

Exploring the life of fuel price responses in retail markets. The effect of cross-sectional aggregation

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Abstract

Empirical studies on vertical price transmission in retail fuel markets commonly use average group data of petrol stations. In this paper a simulation approach is employed to illustrate that, in this case, the persistence of price responses tends to be overestimated. To explore the real extent of the problem, we apply the mean group (MG) and the mean group with common correlated effects (MG-CCE) estimators to individual data from petrol stations. When heterogeneity in the pricing dynamics is captured by MG and MG-CCE estimators, persistence of retail price responses becomes considerably lower than the typical OLS estimations from average group data would suggest.

Keywords: Fuel price responses; Cross-sectional aggregation; Dynamic persistence; Overestimation.

JEL classification: C51; C23; L71; Q41.

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1 Introduction

Since the seminal paper by Bacon (1991) there has been an increasing interest in knowing the speed of fuel price responses to input price shocks (e.g. Borenstein et al., 1997; Polemis, 2012; Contín-Pilart et al., 2009; Remer, 2015; Asane-Otoo and Schneider, 2015). Much of the effort in this field has been devoted to testing possible asymmetries in the speed of response to upward and downward shocks,¹ while little attention has been paid to knowing to what extent the degree of aggregation underlying the data commonly used could affect these estimates. However, it is well known that aggregation over time or over individuals in dynamic models, like those used in this research area, could imply substantial bias.

A reduction of information from temporal aggregation could preclude model specification from properly capturing the intertemporal lag distribution of the real phenomena (Geweke, 1978). This is a type of omitted variables problem that has been revealed to be clearly significant in the estimation of the fuel price adjustment towards long-run equilibrium through Error Correction Models (ECMs). For instance, in the early paper by Bachmeier and Griffin (2003),² the coefficient of the adjustment from weekly data is about five times higher than that obtained from daily data. Thus, the use of daily frequencies is recommended insofar as they are available to researchers (Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003). On the other hand, several theoretical papers have demonstrated that cross-sectional aggregation to build average group data could cause a reduction in the estimated speed of responses and, therefore, an overestimation of the dynamics of the aggregate phenomena studied. This sort of bias, which is critically dependent on the behavioural heterogeneity of the individuals involved in the analysis (e.g. Pesaran, 2003; Stoker, 1993), is revealed to be especially significant under application of ECMs (Lippi, 1988). Given

¹For a complete meta-analysis at this regard see, for example, Perdiguero-García (2013).

²The aim of this paper is to re-examine, by using an ECM, the previous results from Borenstein et al. (1997) based on weekly data.

1 that the behaviour of petrol stations could be quite heterogeneous (Haucap et al.,
2 2017), undermining the consequences of cross-sectional aggregation by appealing
3 to the representative-agent paradigm could be, in this case, an unsuitable strategy
4 which deserves special attention as highlighted by Faber (2015).³
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11 The present paper aims to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the extent to
12 which estimates from average group data of petrol stations could be overstating the
13 life of retail fuel price responses. From a literature search we can see that, in spite
14 of the potential bias commented above, most of the evidence on fuel price responses
15 is based on data at weekly or lower frequencies which, in turn, are aggregated to
16 build data averaged by country. With the purpose of trying to isolate the possible
17 impact of cross-sectional aggregation on the previous analyses, we will focus on those
18 works that include estimates of the adjustment towards long-run equilibrium based
19 on daily data.⁴ These papers offer us results from different degrees of cross-sectional
20 aggregation, which can be usefully exploited for a preliminary exploration of the
21 importance of the problem.⁵
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37 First, we can consider two papers that employ data at country level. With the
38 aim of illustrating the length of the dynamics in each case, let us now to use a syn-
39 thetic measure. Concretely, we are going to pay attention to the average number of
40 days needed to adjust 95% of the retail price deviations from the long-run equilib-
41 rium after an input price shock from the wholesale-refined fuel market.⁶ Thus, in
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47 ³In this paper it is indicated that the pooled estimation, where parameters are restricted to
48 be equal across individuals, is not suitable to analyze the market as a whole. Then, the author
49 advocates the use of a separate analysis for each individual station.

50 ⁴To our knowledge, this is the maximum degree of data disaggregation available in this research
51 area. Probably because of the difficulty in obtaining daily information on retail fuel prices, few
52 papers with this temporal disaggregation have been published to date.

53 ⁵Some papers that employ daily data, but do not involve data aggregation across petrol stations,
54 are not included. This is, for example, the case studied by Bachmeier and Griffin (2003), where
55 shocks from crude oil prices to wholesale petrol prices are analysed and, therefore, the behavioural
56 heterogeneity of sellers operating in the retail market is not a relevant issue.

