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Editorial

Traditional economics and wisdom often claim that economic cycles last an average of five years. Five years on from the collapse of Lehmann Brothers and the Wall Street crash in 2008, giving way to the worst financial crisis since 1929, a number of reactions, going from the economic to the social and cultural, have erupted as a direct consequence of such events. Among them, we have witnessed the Arab Spring, the social protest movements in affected countries, 15-M or Stop Evictions movements in Spain, Occupy Wall Street and its equivalents, etc.

This is why the present issue of *Culture, Language and Representation* has considered it pertinent to address the representation of the global crisis at this point in time. Following Zizek, representation is and cannot be neutral, but constitutes the area of contention where ethical debates are articulated. Representations of the crisis, thus, become also the ground where the ethical discourses that have become urgent and relevant find their voice both at the social symbolic and actual levels.

The articles in the present volume tackle the representation of the economic crisis from various perspectives: sociological, linguistic, literary, the media. A feature that emerges from most of them is the multidisciplinary and comparative approach in what could be described as an attempt to understand the global nature of this complex phenomenon with effects and ramifications at multiple levels of experience.

The opening article by Çelikkol draws on historical and sociological aspects to focus on the Turkish protests igniting from an apparently innocuous park redevelopment. The Gezi protests became a symbol of the discontent with the living conditions of the Turkish population

Presentación

La sabiduría y la economía populares nos indican que los ciclos económicos duran de media cinco años. Pasados cinco años de la caída de Lehmann Brothers y el crack de Wall Street en 2008, que derivó en la mayor crisis financiera desde 1929, se han sucedido un amplio número de reacciones sociales, económicas y culturales, entre las que se podrían citar la primavera árabe, los movimientos sociales de protesta en los países afectados, como el 15-M o la plataforma Stop Desahucios en España, Occupy Wall Street y movimientos equivalentes en otros países, etc. Por estos motivos, hemos considerado pertinente dedicar este volumen de *Cultura, lenguaje y representación* a las representaciones de la crisis económica global. Según Zizek, la representación ni es ni puede ser neutral, sino que se convierte en el terreno de lucha en el que los debates éticos articulan su expresión. Las representaciones de la crisis, en consecuencia, constituyen el campo en el que los discursos éticos que han devenido acuciantes encuentran su voz, tanto en el nivel socio-simbólico como en el de la realidad inmediata.

Los artículos recogidos en este volumen abordan la representación de la crisis económica desde perspectivas diferentes: sociológica, lingüística, literaria o medios de comunicación. El denominador común de todos ellos es el componente multidisciplinar y comparativo utilizado para intentar comprender la naturaleza global de un fenómeno con ramificaciones en múltiples niveles de experiencia.

El artículo inicial de Çelikkol se centra, desde una perspectiva histórica y sociológica, en las protestas turcas sobre un hecho aparentemente inocuo como era la remodelación del parque Gezi. La contribución constituye una respuesta urgente e inmediata sobre unos acontecimientos que de manera simbólica that this article documents with the urgency of the moment. Hawley proposes an original reading of Shakespeare's *Henry IV and V*, disclosing the interconnections of power and the emergent wine trade in the Renaissance. The parallels that he reveals between the current dealings of the markets and institutions, and the past ones, are highly remarkable and enlightening. Two articles analyse the literary derivations of the crisis: Kumar's reading of R. K. Narayan's novel, *The Financial Expert*, highlights the striking similarities between previous fraudulent financial practices and the ones that brought about the current crisis, thus underlining a historical continuity that had been triumphantly proclaimed superseded. Shaw, in turn, explores the genre of Chick Lit in the light of the economic crisis and how it has transmuted into the subgenre of «Recessionista» fiction, underlining the feminist implications for the representation of its heroines.

Another group of articles tackles the media, in particular online communication, and the consequences for the representations of the crisis derived from the choice of medium. Mancera and Helfrich explore the construction and dissemination of propaganda through short slogans in Twitter. Marquis, resorting to Wittgenstein's «grammars of change», looks into the construction of utopias and dystopias in the collective imaginary, and whether social transformations might be conditioned by preconceived ideas and expectations. And finally, through the analysis of online financial news, within a framework of multimodality and drawing on affect and argumentation, Tuunanen and Hirsto conclude that certain discourses about the crisis mirror previous discourses of the war on terror so as to legitimate their neoliberal recipes for the crisis.

aglutinaron el descontento social de la población. Hawley propone una lectura original del *Enrique IV y V* de Shakespeare a través de las relaciones de poder y el comercio emergente del vino en Europa. Los paralelismos entre la situación actual y la acontecida en la Europa renacentista se tornan sorprendentes y reveladores.

Dos artículos analizan las vertientes literarias de la crisis: el análisis de Kumar sobre la novela de R. K. Narayan, *The Financial Expert*, subraya las sorprendentes similitudes entre las prácticas fraudulentas que nos abocaron a la crisis y las ejecutadas años atrás por parte del protagonista de la novela, revelando, así, una continuidad histórica que se había proclamado superada de manera triunfal. Shaw, por su parte, explora el género de la «Chick Lit» y cómo ha transmutado en el subgénero de la novela «recesionista» debido al impacto de la crisis económica en las mujeres, con lo que eso conlleva para la representación de tales heroínas de ficción desde una perspectiva feminista.

Un último bloque de artículos aborda los medios de comunicación, en particular las redes sociales y la comunicación digital. Mancera y Helfrich examinan la elaboración y distribución de mensajes propagandísticos por medio de eslóganes en Twitter. Marquis utiliza el concepto de «las gramáticas del cambio», tomado de Wittgenstein, en su análisis de la construcción de utopías y distopías en el imaginario colectivo, así como de los condicionantes que propician o frenan las posibles transformaciones sociales. Tuunanen y Hristo cierran el volumen con un estudio sobre las noticias financieras digitales desde la perspectiva de la multimodalidad y la teoría de los afectos y la argumentación, para concluir que algunos de los discursos sobre la crisis reproducen otros previos sobre la guerra contra el terror con la intención de legitimar las recetas neoliberales para atajar la crisis.

