Inter-gender interaction and communication in ultimatum games
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Show full item recordcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
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INVESTIGACIONMetadata
Title
Inter-gender interaction and communication in ultimatum gamesDate
2016-09-23Publisher
Taylor & FrancisBibliographic citation
GEORGANTZIS, Nikolaos; PARASYRI, Despoina; TSAGARAKIS, K. P. Inter-gender interaction and communication in ultimatum games. Applied economics letters (2016), online, pp. 1-5Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504851.2016.1237725Version
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionSubject
Abstract
In this paper, we focus on bargaining within male–female pairs, the most pervasive partnership in humankind. We analyze data from an ultimatum game played by Greek subjects. Parallel to this, we introduce a one-way ... [+]
In this paper, we focus on bargaining within male–female pairs, the most pervasive partnership in humankind. We analyze data from an ultimatum game played by Greek subjects. Parallel to this, we introduce a one-way communication protocol according to which the responders can send short messages to the receivers, after making their decisions. The analysis shows that gender and message effects exist and that males are more effective bargainers. [-]
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Applied economics letters (2016), onlineRights
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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- ECO_Articles [696]