57 ⁶This can easily be derived from the estimated coefficients of speed of adjustment towards
58 the long-run equilibrium provided in each of the papers. The period necessary to adjust 95% of
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1 the work by Al-Gudhea et al. (2007), which provides estimates for USA, around 464
2 days are required to fill this percentage of the gap after a shock. The results from
3 Balaguer and Ripollés (2012) concerning Spain would imply that, following a shock
4 in international fuel markets, about 251 days are needed to close this percentage of
5 the gap. Considering the surprising number of days required in both cases, we might
6 suspect that aggregation across petrol stations could be causing a relevant overes-
7 timation of the life of price responses, at least, when it is performed at country level.
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18 Second, we can take into account the paper by Bettendorf et al. (2009). In this
19 case, retail prices are aggregated for the Shell brand in the Dutch petrol market.
20 Authors indicated that competing oil companies in the Netherlands could easily
21 monitor and follow the pricing policy of this company with the largest market share
22 (30%), although it is recognized that differences in pricing strategies may exist be-
23 tween the firms operating in that market. From the results of the estimations of this
24 leader company, we obtain that the period needed to adjust 95% of the retail price
25 deviations from the equilibrium is only 27 days. Hence, evidence may suggest that
26 data disaggregation by brand (which presumably involves relatively homogeneous
27 sellers) could be contributing significantly to reduce overestimation in the life of
28 price responses.
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43 Third, the recent papers by Remer (2015) and Balaguer and Ripollés (2016)
44 are based on data from individual petrol stations with the usual purpose of test-
45 ing asymmetries in the response of prices. In the first of the two cases, the retail
46 price observations belong to petrol stations from several states in USA (New Jersey,
47 Maryland, Virginia, Philadelphia and Washington). From the estimates, we find
48 that adjustments would need about 43 days until 95% of the gap was closed. From
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56 the deviations is obtained from the natural logarithm of 0.05 divided by the value of the speed
57 adjustment coefficient. When the adjustment is split in order to distinguish the effect of upward
58 and downward shocks, for the sake of simplicity, we will consider the average coefficient.
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1 the second of the papers we can observe the period required to close this percentage
2 of the gap for the two greater metropolitan areas in Spain. Specifically, we are refer-
3 ring to Madrid and Barcelona, for which 25 and 27 days were required, respectively.
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5 It is clear that the lengths of price responses in the last three papers contrasted with
6 those where data are aggregated at country level, which suggests the importance of
7 the problem when different operating brands with singular pricing strategies are
8 disregarded. At this point, we further ask ourselves whether aggregation at brand
9 level could be considered a reasonable empirical strategy to prevent an important
10 part of the overestimation of the length of the dynamics.
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22 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start by describing
23 the baseline model. Following, we will discuss a set of results obtained by simu-
24 lations to draw attention to the problem statement. In Section 3, we present an
25 application on Spanish diesel prices that have been collected daily to prevent, as
26 much as possible, temporal aggregation bias. Then, we will compare the empirical
27 results from heterogeneous panel estimates with those derived from the common
28 OLS estimates based on cross-sectionally aggregated data. First, we will perform
29 this comparison using the entire sample. Thus, we try to examine to what extent
30 aggregation across a large diversity of brands, which probably hides a high degree
31 of behavioural heterogeneity, affects the accuracy of the estimation results. Second,
32 we further focus on a sub-sample of the leader's petrol stations. The purpose will
33 be to know whether the extent of the problem would persists through this empirical
34 strategy. In Section 4, we test the robustness of the results. Finally, in Section 5,
35 we present our concluding remarks.
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2 The analytical framework

2.1 Model specification

It is well known that, in the case of cointegration between non-stationary time series, implementation of an ECM specification can be a particularly useful strategy to describe dynamics between variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). This empirical strategy is mostly being adopted by studies on vertical price transmission in fuel markets. Here, we adopt this approach by introducing the possible heterogeneity of the behaviour of each of the firms ($i = 1, 2, \dots, N$):

$$\Delta p_{it} = \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{im} \Delta p_{it-m} + \sum_{j=0}^J \delta_{ij} \Delta w p_{t-j} + \theta_i (p_{it-1} - \alpha_i - \phi_i w p_{t-1}) + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where Δ is the first-differences operator, p_{it} is the retail price of the i -th firm at time t ($t = 1, 2, \dots, T$), and $w p_t$ is the corresponding wholesale fuel price at time t , which is common for all operating firms. The speed of adjustment towards the level of equilibrium is captured by θ_i , characterizing the long-run dynamics of the model. Lastly, ϵ_{it} is a random disturbance term, which is assumed to be *iid*.