Artículos / *Articles*

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Saturnalia Revisited: Gezi Park Protests and Carnival Today

Retorno a la Saturnalia: las protestas del parque Gezi y el carnaval hoy

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ABSTRACT: The present article conjoins the history of Taksim district from the 19th century to the early years of the Turkish Republic, up to the events of May 28th, 2013, known as Gezi Park protests. In trying to determine whether a shared memory of displacement cuts through such different historical layers of the Republic, the article seeks answers for the provenance of the protests and its deployment on the public and private spheres. The analysis borrows from Bakhtinian carnival and carnivalesque, and posits the question whether a different carnival sense of the world, diverging from that of Bakhtin, is predominantly becoming the rule in national and international movements of dissent.

Keywords: Gezi Park, Taksim, protests, Bakhtin, carnival.

RESUMEN: El presente artículo repasa la historia del distrito Taksim entre el siglo XIX y los primeros años de la república turca, hasta llegar a los eventos del 28 de mayo de 2013, conocidos como las protestas del parque Gezi. El artículo busca respuestas a los orígenes de las protestas, así como su desarrollo tanto en las esferas pública como privada. Para tratar de determinar si existe una memoria de exclusión que informe los diferentes estratos históricos de la república, el análisis utiliza los conceptos de carnaval y lo carnavalesco teorizados por Bajtin e interroga la posibilidad de que otros modelos de carnaval, diferentes de los preconizados por Bajtin, se constituyan en la norma para los diversos movimientos de protesta a nivel nacional e internacional.

Palabras clave: parque Gezi, Taksim, protestas, Bajtin, carnaval.

Taksim Meydanı, located on the European side of Istanbul, is a buzzing social, cultural, economic and touristic epicenter with its evercrowded main street Istiklal running perpendicular to the circular outline of the square. Where the street merges into the square stands Cumhuriyet Anıtı of 1928. On the south end of the monument, Mustafa Kemal can be seen with his companion in arms İsmet İnönü and Fevzi Çakmak Pashas somewhat slantingly overlooking the main street and dressed in the most up-to-date Western fashion (civil and military) of the time to symbolize the modernization efforts of the nascent Republic. Less prominent and eye-catching, and for that matter more intriguing figures though can be found on the west and east sides, in the roundels; one depicting a late Ottoman woman with a veil covering her sorrowful face, and the other unveiled, an early Republic woman, looking sanguinely at the skies.[1]

Roughly a century and two decades before the erection of the monument, Topçu Kışlası (1806, The Taksim Military Barracks) was built on the site by the command of Sultan Selim III, as a token of his desire to modernize the backward Ottoman army. Not waiting long, the barracks saw service a year later, and were severely damaged during the uprising of Kabakçı Mustafa. Overcoming and recovering from the initial rebellion, the structure enjoyed a relatively peaceful century till it received a decisive blow by yet another uprising in April 19, 1909, after which the military establishment was completely abandoned and left to the whims of fate. Dilapidated, the ghost structure became a habitat for the poor, homeless and the dejected strata of a dying empire. In 1923, it was redesigned, true to the populist spirit of the new Republic, as a makeshift football stadium, and on October the 26th the first national match was played against the national team of Romania ending in a draw of 2-2.

After the death of the founding father Mustafa Kemal,[2] İsmet İnönü, the second most important man of the state, stepped in and ordered the transference

1. One can speculate on the unusual reversal of directions. That is, in the common wisdom of Kemalist nationalism, the Republican women are generally associated with the West. See Hale Yılmaz's (2013) book on the significance of dress regulations for women in representing the Western styled, Republican modernity. One could expect the unveiled, early Republic woman figure to be facing west but it is curiously placed on the east side of the monument. As much as the reversal is open to various interpretations, it would be proper to highlight the presence of two Soviet figures (general Mihail Frunze and marshal Kliment Vorosilov) among the attendants standing behind Mustafa Kemal.

2. November 10, 1938. On this day of national mourning, time comes to a halt when the clock strikes 9:05 am. Citizens participate or rather are expected to participate in the one minute moment of silence.

of the stadium down to its modern place in Beşiktaş (within walking-distance from the square) and renamed it after his surname, BJK (Beşiktaş), İnönü Stadyumu. İnönü's interest in the district and his ambition to carve his name in the modern architectural designs of the country did not stop at that. Henri Prost, a French architect and urban planner hired by the state, offered the draft of a park on the empty space that could be redeveloped by razing the rickety barracks. In 1940, the plan was carried out, and in 1942 it was officially christened İnönü Gezisi. The name, however, has never caught the popular imagination, for the citizens frequenting the park preferred to drop the surname and simply called it Gezi Parkı.

Along with such prosperous enterprises at nation building in the mid twentieth century, the state also resorted to other schemes ensuing in sanguinary spectacles. The September 6-7 events (1955) were one of a kind during which a population made of Rums and Armenians then residing in Pera was forced to vacate their homes, workshops, and cemeteries at the threat of rape, looting, and death. What caused the uproar and compelled the ordinary Turkish citizens to gang up on the minorities living around the Taksim-Beyoğlu district occurred on account of a miscalculated move by the government. The house in Thessaloniki, Greece, in which the founding father Mustafa Kemal was born, was alleged to have been attacked by some Greek nationalists. Highly mediatized and dramatized, the report of a bomb detonating in the courtyard was seized by the already stressed government as an instrument of propaganda to tighten its loose grip on the state. The rumour had it, even to the present day, that the bomb was planted there by the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) to create an atmosphere of legitimate and reactionary defensive stance. But the plan backfired as the government did not expect (at least not all of it) the degree of violence the masses would indulge in in their furious and senseless attacks on the minorities. The mosaic, a famous symbol once used to describe the multilingual, multicultural, and multiethnic fabric of Turkish society, was irreversibly cracked. Prospects of mourning over what transpired, or sparing a considerable time on discovering the culprits and questioning the likely causes and consequences of the events, were quickly brushed aside and immediately forgotten as the *Grand Champs des Morts* of Pera, the famous cemeteries guarding over the non-muslim dead, began to knuckle under the weight of Divan Oteli.[3] The construction of the Hotel was launched the same year, within a few months from the tumultuous month of September, and was

3. The non-Muslim cemeteries were not the only ones giving way to the modernization efforts of the young Republic. The graveyards of the Muslims were also subjected to the frenzy of

finished in 1958. Some marble works from the cemeteries, however, have not been completely lost to historical oblivion for they were brought to daylight and still used as stepping stones climbing up to Gezi Parkı.[4]

The parochial and unrefined account of Taksim district thus outlined and compacted has surely its shortcomings. It serves though at least one useful end: a personal effort at representation and narrativization of the tremor that the May 28th, Tuesday event, alias Gezi Parkı Protests, caused, whose seismic waves can still be felt to this very minute. Hyperbolic as the metaphor might sound, the following nineteen days were indeed tempestuous and catastrophic. With the mainstream media blackened out, or rather busy broadcasting a documentary on penguins, personal reports on the escalating police violence began flooding in and through social media. Taksim district was dead to much of the country for three consecutive days till the police gave in to the growing numbers of protestors on the fourth day and only then the whole event was widely, even obsessively, broadcast. The debris of empty tear gas canisters, dug out pavement stones, broken bottles, burnt rubber and dust could be found scattered around the sight stretching from the park, the hotel, to the monument, the square and Istiklal. No quarter was spared.

