project
ECO 2017-82259-RRights
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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