Second, we also consider a restricted version of Eq. (1) as follows:

$$\Delta \bar{p}_{.t} = \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_m \Delta \bar{p}_{.t-m} + \sum_{j=0}^J \delta_j \Delta w p_{t-j} + \theta (\bar{p}_{.t-1} - \alpha - \phi w p_{t-1}) + \epsilon_t \quad (2)$$

where $\bar{p}_{.t} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N p_{it}$, and the subscript i in coefficients and the random disturbance term is disregarded. Then, the specification from Eq. (2) implies some degree of cross-sectional aggregation as is usual in this research area.

2.2 Simulation

With the aim of illustrating the problem statement, let us obtain artificial series of retail fuel prices based on Eq. (1). For this purpose we consider, as the wholesale price series (wp_t), spot prices of refined diesel fuel. Specifically, we consider the wholesale spot prices at Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (Euros/litre), which represent the principal and direct raw material cost in the European retail markets for diesel. These prices are provided by Platts of the McGraw-Hill Company and correspond to a sample period that ranges from 10 June 2010 to 25 November 2012.⁷ A preliminary analysis of time series indicates that it follows an I(1) process. Namely, in accordance with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) proposed in Dickey and Fuller (1979), wholesale price series are non-stationary in levels (ADF = -1.59) but their first differences can be considered stationary (ADF = -20.32).

Cointegration between retail price and wholesale price series would require the coefficient of the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium in Eq. (1) to be negative ($\theta_i < 0$). In order to facilitate our simulation process, let us assume that the coefficient (θ_i) is uniformly distributed on a plausible bounded interval $[-1, 0]$. Therefore, we allow for heterogeneity in the speed at which firms adjust towards long-run equilibrium. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, the remaining coefficients in Eq. (1) are fixed (in accordance with the values shown in the caption of Table 1). Finally, we assume that ϵ_{it} is a random disturbance term, which is distributed normally with mean zero and constant variance (of 0.05).

[Please insert Table 1 about here]

Taking into account our wholesale fuel prices (wp_{it}) and the above assumptions, in accordance with Eq. (1) let us first obtain 1,000 simulated panels of retail prices (p_{it}) corresponding to each of the uniformly distributed coefficients that have been

⁷Missing values resulting from closure of the spot markets at weekends and in holidays have been filled in with prices from the day before.

1 generated (θ_i). Each of the simulated panels are thus composed of $N = 300$ and
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 3 $T = 900$. Subsequently, in each panel, we can aggregate retail prices across the N
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 5 firms to estimate the speed of adjustment regardless of the behavioural heterogene-
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 7 ity, in accordance with the restricted ECM from Eq. (2). In Table 1 we show the
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 9 estimated speed of adjustment (averaged for the 1,000 simulated panels) and the
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 11 corresponding period required to close 95% of the gap. The estimated coefficient
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 13 is, in absolute terms, lower than the mean of the uniformly distributed coefficients
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 15 (θ_i) in the interval $[-1, 0]$. Consequently, when aggregate retail prices are employed,
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 17 the period required to close this gap overestimates the mean period for individuals.
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 19 Specifically, the expected life of price responses in terms of 95% of the gap is over-
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 21 estimated by about 2 days.
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26 We have considered it interesting to replicate the above simulation, but now
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 28 allowing for a lower range of heterogeneity behaviour of individuals regarding the
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 30 coefficient of speed (θ_i). With this purpose we define the speed of adjustment as
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 32 uniformly distributed in a shorter range $[-0.8, -0.2]$, which involves the same mean
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 34 speed coefficient as before. As we can see in Table 1, the estimated coefficient of
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 36 speed from aggregate data is, once again, lower in absolute terms and the life of price
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 38 adjustment is consequently oversized. However, note that the difference between the
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 40 mean of the true individual coefficients and the estimated coefficient is lower than
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 42 when more heterogeneity is allowed. Thus, the expected life of price responses is
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 44 also overestimated but to a lesser extent than before.
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52 **3 An econometric exploration**