Strolling along the barricades built from the remnants of violent clashes, among the tents set up in Gezi Parkı, and beside the protestors wearing Guy Fawkes masks, one could not help but think if the whole scene was what Derrida meant by *contretemps*, time being out of joint.

> The world is going badly. It is worn but its wear no longer counts. Old age or youth-one no longer counts in that way. The world has more than one age. We lack the measure of the measure. We no longer realize the wear, we no longer take account of it as of a single age in the progress of history. Neither maturation, nor crisis, nor even agony. Something else. What is happening is happening to age itself, it strikes a blow at the teleological order of history. What is coming, in which the untimely appears, is happening to time but it does not happen in time. Contretemps. The time is out of joint. (Derrida, 2006: 96)

The ancient festival of Saturnalia held each year on the 17th of December was one example of an unhinged time of teleological order during which

construction projects. For a comprehensive diagram on the fate of the graveyards, see Brian Johnson (2005).

4. For a general history of Taksim district and how it is related to the recent Gezi Parkı protests, see the final issue of NTV Tarih magazine. Once a mainstream journal on history, it stopped distribution after its special issue on Gezi Parkı, available in Turkish at <www.yasarkenyazilantarih.com>.

transgressions were allowed and even solicited by the Roman Republic.[5] Celebrating the seasonal cycle and the triumph of life over death during the winter solstice, when the sun hit the nadir point of its altitude on the horizon, Roman citizens allotted a significant place to the ritualistic meaning of the carnival. The days of Saturnalia were meant not only as religious ceremonials praising the gods overseeing the order of nature; perhaps, more crucially, they were also appropriated as social and political manoeuvres for keeping the delicate balance of social hierarchy. Slaves were allowed to gamble in public, change their cloths of servitude and were even treated as equals with their masters, eating from the same table and entitled to free speech. The week of Saturnalia, allowing such free and complaisant interactions between the slaves and the masters, between the nadir and zenith strata of the Roman Republic, was organized around the cyclical and dialectic nature of death and rebirth. *Apropòs* of the ancient carnivalistic rituals, Bakhtin posits such circular nature as «the very core of the carnival sense of the world», as «the pathos of shifts and changes» of «[…] all-annihilating and all-renewing time» (Bakhtin, 1998: 252).

Thanks to the sacrosanct celebration of opposites, the state was able – or at least it thought it was – to tame and ward off any catastrophe that might befall on the mighty Republic for the rest of the 358 days left in the calendar. Needless to say, Romans strictly prohibited any transgression of the border between the master and the slave after Saturnalia days were over, and any attempt would only result in death. In other words, any act of insubordination would be considered a deliberate public declaration of refusal to comply; a dangerous form of *indocilite* revealing the fissures on the seemingly smooth surface of the regime.

> A single act of successful public insubordination, however, pierces the smooth surface of apparent consent, which itself is a visible reminder of underlying power relations. Because acts of symbolic defiance have such ominous consequences for power relations, the Romans, as Veyne reminds us, dealt more harshly with indocilite than with the mere fractions of law. (Scott, 1990: 205)

5. After the Punic Wars with Carthage, during which Rome faced a threat of total annihilation at the hands of Hannibal Barca, the festival gained an indispensable place within the official lexicon of the Roman Republic. Keeping afresh the memory of utter destruction, it took up a ritualistic value of praising the rebirth of the republic over its imminent demise.

The Roman Empire is long gone, and the week of Saturnalia is coopted as a marking stone of linear history. Today's carnivalistic acts of defiance, emotive expressions of «shifts and changes», inversions of social order, celebration of life over death might be likened to the ancient precedents of the festival. Over the years, however, the pattern of carnival has also undergone drastic changes for *indocilite*, a precipitous perforation of official time has become the norm, and the desperate attempt to define one's *ontopology* within the cone of dislocated time has turned into a national reality.[6] The paradigm shift is obvious, and a sense of diasporic uncertainty permeates today's carnivals of dissent as Jacques Derrida puts it as regards the notion of national belonging: «All national rootedness, is rooted first of all in the memory or the anxiety of a displaced – or displaceable – population. It is not only time that is "out of joint", but space in time, spacing» (Derrida, 2006: 103).

The claim thus attributing the same characteristics to the contemporary protest movements popping up around the world for the last decade might sound (or already does) far-fetched and irrelevant. Some recurrent patterns, though, can be found to traverse each one of them, from Occupy Wall Street to Tahrir and Taksim squares. Obviously, such high-profile and popular public spaces have their long and painful histories of displaced populations whose memories have tinged the fervor and the anxiety on re-building or rather safeguarding the nation. OWS, reminiscent of the Great Depression of 1929, has made a call to the 99%, consisting of many (not all) «colors, genders and political persuasions» to unite in the name of stopping «the greed and corruption» of the 1%. Tahrir has more than one layer of revolution in its wake, that's why it has been named the square of liberation. Tahrir is also a unique case of an ongoing displacement, another discarded revolution in progress.

