Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems
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https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-017-0212-5 |
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Title
Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problemsDate
2017-12Publisher
Springer-VerlagBibliographic citation
García-Segarra, J. & Ginés-Vilar, M. J Econ Interact Coord (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-017-0212-5Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11403-017-0212-5Version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionSubject
Abstract
Some bargaining solutions may remain unchanged under any extension of a bargaining set which does not affect the utopia point, despite the fact that there is room to improve the utility of at least one agent. We call ... [+]
Some bargaining solutions may remain unchanged under any extension of a bargaining set which does not affect the utopia point, despite the fact that there is room to improve the utility of at least one agent. We call this phenomenon the stagnation effect. A bargaining solution satisfies stagnation proofness if it does not suffer from the stagnation effect. We show that stagnation proofness is compatible with the restricted version of strong monotonicity (Thomson and Myerson in Int J Game Theory 9(1):37–49, 1980), weak Pareto optimality, and scale invariance. The four axioms together characterize the family of the bargaining solutions generated by strictly-increasing paths ending at the utopia point (SIPUP-solutions). [-]
Investigation project
Ministerio de Educación (ECO2015-68469-R) ; Fundación Bancaja (PREDOC/2007/28) ; E-2011-27 Pla de Promoció de la Investigació de la UJI, P1-1B/2015/48Rights
© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG. Part of Springer Nature.
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