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 55 Now we present an application based on real prices fixed by petrol stations. We
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 57 first estimate the dynamic heterogeneous panel represented by Eq. (1) by adopting
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 59 the econometric approach proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), which is widely
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1 known as the mean group (MG) estimator. When large time panels are available,
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3 the MG estimator has proved to be a suitable procedure to prevent inconsistent
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5 and highly misleading estimates of the coefficients from aggregate data if behaviour
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7 differs across individuals. In this case individual micro-relations should be esti-
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9 mated separately by OLS and, then, the mean of the estimated coefficients and
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11 their standard errors calculated explicitly. In this section we will further apply the
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13 MG common correlated effects (MG-CCE) procedure proposed by Pesaran (2006).
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15 It is an extension of the MG procedure that provides consistent estimates under
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17 serial correlation in errors and various forms of cross-sectional dependence among
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19 individuals (Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011). We must take into account that this exten-
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21 sion may be especially useful in our case where the pricing behaviour of each i-firm
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23 can be driven by unobserved factors that are common to their neighbouring firms,
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25 such as greater (less) demand derived from the higher (lower) level of traffic in some
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27 locations. In practice, the correlated effects will be captured by the lagged cross-
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29 sectional average of the prices fixed by all competitors operating at each moment of
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31 time within a certain radius.⁸ Finally, estimates of Eq. (1) by MG and MG-CCE
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33 will be subsequently compared with those obtained by OLS from aggregated data.
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35 In this last case, we will consider the restricted ECM from Eq. (2).
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41 Our retail prices are now diesel prices (Euros/litre) collected daily at mid-
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43 night from the website of the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism
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45 (<http://geoportal.mityc.es/>) throughout the period from 10 June 2010 to 25 Novem-
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47 ber 2012.⁹ The sample includes prices from 590 petrol stations involving a large
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49 number of operating brands as well as a relevant group of independent sellers in
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51 Spain.¹⁰ It is obvious that it presumably contains petrol stations with notably

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54 ⁸A similar application, in which the average behaviour of neighbouring individuals is taken into
55 account, can be seen in Eberhardt and Teal (2013).

56 ⁹Petrol stations that, for reasons such as closure due to repair work or holidays, did not provide
57 prices for any part of the period have not been considered.