Haunted by the ghosts of September 6-7 events, by the cemeteries lying beneath, by the memory of bloody May 1st, 1977, by the assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, Taksim is no exception in reminding the dissenters – to repeat Derrida once again – of a threat of looming displacement. Just as the threat of deracination has been one of the main catalysts prompting people to pour on the streets on the 28th of May, 2013, another curious factor, driven by the starkest of contradictions, has helped to maintain the determined posture of the protests. Without any particular political

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6. Derrida's definition of the word *ontopology* in *Specters of Marx* deserves a quotation at length: «By ontopology we mean an axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present - being [on] to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general» (Derrida, 2006: 103).

party, agenda, affiliation or fraction standing at the helm, and consisting of diametrically opposed groups, Gezi Parkı protests subsisted on constant negation. Say, a Kemalist, nationalist chant «We are all Mustafa Kemal's soldiers» would be heard at one instant and moments later you could see its denigration on a wall graffiti. Or a popular chant «Shoulder to shoulder against fascism» would be re-phrased by LGBT (standing for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) as «Leg to shoulder against fascism». One cannot really exhaust the categories of negations and contradictions found in Gezi Parkı Protests. In his foreword to *Grundrisse*, Martin Nicolaus offers two symbiotic processes in order to grasp a society in motion. The first, in which everything seems dipped in the «marketplace», «circulation of capital» calmness passes itself off as the consonant identity of the whole, whereas the other process, lurking right beneath the former, is characterized by a raging contradiction. The non-identity of the secondary process «stamps its character upon the other and defines the nature of the whole». In doing so, «behind the "no trespassing" signs, barbed-wire fences, armed patrols and guard dogs, *contradiction* ceases to be a mere reflection and may be studied at the source» (Nicolaus, 1993: 29-32 [emphasis in the original]).

The subsequent section of the article is devoted to an overall (though insufficient) sketch of the recent event's source of contradictions, its co-existing paradoxes of «praise and abuse», «youth and old age», «top and bottom», «face and backside» with their roots firmly attached to the historically charged and anxiety-laden symbols of the Taksim district and national belonging (Bakhtin, 1998: 253).

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Perhaps the best place to commence the interpretation of the spasmodic trajectory of Gezi Parkı protests would be the Janus faced women of the Republic Monument. Accentuating the nuance between the two incompatible time periods of the Turkish Republic, the figures represent the betwixt and between condition of the Turkish society, caught at the crossroads of occidental and oriental sociopolitical modalities. Indeed, the protests revolved around such pedestal antagonism, between the modern, liberal view of life, and the conservative stance of the government.

> Just imagine a prime minister who is on TV almost 24/7 and who preaches to people to «go and consume alcohol at home», to «have at least three children per couple», to «ban their children from attending rock concerts», to «raise pious and well-behaving children», «to eat this kind of bread and not that».

> Imagine again, he and his colleagues giving orders to ban or censor popular TV soaps and films on moral and religious grounds, interfering with the repertory of public theatres and voicing their plans to stop funding the arts like opera and ballet. (Sözalan, 2013: 146)

The protests, as much as they were instantaneous blazes of pent-up resentments against the state intrusion into the private sphere of life, were also testimonial to the long brewing feeling of insecurity, for the personal line was not the only one the government of the Justice and Development Party deigned to cross. Devising a plan to reshape the visage of Taksim district, the party set out to conjure up one of the ghost structures of the square: The Taksim Military Barracks of Sultan Selim the Third. Announced by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, the structure was planned to be built true to its original architectural design.[7] The new barracks building, however, would not serve the military purposes as it did during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was rather intended to be used as a hotel and a mall.

On May 27th, half an hour to midnight, bulldozers rumbled to demolish Gezi Parkı. The first tweet was sent a few minutes later and 20 protestors were able to stop the construction team. Next day, around noon, the demolition was resumed, protected by a small contingent of the police force. Tear gas sprayed, the image of one of the protestors, «the woman in red dress», became one of the leading symbols of the protests.[8] The following day Erdoğan challenged the protestors by sticking to his plan to build the modern barracks, and even lectured the public on the history of Gezi Parkı. Setting the challenge to practice, the tents of the protestors in the park were burned down in a dawn raid around 5 a.m. And that was the crucial breaking point in the Gezi Parkı protests, for the first few tweets began mounting up at an immense rate with the hashtags #heryertaksim, #direngeziparkı becoming global trending topics. More and more protestors were drawn to the site of the protests. Other cities in the country also seconded the strife in Taksim and well-attended protests were held in the capital Ankara, İzmir, Adana, Mersin, Eskişehir, Hatay, Tunceli, Konya, and Manisa. The Prime Minister Erdoğan's arbitrary and unyielding attitude, the disproportional, excessive use of police force, the anger at the

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7. Gezi Parkı was not the only target of demolition plans for the construction of malls. Emek Sineması (1924), the first cinema saloon of the Turkish Republic, was the first to go. It was bulldozed completely on the twentieth of May, 2013.
8. «The woman in red dress», being a national symbol of the protests, had international repercussions as well. 8 women deputies of the Left Ecology Freedom Party of Italy were dressed in red during the parliamentary discussions on the rights of abortion.

censorship of the mainstream media, were indeed among the main reasons for such wide-scale occurrence of protests. What literally and figuratively set ablaze the country, however, was the fire itself the state employed against the peaceful demonstrators. The act of burning the tents was shocking for it was not one of the usual procedures expected of a government to curb a demonstration. It was rather an act of «state of exception», to borrow from Agamben, in which the «political system» no longer regulated «the forms of life and juridical rules in a determined space», but included «at its very center a *dislocating localization* […] into which every form of life and every rule can be virtually taken» (Agamben, 1998: 175 [emphasis in the original]).

It was such a contingent and fragile status of *topos*, which could be discarded at any minute by the state, or rather its definition/defense in national discourse, that prodded the dissenters to venture on a violent confrontation with the police. Without any definite political agency leading the way, the threat of *dislocating localization* brought together the most unlikely figures from different sections of society. In other words, what started off as an environmentalist and so called apolitical demonstration was transformed into a complex and politicizing movement of protest testifying to the incidental nature of national belonging and identification.[9] Slavoj Zizek's analysis of the consequences of contingency for the recent global insurgencies might prove to be valid for Gezi Parkı as well: «[…] violence threatens to explode not when there is too much contingency in the social sphere, but when one tries to eliminate this contingency» (Zizek, 2012: 17).

