An experimental study on the effect of co-payment in public services
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Títol
An experimental study on the effect of co-payment in public servicesData de publicació
2016-08-08Editor
ElsevierISSN
2214-8043Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804316300842Versió
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
This paper aims to shed light on the impacts of imposing co-payment on public services, a strategy increasingly employed in the realm of publicly provided healthcare. We analyze the effect of imposing a charge for the ... [+]
This paper aims to shed light on the impacts of imposing co-payment on public services, a strategy increasingly employed in the realm of publicly provided healthcare. We analyze the effect of imposing a charge for the individual appropriation of common resources. In our design, withdrawing the maximum amount is the dominant strategy for every player, but the resulting equilibrium is socially inefficient. We find that the presence of a price that is small enough to leave intact the conflict between individual incentives and collective welfare is not effective in reducing appropriation among agents who have previously been acting without it. In fact, the upward trend in the average extraction of common funds continues after the introduction of a price. In an alternative treatment in which we impose copayment from the outset of the experiment, withdrawals are lower than in the free-access baseline. Our results provide insights on the conditions for the effectiveness of co-payment in curbing the over-consumption of public resources. [-]
Publicat a
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2016Drets d'accés
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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