58 ¹⁰We consider the stations operating throughout the entire period located in the metropoli-
59 tan areas of Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia. Concretely, our sample covers the following cities:
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1 different pricing strategies. Therefore, to explore the possible reduction in the over-
2 estimation of the length of the dynamics from aggregation at brand level, we have
3 also carried out fieldwork to identify those petrol stations belonging to the leading
4 brand in the sector (Repsol). We then alternatively use the sub-sample resulting
5 from considering the prices fixed by the 226 petrol stations that operate under this
6 brand. In short, we employ a full sample and a sub-sample of retail prices consisting
7 in two panels of 531,000 and 203,400 retail price observations, respectively. All these
8 prices are expressed net of taxes following the information by the Spanish Ministry
9 of Economy's Tax Office. To implement the MG-CCE procedure we will need the
10 precise geographical location of the petrol stations. To this end, we extracted the
11 coordinates (longitude and latitude) from the website of the Spanish Ministry of
12 Industry, Energy and Tourism.
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29 Before applying the ECM represented by Eq. (1), we analysed the time series
30 properties to ensure that there is cointegration between the retail and the whole-
31 sale price series. First, the analysis of time series indicates that they follow an I(1)
32 process. Specifically, the Breitung and Das (2005) panel unit root test, which is
33 robust to the presence of cross-sectional dependence,¹¹ was employed on the set of
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39 Alacuás, Albal, Albalat dels Sorells, Alboraya, Albuixech, Alcácer, Alcalá de Henares, Alcobendas,
40 Alcorcón, Aldaya, Alfafar, Alfara del Patriarca, Almacera, Badalona, Badia del Vallès, Barberà
41 del Vallès, Barcelona, Begues, Benetúser, Beniparrell, Boadilla del Monte, Bonrepós y Mirambell,
42 Brunete, Burjasot, Castellbisbal, Castelldefels, Catarroja, Cerdanyola del Vallès, Cervelló, Chiriv-
43 ella, Colmenar Viejo, Corbera de Llobregat, Cornellà de Llobregat, Coslada, Cuart de Poblet, El
44 Papiol, El Prat de Llobregat, El Puig, Emperador, Esplugues de Llobregat, Foyos, Fuenlabrada,
45 Gavà, Getafe, Godella, Humanes de Madrid, L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, La Palma de Cervelló, Las
46 Rozas, Leganés, Lugar Nuevo de la Corona, Madrid, Majadahonda, Manises, Masalfasar, Masam-
47 agrell, Masanasa, Mejorada del Campo, Meliana, Mislata, Molins de Rei, Moncada, Montcada
48 i Reixac, Montgat, Móstoles, Museros, Paiporta, Pallejà, Paracuellos de Jarama, Parla, Paterna,
49 Picaña, Picasent, Pinto, Pozuelo de Alarcón, Puebla de Farnals, Puzol, Rafelbuñol, Ripollet, Rivas-
50 Vaciamadrid, Rocafort, San Antonio de Benagéber, San Fernando de Henares, San Sebastián de los
51 Reyes, Sant Adrià de Besòs, Sant Andreu de la Barca, Sant Boi de Llobregat, Sant Climent de Llo-
52 bregat, Sant Cugat del Vallès, Sant Feliu de Llobregat, Sant Joan Despí, Sant Just Desvern, Sant
53 Vicenç dels Horts, Santa Coloma de Cervelló, Santa Coloma de Gramenet, Sedaví, Silla, Tabernes
54 Blanques, Tiana, Torrejón de Ardoz, Torrelles de Llobregat, Torrente, Tres Cantos, Valencia,
55 Velilla de San Antonio, Viladecans, Villanueva de la Cañada, Villanueva del Pardillo, Villaviciosa
56 de Odón, and Vinalosa.
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58 ¹¹In accordance with the LM-statistic of Breusch and Pagan (1980), we can reject cross-sectional
59 independence among the retail prices (with p-values virtually equal to zero).
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1 individual retail prices, while the ADF unit root test was applied to cross-sectionally
 2 aggregated retail prices. Results are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix A. Ad-
 3 ditionally, prices of the corresponding raw material are the wholesale spot prices of
 4 refined diesel, whose stationary analysis has been performed in the previous subsec-
 5 tion. Second, we chose the bootstrap approach of Westerlund and Edgerton (2007)
 6 to test for cointegration between individual retail prices and wholesale prices, as it
 7 allows for heterogeneity and is robust to very general forms of cross-sectional in-
 8 terdependence. While two of the statistics proposed are group-mean tests (G_τ and
 9 G_α), under the alternative hypothesis that at least one cross-sectional unit is coin-
 10 tegrated, the other two statistics are panel tests (P_τ and P_α), with the alternative
 11 hypothesis that the whole panel is cointegrated. We obtain that the set of individ-
 12 ual retail price series and wholesale price series are cointegrated. Finally, the ADF
 13 test also indicates cointegration between aggregate retail prices and wholesale prices.
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31 We can now estimate Eq. (1) for both the full and the sub-sample. To know
 32 whether behavioural heterogeneity should be considered in our estimation process,
 33 we employ a Hausman-type statistical test. As we can see in Table 2, in all cases we
 34 overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis of behavioural homogeneity across the N
 35 individuals. Thus, we can think that MG and MG-CCE should provide more accu-
 36 rate estimates, whereas the OLS to aggregate data across firms, where the assump-
 37 tion of a representative agent is implicitly imposed, should be taken with caution.
 38 At this point we would ask ourselves whether the results from the heterogeneous-
 39 type panel estimator are substantially different from those obtained from aggregate
 40 data. In Table 2 we also present the results to answer this question and, based on
 41 the speed coefficients (θ), in Figure 1 we provide a general comparison among the
 42 estimated adjustments resulting from the MG and MG-CCE procedures in Eq. (1),
 43 and OLS in Eq. (2).
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1 [Please insert Table 2 about here]

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6 Although all the estimated coefficients of the speed are significantly negative (in-
7 dicating that retail fuel prices return towards their equilibrium after price shocks),
8 the size of the estimated coefficients from MG and MG-CCE clearly differ from those
9 obtained from OLS based on aggregate data. For the full sample, the magnitude of
10 the estimated speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium is consistently much
11 higher in the first two cases. The magnitudes of the estimated speed of adjustment
12 to equilibrium by taking into account the MG and MG-CCE procedures are about
13 two times higher than those based on OLS for aggregated prices. The importance
14 of the difference can be illustrated in the Figure 1(a) in terms of the life of retail
15 price responses. For example, as can be seen, retail prices require 27 and 25 days
16 to adjust the 95% of the gap according to the MG and MG-CCE estimates based
17 on disaggregated data, while it becomes 58 days when heterogeneity is neglected in
18 the OLS estimates based on aggregate data.
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35 To explore to what extent there is a reduction in the overestimation of the length
36 of the dynamics from aggregation only at brand level, we can focus our attention
37 on the sub-sample of stations belonging to Repsol. In this case, the magnitudes of
38 the estimated speed of adjustment from the MG and MG-CCE procedures is only
39 about 23% higher than that based on OLS for aggregated prices. As we can see
40 in the Figure 1(b), the number of days required to adjust 95% of the gap after a
41 wholesale-refined fuel price shock are 30 and 29 from the MG and MG-CCE proce-
42 dures, respectively. These results obtained taking into account heterogeneity barely
43 diverge from those based on aggregate retail prices at brand level, which are about
44 37 days. This would be consistent with the fact that behaviour is more homogeneous
45 among petrol stations within a brand than if all the brands and independent stations
46 are included the analysis. It therefore seems that the overestimation of the length
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1 of the dynamics would be substantially reduced when aggregation is performed at
2 brand level.
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10 4 Robustness check