Straining under the increasing pressure of the protests, the government and the Prime Minister had to take in the claims over Gezi Parkı. Erdoğan, not completely abandoning the project of building the barracks, even gave a sociocultural twist to his initial remarks by adding that a plan of a city museum might be included in the original construction drafts, hoping all along to decrease the tension of the protests. There was no going back, however, for the threshold had been crossed and it was no longer a sectoral confrontation between environmentalism and the state oppression, but a collective standout against the threat of national extirpation. The Turkish saying «Once the "djinn" comes out of the bottle, it cannot go back in» would nicely encapsulate the irreversibility of the situation for the genie did not come from Aladdin's magic

9. The debate whether the protestors constituted a depoliticized or politicized bloc dragged on for several days. The ongoing process of politicizing would suit them best, for in the ditch-like comradeship any differences based on political affiliations (though preserved) became null and void.

lamp granting the master's wishes, but constituted a haunting and mischievous one determined to stay.

If the threat of removal of contingency in the societal constellation, as Zizek put it, were to trigger a chain reaction of violence, it would not be erroneous to claim as well that once such a sensitive element had been touched upon, not only violence but a creative energy of humour might also burst open. At least that was the case with Gezi Parkı protests. Reluctant to lend ear to the nationwide demands of the resistance, Erdoğan, a few hours after losing Taksim square to the protestors, came up with yet another remark on «dispute settlement». Roughly translated, Erdoğan's statements amounted to the following:

> Atatürk Kültür Merkezi (Atatürk Cultural Center, toward which the unveiled woman of the monument was turned to) will be demolished and in its place an opera building will be built. We will further initiate the construction of a mosque in the district. I will not ask the permission of a few *çapulcu* (equivalent of *looter* in English) for the plans underway.

At 4:00 p.m., the same day, Erdoğan continued on his plethora of aphorisms on a live coverage by one of the pro-government television channels. Cursing the social media apparatus twitter as a societal nuisance, he even went to the extreme of naming everyone an alcoholic regardless of the amount of alcohol consumed. One sip would be enough for stigmatization. Instead of exasperating the so-called looters and without any further breeding of violence, the expression «çapulcu» was immediately transformed into a plaything in the hands of the protestors. Inflected in various Western languages, the word enjoyed international and multilingual renown. Some versions were as follows: English, «to chappul», Spanish, «chapulear», French, «chapouller», Italian, «ciapullare», German, «tschapuliere», etc.[10] The original denotation of «çapulcu / looter» thus underwent a change in meaning, the new definition of the word designating «someone fighting for her / his rights». Even the famous linguist Noam Chomsky sent his support and solidarity for the Gezi protests through such neologism; and one could see the anglicized usage «I am chappulling everyday» painted on the walls around Taksim district. The metamorphosis of the word is significant at least in two senses. First, as it was mentioned a few pages back, the reappropriation was the perfect example of

10. The inflections may vary due to different interpretations. The English version, though, made it to the Wikipedia.

negation and adaptation, an act of carnival laughter, if you will, as Bakhtin described it.

> Laughter embraces both poles of change, it deals with the very process of change, with *crisis* itself. Combined in the act of carnival laughter are death and rebirth, negation (a smirk) and affirmation (rejoicing laughter). This is a profoundly universal laughter, a laughter that contains a whole outlook on the world. Such is the specific quality of ambivalent carnival laughter. (Bakhtin, 1998: 254 [emphasis in the original])

And secondly, the neologism stood for the total anonymity of the protestors, for the word did not suggest any specific left or right wing solidarity, or class inclination, but functioned as the overall «outlook on the world». It was a nascent banner of cultural and national determination in time and space, a different modality of citizenship, as each and every political stratification involved in the protests united under the freshly minted insignia of «çapulcu». Even though it is difficult and objectionable to identify a certain political affiliation as the momentum of Gezi protests, Zizek's analysis becomes relevant at this stage:

> Recall Ayn Rand's favorite ideological fantasy (from *Atlas Shrugged*), that of «creative» capitalists going on strike – does this fantasy not find a perverted realization in many strikes today, which are often strikes of the privileged «salaried bourgeoisie» driven by the fear of losing their privileges (the surplus over the minimal wage)? They are not proletarian protests, but protests against the threat of being reduced to a proletarian status. In other words, who dares to strike today, when having the security of a permanent job is itself becoming a privilege? (Zizek, 2012: 12)

Where Zizek misses the mark by a wide margin, however, is in his indiscriminative attribution of a non-proletariat, «salaried bourgeoisie» character to the global strikes today. Gezi is an exception as much as other global movements of protest for one can only speculate on the dynamics of resistance, but cannot reduce the driving factors to the function of one particular class. Truly, the middle-class influence is apparent in Gezi, but to claim a reactionary stand-off against the threat of being reduced to the proletariat class as the leitmotif of the protests sounds awkward at best. Along with the salaried discontent daring to risk the permanent job opportunities, Gezi also taught to establish not only horizontal and vertical associations, but illegally dangerous ones as well. The «Gazi to Gezi: Turkish Protests Unite Minorities Who Distrust Each Other» article published by *The Atlantic* displayed such ambiguous relation between the white collar workers and the seasoned protestors of the proletariat.[11]

> «Gazi is known as a nest for terrorists», says Kartal Yuksel, a Gezi Park protest leader, taking a 3 a.m. break from a drawn-out battle with police on June 12. «Even the young kids start as terrorists against cops. They burn buses for no reason. They don't need provocation to attack the cops. They don't want to accept the force of the government. It's just a way of life for them. They know how to make Molotov cocktails, how to protect themselves from the gas. Although he mistrusts their motivations, Yuksel says the Gazi demonstrators have proven to be invaluable to the determined, if somewhat clueless, middle-class kids clashing with police in Taksim».
> «The Gazi guys are happy because up until now, they've been labeled as radical groups», he says. «Right now, most of them are in Taksim. They've helped us a lot, actually [...] today, I'm grateful for them, because most of the techniques we've used have been taken from them». (Anderson, 2013)

Before flying to Morocco on the third of June, the prime minister affirmed and further stretched the divided situation of the country just like Yuksel did. Erdoğan sliced the population in half, warning of the danger of the other 50%, standing indoors, which he claimed to be barely able to hold in check. Four days later, on his return, he was welcomed by the target percentage of the nation with the slogans, «Stand firm, do not bow. The nation is with you», or with a more partisan and militant one, «Let us go and crush Taksim». Fortunately, there was no sign of civil war on the horizon except for the reports of a few civilians' backing of the police force in stopping the demonstrators. Ali İsmail Korkmaz, aged 19, a university student in Eskişehir, was killed by one such civil-state combined groups. Trying to run away from the uniformed police, Korkmaz was beaten to death in one of the side streets of the city. Although the party vehemently rejected the involvement of pro-government civilians in the incident, security cameras told otherwise. The court trial is still on.

