Selection of the distributional rule as an alternative tool to foster cooperation in a Public Good Game
View/ Open
Metadata
Show full item recordcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONMetadata
Title
Selection of the distributional rule as an alternative tool to foster cooperation in a Public Good GameAuthor (s)
Date
2017Publisher
ElsevierISSN
0378-4371Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437116307804Version
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionSubject
Abstract
This paper presents an investigation about cooperation in a Public Good Game using an Agent Based Model calibrated on experimental data. Starting from the experiment proposed in Colasante and Russo (2016), we analyze ... [+]
This paper presents an investigation about cooperation in a Public Good Game using an Agent Based Model calibrated on experimental data. Starting from the experiment proposed in Colasante and Russo (2016), we analyze the dynamic of cooperation in a Public Good Game where agents receive an heterogeneous income and choose both the level of contribution and the distribution rule. The starting point is the calibration and the output validation of the model using the experimental results. Once tested the goodness of fit of the Agent Based Model, we run some policy experiment in order to verify how each distribution rule, i.e. equidistribution, proportional to contribution and progressive, affects the level of contribution in the simulated model. We find out that the share of cooperators decreases over time if we exogenously set the equidistribution rule. On the contrary, the share of cooperators converges to 100% if we impose the progressive rule. Finally, the most interesting result refers to the effect of the progressive rule. We observe that, in the case of high inequality, this rule is not able to reduce the heterogeneity of income. [-]
Is part of
Physica A 468 (2017) 482–492Rights
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
This item appears in the folowing collection(s)
- ECO_Articles [692]