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12 To test the robustness of our empirical results,¹² we alternatively consider crude
13 oil prices as the origin of shocks, in line with many other works in the literature
14 (e.g. Borenstein et al., 1997; Grasso and Manera, 2007). Specifically, we employ the
15 wholesale prices for Europe Brent crude oil (Euros/litre), which were obtained from
16 the US Energy Information Administration. A preliminary analysis indicates that
17 the crude oil price series follow an I(1) process. That is, according to the ADF test,
18 the series of crude oil price are non-stationary in levels (ADF=-1.83), but station-
19 ary in first differences (ADF=-22.31). Moreover, as can be seen in Table A1 of the
20 Appendix A, the results of the Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) tests suggest that
21 there is cointegration between the set of individual retail prices and the crude oil
22 price series, while the outcome of the ADF test also indicates cointegration between
23 aggregate retail price and crude oil price series.
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41 The main results can be seen in Table 3. Moreover, in Figure 2 we also provide
42 a graphical representation based on the estimated coefficients of the speed of ad-
43 justment (θ). As expected, estimates now indicate the need for more days to reach
44 95% of the transmission in relation to previous results concerning shocks from the
45 wholesale refined fuel market. The comparison between MG or MG-CCE estimates
46 and those obtained with OLS show us the robustness of the outcome from consid-
47 ering the crude oil prices alternatively. Thus, for example, the magnitude of the
48 estimated speed of adjustment to equilibrium by taking into account the MG-CCE
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57 ¹²Our empirical results are also robust to the decomposition of estimated coefficients in accor-
58 dance with upward and downward input price shocks. Results from decomposition are available
59 from the authors upon request.
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1 procedure is about two and a half times (one and a half times) higher than that
2 based on aggregated prices for the full sample (sub-sample for Repsol). Hence, the
3 expected number of days required to close the percentage of the gap with equilibrium
4 is almost three times (one and a half times) lower than that based on aggregated
5 prices for the full sample (sub-sample for Repsol).
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11 [Please insert Table 3 about here]
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13 [Please insert Figure 2 about here]
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18 5 Concluding remarks

19 The literature on vertical price transmission in fuel markets typically uses ECM
20 specifications to measure the speed at which the retail prices adjust towards the
21 long-run equilibrium. These papers are generally based upon aggregate data across
22 petrol stations, which might lead to bias in the estimation of the speed. We first ad-
23 dress the problem statement by discussing a set of simulated results from wholesale
24 refined fuel prices. Our simulation illustrated that application of OLS by using ag-
25 gregate data and, therefore, excluding potential behaviour heterogeneity may cause
26 an overestimation of the life of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. It
27 has been further illustrated how the problem is reduced if behaviour among firms
28 involved in the analysis is more similar.
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46 To explore whether the period of price responses might be frequently overesti-
47 mated, we exploit a dataset of real retail prices for diesel. These prices refer to
48 a sample of petrol stations operating in Spain. They have been collected daily to
49 prevent, as much as possible, temporal aggregation bias. In this way we have tried
50 to isolate the possible impact on the estimated speed derived from aggregation over
51 a large number of brands and independent stations included in the sample. Indeed,
52 application of a Hausman-type statistical test has suggested that the behaviour of
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1 the operating sellers is significantly heterogeneous. To account for this, we have
2 applied the MG and MG-CCE procedures on individual data following Pesaran and
3 Smith (1995) and Pesaran (2006). Empirical evidence from both heterogeneous
4 panel procedures consistently suggests that the speed at which real prices return to
5 the long-run equilibrium after a shock is substantially greater than that estimated
6 by the OLS from aggregate data. That is, the life of the retail price responses seems
7 to be notably oversized when the presence of heterogeneity is not taken into account
8 by the dynamic model. Aggregation when analysis is performed for a sub-sample
9 of petrol stations belonging to an specific company (i.e. Repsol) seems rather less
10 problematic.
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24 Thus, our findings can be seen as complementary to the recommendation put
25 forward earlier by Bachmeier and Griffin (2003). That is, besides the use of high
26 frequencies in this study area, we further advice on the importance of using disag-
27 gregated data for petrol stations as far they are available. Evidence from empirical
28 researches adopting the approach advised here could be useful to better know when
29 price changes in international fuel markets would be transmitted to local markets.
30 It could be particularly interesting to improve the cost-saving strategies of retailers
31 in the fuel sector. Thus, by monitoring the prices of crude oil or refined fuel in
32 international markets, they can take advantage of a substantial temporary drop in
33 the wholesale prices by purchasing from distributors in the precise moment in which
34 the drop is fully transmitted. Moreover, it is well known that fuel is a very impor-
35 tant consumer product in industrialized countries and, therefore, the evolution of its
36 retail prices plays an essential role in the control of inflation. Hence, for monetary
37 authorities it can be of great interest to have accurate information about when a
38 substantial oil price shock will be transmitted to the local market. In fact, monetary
39 measures introduced to moderate consumer price responses would probably be im-
40 plemented too late if they are based on the estimates from aggregate data. Finally,
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1 knowing more accurately the life of price responses could be also helpful in order
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3 to design adaptive fiscal policies, consisting in timely modifications of fuel taxes,
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5 oriented at reducing the retail price volatility of fuel products.
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Appendix A