Gezi Parkı was evacuated by force on the 15th of June, and another period of strife and chaos ensued slowly but not surely giving its place to a restless resolution. As of today, October 29, when the nation is celebrating the 90th anniversary of the Republic, the net results of the protests are as follows: 3,584

11. Gazi is a ghetto situated on the European side of Istanbul. Consisting mostly of Kurdish / Turkish Alewites, the neighborhood experienced violent clashes in 1995, leaving 22 dead, many of them shot down by the official / illegal bullets of the government at the time. In other words, Gazi, with its underemployed, already back-beaten population is the perfect example of the proletariat class Zizek portrays as the slums beyond the gated communities in Brazil.

under arrest, 8,041 wounded and 7 dead. As of today, we are celebrating «the project of a hundred years», the inauguration of under-the-Bosphorus tunnel connecting Europe to Asia Minor.

Towards the end of his article «Carnival and Carnivalesque», Bakhtin laments the loss of the good old and bygone days of carnival of the late 17th century, and he complains of a «deterioration» and «dissipation» for he believes carnival to have lost its «authentic sense of a communal performance on the public square». For Bakhtin, no one participates directly in the carnival act anymore, and the participation is always mediated by an already carnivalized literature incapable of «genre-shaping power» (Bakhtin, 1998: 258). Gezi protests might sustain Bakhtin's complaints to a certain extent, for what happened in Gezi was not only lived, direct performance on the public sphere, but also an extensive use of the already carnivalized literature. The mediation itself was turned on its head as was the case with the neologism «çapulcu» and numerous other examples of negations within and without the groups partaking of the carnival act. From the chants of football fans «Tear gas oley!» and the wall graffiti «The only cure is Drogba», to the classical music concerts held in the shadow of the monument, Gezi was the conjoining point of the popular and so called refined cultural preferences.

Romans believed god Ianus, alias Saturn, to be the original ruler of the Capitoline hill, migrating from the territory of Sabine, land of the gods. The citizens of the Republic regarded him as one of the indigenous fathers of the Roman civilization and they feared him as well for he was a foreigner, an exile without a toponym from times immemorial (Versnel, 1994: 146-150). Ianus was the perfect example of *homo sacer* in Roman law, placed at «the intersection of a capacity to be killed and yet not sacrificed, outside both human and divine law» (Agamben, 1998: 73). Tautological as it is, and if the claim does not already sound far-fetched, today's carnivals of dissent revolve around such sacred figures that can be killed with impunity. Burning the tents in Gezi was just one episode of *dislocating localization*, and the murder of Ali İsmail its culminating point in the practice of *homo sacer*. The paradigm shift seems apparent, today's carnivals, just like their counterparts in ancient Rome, nurture on «the anxiety of a displaced – or displaceable – population», by the time of *contretemps*, and the topos of *homo sacer*.

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Annex

The South end of the Republic Monument facing İstiklal Street

The veiled/unveiled women figures

Late 1930s. The Republic Monument and Taksim Military Barracks

The uprooted trees in Gezi Park «The woman in red dress»

Burning the tents in Gezi and ensuing clashes in the square

Chomsky in Solidarity

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In Vino Veritas: Old Wine Markets in New Global Economic Battles

In vino veritas: antiguos mercados vinícolas en modernas batallas económicas

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Abstract: Wine markets have supported regional cultures and international alliances for centuries. Renaissance diplomatic and dramatic language refers to French *markets*, not *economies*, extending globally from Bordeaux to the Far East. Yet Shakespeare invents our representation of the global economy's ill-gotten gains and predatory speculation in wine (and other) markets. Prince Hal leverages the very wine market that he derides obsessively into a narrative of sin and redemption. Hal consummates his narrative by rejecting Falstaff, whom he identifies as an earthly Bacchus. But Burgundy's pragmatic representation of the excellence of viniculture in *Henry V* fits the paradigm of sustainable *marketplaces* in part because the symbolism of fine wine is universally esteemed. Today's economic crisis proves that the quasi-Hegelian idea of an ethical economy cannot be attained through financial interdependence alone. Moreover, it validates the Renaissance narrative that responsible wine markets improve with age.

Keywords: wine, markets, Shakespeare, Renaissance, representation, pragmatism.

Resumen: Los mercados vinícolas han apoyado las culturas regionales y las alianzas internacionales durante siglos. El lenguaje diplomático y teatral del Renacimiento hace alusión a los *mercados* franceses y no a las *economías*, expandiéndose globalmente desde Burdeos hasta el Lejano Oriente. Es Shakespeare quien inaugura las representaciones de la especulación depredadora y las ganancias ilícitas en la economía global a través de los mercados vinícolas (y otros). El príncipe Hal provoca el endeudamiento del mercado vinícola que él mismo ridiculiza obsesivamente por medio de narrativas ancladas en el pecado y la redención, así como con su relato rechazando a Falstaff, al que identifica con un mundano Baco. Sin embargo, la representación pragmática que Borgoña hace sobre la excelencia de la viticultura en *Enrique V* se corresponde con el paradigma de los mercados sostenibles, en parte debido al simbolismo de que un buen vino es valorado universalmente. La crisis económica actual pone de manifiesto la idea cuasi hegeliana de que no se puede conseguir una economía ética únicamente por medio de la interdependencia financiera, e incluso valida la narrativa renacentista de que los mercados vinícolas responsables mejoran con la edad.

Palabras clave: vino, mercados, Shakespeare, Renacimiento, representación, pragmatismo.

Modern representations of the global economic crisis owe a debt to Renaissance diplomatic and dramatic language concerning wine marketplaces. In the lexicon of early modern Britain, markets extend globally, while economics refers solely to household budgets. A «free market in London» meant that merchants could sell imported wine without paying extraordinary surcharges (Green, 1872: 661). Approved merchants sold wine in «overt markets», implying that unofficial global exchanges flourished in the shadows (Green, 1872: 656). Renaissance markets endured crises like those afflicting today's global economy due to leverage and arbitrage. Parliamentarian Ralphe Maddison (1641: 1) critiqued trade imbalances that seemed «mysticall» to his peers. But wine markets stabilized international relations between England and France long after Britain lost possession of Aquitaine in 1453. Markets from Bordeaux to Burgundy sustained French viniculture and satisfied English palettes due in part to the symbolic discourse of wine connoisseurship spoken by those vying for power in Renaissance Europe. Indeed, Shakespeare invents our representation of global economic failures by showing the expropriation of healthy wine narratives by power brokers suffering from identity crises.

