Monetary incentives and self-chosen goals in academic performance: An experimental study
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INVESTIGACIONMetadata
Title
Monetary incentives and self-chosen goals in academic performance: An experimental studyDate
2018-01Publisher
ElsevierBibliographic citation
HERRANZ-ZARZOSO, Noemí; SABATER-GRANDE, Gerardo. Monetary incentives and self-chosen goals in academic performance: An experimental study. International Review of Economics Education, Volume 27, January 2018, pp. 34-44..Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1477388017300816#!Version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionSubject
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of incentive-compatible self-chosen goals on academic performance by means of a randomized field experiment. We use two alternative payment mechanisms, a piece-rate and a rank-order ... [+]
This paper analyzes the effect of incentive-compatible self-chosen goals on academic performance by means of a randomized field experiment. We use two alternative payment mechanisms, a piece-rate and a rank-order tournament, to motivate students depending on their absolute or relative academic performance respectively. Students enrolled in Introductory Microeconomics were classified in two types depending on whether they had a failed background in this course (returning students) or they had not (new students). Controlling for potential confounding factors such as gender, degree, professor and university entrance grade, we find that both payment mechanisms are effective increasing grades of new and returning students. [-]
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© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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