[Please insert Table A1 about here]

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Table 1: Results from simulation

| | $\theta_i \sim [-1, 0]$ | $\theta_i \sim [-0.8, -0.2]$ |
|--|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Mean of uniformly distributed coefficients | -0.500 | -0.500 |
| Days to close 95% of the gap | 5.99 | 5.99 |
| OLS estimator on aggregate retail prices | | |
| Number of lags (M) | 1 | 1 |
| Number of lags (J) | 0 | 0 |
| $\frac{\sum_{r=1}^R \theta_{OLS_r}}{R}$ | -0.390*** (0.007) | -0.476*** (0.005) |
| Days to close 95% of the gap | 7.67 | 6.29 |

We assume that $\beta_{im} = 0$ for $m \geq 1$, $\delta_{ij} = 0.5$ if $j = 0$ and 0 otherwise, $\alpha_i = 0$, and $\phi_i = 1$. θ_{OLS_r} is the estimated coefficient from the panel r . The total number of simulated panels is $R = 1,000$. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.

Source: Own elaboration.

Table 2: Results based on real response of retail fuel prices (to refined fuel prices)

| | Full sample (all brands) | Sub-sample (Repsol) |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| MG estimator on individual retail prices, Eq. (1) | | |
| Number of lags (M) | 7 | 7 |
| Number of lags (J) | 8 | 8 |
| θ_{MG} | -0.113*** (0.001) | -0.100*** (0.002) |
| Days to close 95% of the gap | 26.51 | 29.96 |
| Obs. ($N \times T$) | 531,000 | 203,400 |
| Individuals (N) | 590 | 226 |
| Hausman test | 36,454.00 [0.000] | 1,230.58 [0.000] |
| MG-CCE estimator on individual retail prices, Eq. (1) | | |
| Number of lags (M) | 7 | 7 |
| Number of lags (J) | 8 | 8 |
| θ_{MG-CCE} | -0.122*** (0.005) | -0.102*** (0.005) |
| Days to close 95% of the gap | 24.56 | 29.37 |
| Obs. ($N \times T$) | 531,000 | 203,400 |
| Individuals (N) | 590 | 226 |
| Hausman test | 92,408.94 [0.000] | 5,177.49 [0.000] |
| OLS estimator on aggregate retail prices, Eq. (2) | | |
| Number of lags (M) | 7 | 7 |
| Number of lags (J) | 8 | 8 |
| θ_{OLS} | -0.052*** (0.012) | -0.082*** (0.019) |
| Days to close 95% of the gap | 57.61 | 36.53 |
| Obs. (T) | 900 | 900 |

Akaike Information Criteria were employed in order to select the optimal lag length. In addition to the variables listed in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), all regressions include in the long-term relationship a time trend and a set of daily dummies that control for the possible effects of seasonal changes in demand for each day of the week. The MG-CCE incorporates, as an explanatory variable, the lagged cross-sectional average of the retail prices fixed by all the competitors operating at each moment of time within a 200-metre radius. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are presented in brackets. We use *** to indicate significance at the 1% level.