Renaissance wine markets had a global reach without being globalized. Localities and regional experts maintained the quality and control of vintages. David Hancock (2009: 405) is among the excellent scholars of wine history who see a teleological development in the integration of old marketplaces into the global economic regime: «The globalization of [wine] trade in the nineteenth century also built upon networked approaches and self-organized systems inherited from the eighteenth century». Yet narratives about the inexorable triumph of the global economy ignore crucial language on marketplace ethics in early modern British diplomacy and drama. Renaissance diplomats encouraged British policymakers to trade with peaceful wine markets rather than fight over hostile commercial territory. Shakespeare's *Henry V* and two parts of *Henry IV* stage wine markets as arenas of strife between modern and classical narratives shaping Hal's identity as king. Hal's stunning victory in the civil war is eclipsed by the symbolism of his rejection of Falstaff, whom he denounces as a degenerated Bacchus. Ironically, both Hal and Falstaff discount the true value of wine marketplaces. Falstaff's overindulgence in spirits is déclassé, while Hal's display of newly-minted piety in shunning taverns seems hypocritical. But Falstaff's defense of wine based on classical medical theory helps to create the narrative of modernity, as Harold Bloom (1987: 2) suggests: «Representation itself changed permanently because of Hamlet and Falstaff». Wine persists in our representation of the global economy because its traditional symbolic value is equaled only by jewels and gold. Crucially, early modern Britain preferred excellent French and Rhenish wines to cheaper vintages available globally.

1. Economic versus Diplomatic Narratives about Wine Markets

Britain's financial decline under Charles I caused policymakers to seek reforms in international markets. Maddison presented his findings to Parliament in 1640 by «setting forth "the depth of the mystery of trade"» (Bruce, 1858: 204). He blamed foreign usury and debasement of coins for England's economic woes. He proposed resetting exchange rates weekly in order to defend Britain from international fraud and currency speculation. Maddison (1641: 1) accused «Bankers or lenders of monies beyond Seas» of manipulating foreign markets at Britain's expense. His monetary solution to perceived trade inequalities required closing French markets to British trade, although England's demand for French wine rose steadily throughout the Renaissance. Elizabeth I had asked ambassador Francis Walsingham to ensure «the safety of the English Merchants now repairing to the Vintage […] to the town of Burdeaux» after the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572, when French religious strife endangered visiting Protestant traders (Digges, 1655: 249). James I's trade policy was even more expansive than Elizabeth's. James decreed that new French vintages could be discharged on English shores annually after December 1st, a limitation designed to ensure the quality of the imported product. English Renaissance diplomatic narratives overcame Maddison's argument for protectionism, variations of which are extant today.

To his credit, Maddison believed that sound policies could correct abuses in international commerce: «The rise in exchange in King James's time was the result of an act of state» (Bruce, 1858: 204). Yet his pre-mercantilist theory slighted James's peace treaties with European competitors that spurred imports of quality commodities like French wine. In effect, James fulfilled the hope expressed by Francis Walsingham in 1571 that Britain might cease fighting over hostile northern European markets in order to cultivate peaceful commercial ties with wine producers in Bordeaux and Burgundy: «And though France cannot yield profit that Flanders doth, yet may it yield some profit with less hazard, and more safety» (Digges, 1655: 121). British commerce with benign European and Far Eastern markets produced gains that outstripped by far any losses resulting from debased French coins or unfair currency valuations.

Maddison's worst fears about Charles's monetary policy were realized two years after the publication of his treatise with the start of the English Civil War. His long-held view that financial «Leakes in this Ship or house» would result in popular uprisings proved prescient (1641: 1). But Walsingham's diplomatic approach to global commerce was every bit as realistic as Maddison's. Both men knew that entrenched constituencies in government could never allow England to forsake entirely her interests in war-torn northern Europe; however, their theories about the marketplace were based upon different foundations altogether. Maddison proposed blocking international trade in order to safeguard England's reserves of precious metals. Walsingham argued pragmatically that increasing the quantity and quality of trade between peaceful foreign markets would yield a solid return on investment. Walsingham's diplomatic rationale prevailed because England depended upon imports for her survival. Britain's consumption of wine was discretionary, but her populace would have flouted Maddison's laws halting the importation of French vintages.

Maddison (1641: v) critiques astutely Britain's «home-bred monopolian [monopolistic] practices» that stifled marketplace growth. Monopolies contracted the money supply, causing domestic recessions while devaluing British currency abroad. But Maddison's analysis is torn between explaining the logic of devaluation and accusing French bankers of fraud. Like their European counterparts, French banks held foreign currency reserves to allow some visiting traders to buy wine on contract, eliminating the need for merchants to transport their own bullion overseas. A weak English currency allowed French banks to devalue British coins by 10% even though France debased her coins with alloys like copper, a practice resulting from turmoil on the Continent dating from the 1590s. Maddison (1641: 27) asked his peers to note carefully foreign governments' «new expressions» in denominating their currency. He saw protecting British currency as the key to «maintaine the price of our kingdoms commodities, rents, and artizens» (1641: 24). But he would have plunged England into a depression if he had succeeded in restricting British imports to the barest essentials in a vain attempt to hoard domestic gold and silver reserves.

Diplomats like Walsingham proposed resolving monetary inequalities by expanding political and cultural relations with high-quality French wine marketplaces. They viewed as equitable the exchange of British wool, textiles, lead, and tin for French wine. They knew that the military expenditures required to pacify hostile European markets could never be recouped. As well, Elizabeth's closest advisor, Lord Burleigh, saw an advantage in developing trade relations with historical allies instead of crossing swords with powerful foes: «The amitie that we made most account of, was that which this crown had with the house of Burgundy, and not with Spain» (Digges, 1655: 370). No British official proposed eliminating all trade barriers, but the crown's most highly placed advisors held that robust marketplace activity raised domestic living standards partly through the importation of superior wines whose quality was assured by local connoisseurs and cultural institutions.