Source: Own elaboration.

Table 3: Results based on real response of retail fuel prices (to crude oil prices)

| | Full sample (all brands) | Sub-sample (Repsol) |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| MG estimator on individual retail prices, Eq. (1) | | |
| Number of lags (M) | 8 | 7 |
| Number of lags (J) | 8 | 7 |
| θ_{MG} | -0.068*** (0.001) | -0.067*** (0.001) |
| Days to close 95% of the gap | 44.05 | 44.71 |
| Obs. ($N \times T$) | 531,000 | 203,400 |
| Individuals (N) | 590 | 226 |
| Hausman test | 11,321.51 [0.000] | 882.71 [0.000] |
| MG-CCE estimator on individual retail prices, Eq. (1) | | |
| Number of lags (M) | 8 | 7 |
| Number of lags (J) | 8 | 7 |
| θ_{MG-CCE} | -0.080*** (0.005) | -0.068*** (0.005) |
| Days to close 95% of the gap | 37,45 | 44.05 |
| Obs. ($N \times T$) | 531,000 | 203,400 |
| Individuals (N) | 590 | 226 |
| Hausman test | 82,304.23 [0.000] | 681.49 [0.000] |
| OLS estimator on aggregate retail prices, Eq. (2) | | |
| Number of lags (M) | 8 | 7 |
| Number of lags (J) | 8 | 8 |
| θ_{OLS} | -0.031*** (0.008) | -0.047*** (0.013) |
| Days to close 95% of the gap | 96.64 | 63.74 |
| Obs. (T) | 900 | 900 |

Akaike Information Criteria were employed in order to select the optimal lag length. In addition to the variables listed in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), all regressions include in the long-term relationship a time trend and a set of daily dummies that control for the possible effects of seasonal changes in demand for each day of the week. The MG-CCE incorporates, as an explanatory variable, the lagged cross-sectional average of the retail prices fixed by all the competitors operating at each moment of time within a 200-metre radius. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are presented in brackets. We use *** to indicate significance at the 1% level.

Source: Own elaboration.


Table A1: Unit root and cointegration tests on real prices

| | Full sample (all brands) | | Sub-sample (Repsol) | |
|---|--------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|
| | Levels | First diff. | Levels | First diff. |
| Unit root test | | | | |
| Breitung-Das test on individual retail prices | 0.006 | -29.013*** | -0.041 | -17.739*** |
| ADF test on aggregate retail prices | -1.748 | -5.681*** | -1.565 | -5.935*** |
| Cointegration between wholesale-refined fuel prices and retail prices | | | | |
| Westerlund tests on individual retail prices | | | | |
| G_τ | -6.239*** | | -5.897*** | |
| G_α | -102.855*** | | -105.218*** | |
| P_τ | -162.114*** | | -162.756*** | |
| P_α | -110.663*** | | -117.814*** | |
| ADF test on aggregate retail prices | -3.682*** | | -3.653*** | |
| Cointegration between crude oil prices and retail prices | | | | |
| Westerlund tests on individual retail prices | | | | |
| G_τ | -4.789*** | | -4.275*** | |
| G_α | -60.185*** | | -51.696*** | |
| P_τ | -114.794*** | | -72.537*** | |
| P_α | -58.582*** | | -59.491*** | |
| ADF test on aggregate retail prices | -3.941*** | | -3.531*** | |

We use *** to denote the rejection of the null hypotheses (unit root and non-cointegration) at the 1% significance level. The lag order for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Breitung-Das and Westerlund tests are obtained by using the Akaike Information Criteria. Critical values for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Breitung-Das tests are based on MacKinnon (1996) and Breitung and Das (2005), respectively. The Westerlund tests employ bootstrapped robust critical values based on 500 replications, where the Bartlett kernel bandwidth is set according to the $4(T/100)^{2/9} \approx 7$ rule.

Source: Own elaboration.


Figure 1. Retail price adjustment after a change in wholesale-refined fuel price



The black and red continuous lines represent the results from Eq. (1) by using the MG and MG-CCE procedures, respectively. The dashed blue line denotes those obtained from Eq. (2) by using the OLS procedure on aggregated data.

Source: Own elaboration based on the estimated results of Table 2.

Figure 2. Retail price adjustment after a change in crude oil price



The black and red continuous lines represent the results from Eq. (1) by using the MG and MG-CCE, respectively. The dashed blue line denotes those obtained from Eq. (2) by using the OLS procedure on aggregated data.

Source: Own elaboration based on the estimated results of Table 3.