Wine markets contributed to the demise of Maddison's vision of an insulated British marketplace. The old adage that British wine could be consumed only through clenched teeth and closed eyes suggested that French wine would enter England's markets through normal or illicit channels. The British crown was loathe to relinquish its prisage of two tuns out of every twenty tuns of imported wine as well as its butlerage of two shillings per tun of foreign vintages. As well, James granted wine monopolies for his personal gain. He approved the Earl of Southampton's monopoly on «sweet wines coming into the realm, at the rent of 6,000£» (Green, 1872: 427-428). The crown was said to «farm» the «impost» of the monopolists' trade (Green, 1872: 427). Specialized wines from small European markets like Crete were strong candidates for leasing by monopolists, whereas French wines were difficult to monopolize because of their sheer volume. Furthermore, James waived customs fees on the prodigious quantities of wine imported by foreign ambassadors. The allure of French wine trumped all arguments favoring harsh restrictions on international commerce.

Despite bad harvests and awkward transportation systems, French wine markets remained islands of relative prosperity. The Church's possession of vast tracts of low-tax arable land helped to sustain French viniculture. Farmers producing grain at a subsistence level found that planting their fields with vines increased their incomes. Thus, international wine traders and producers were extremely well positioned in France's economy. The ports of La Rochelle, Nantes, and Bordeaux profited by shipping wine abroad. Marcel Lachiver (1988: 123) estimates that by 1510 wine in excess of «80 000 tonneaux dans les années exceptionelles» reached London, which regained its status as a «bon client». France's Henri IV depended upon wine export duties to fund his state, a brute fact that was ignored occasionally by Parisian politicians. But the quality of French wine markets drew English traders despite export tariffs and religious differences. Strong commercial ties encouraged France and England to form alliances in defusing threats from Spain and Northern Europe. On the personal level of international relations, Henri admired Elizabeth's character, which showed in «un brave langage et un plaisant style» of her correspondence (Xivrey, 1843: 227).

Wine had a corrosive effect on border restrictions between France and England. Perishable wines needed to proceed expeditiously through English customs given that foul weather and contrary winds constantly delayed Channel departures. Adverse weather conditions could ruin the product in transit even though connoisseurs stationed at ports like Bordeaux added a layer of quality control to vintages exported internationally. Most importantly, wine crossed borders because it was celebrated worldwide on the symbolic level. Anthony Reid (1989: 39) reports that Dutch explorer Frederick de Houtman attended a water feast presented by Sultan ala'ud-din Ri'ayat Syah of Aceh (Sumatra) that included «very strong brandywine», probably Spanish *eau ardente* shipped to the Far East aboard Portuguese vessels. The trade in spirits exerted an especially strong influence on British rulers, whose tenure in office depended in part on their respect for wine market narratives.

2. Healthy Narratives of Renaissance Wine Markets

Classical medical philosophy casts an aura of truth and respectability upon Renaissance narratives extolling the benefits of wine consumption. Consequently, impediments to the free transportation of wine were viewed in a negative light. Exorbitant expenses became a source of intense irritation for wine merchants forced to tarry at ports of call. Diplomats endured price gouging while languishing at border checkpoints, where «frontier news are never of any great value», making foreign postings an added hardship (Digges, 1655: 21). Walsingham's foreign policy expertise was wasted during stops at «frontiers», which were «commonly better furnished with fables then matters of truth» (Digges, 1655: 21). Thus, classical representations of the medicinal value of wine taken in moderation placed viticulture in a category affirming the received wisdom of the ancients.

The gustatory pleasures and medicinal benefits of wine had long made it a staple in Britain. William Turner's 1562 publication, *A New Boke of the Natures and Properties of all Wines that are commonly used here in England*, draws heavily upon the classical medical philosophy of Galen and Hippocrates. Turner feared that Elizabethan England lacked the intellectual drive to grasp time-honored narratives about the connoisseurship and medical applications of wine. Galen famously used wine for a variety of therapeutic procedures. He selected wine to disinfect wounds because it was stronger than water without being overly astringent. He assigned each variety a specific remedial function for internal medical ailments. Galen's knowledge of Mediterranean and northern European wines made him a connoisseur, but his philosophical training and medical prowess lent his commentary a special authority in the Renaissance. Turner wished to elevate Britain's wine connoisseurship based on ancient theories of wellness through viniculture. The English were more familiar with Rhenish than French vintages until the accession of James I, who opened many wine-producing markets to English traders. Britain's close ties to northern Europe account for the popularity of Rhenish wines, but French vintages regained favor as a result of stabilized markets in La Rochelle and Bordeaux following Henri IV's settlement of domestic religious divisions.

Turner was justified in believing that Britain had not benefitted completely from knowledge about wine contained in classical treatises. English physicians lacked many wines prescribed by Galen to treat wounds at various stages in the healing process, particularly during suturing procedures. Galen used dry white wines from the Middle East and Europe to clean fresh wounds because of their styptic and cooling properties. But he found that «wines that are both sweet and tawny orange like the Falernian are unsuitable» for fresh wounds because they heat the inflamed tissue, although they could be used to reduce scarring as the injury healed (Johnson, 2011: 149). Even if Galen's humour theory proved to be unfounded, his surgical techniques were superior to those of most Renaissance practitioners as a result of his five years of experience healing traumatic injuries at Alexandria's Coliseum. As well, Galen ranked wines according to quality ranging from vinegar to vintages of «good quality», such as «Sabine, Adrian, and Alban, and like the Arsyine and the Titacazene» (Johnson, 2011: 279). Few Renaissance winemakers could afford to meet Galen's ten-year standard for aging spirits properly, but his readers learned of vintages from distant regions as a result of his encyclopaedic knowledge of wine.

Falstaff's self-serving pronouncements on classical Greek and Roman medical theory relating to wine connoisseurship exceeded the common understanding in Britain. Even connoisseurs in early modern Bordeaux scarcely attained Galen's level of sophistication regarding table wines. Yet the medical theories of Hippocrates, Galen, and Dioscurides counted heavily for traveling British diplomats whose advanced age, remote postings, and arduous journeys required them to rely upon established medical advice. Illness was the primary reason diplomats sought relief from their assignments abroad. Thus, English connoisseurship cannot be discounted entirely. In 1366, wine deemed by Edward III's butler, William de Strete, to be «unsaleable in London on account of its thinness» was shipped promptly to Scotland for resale (Bain, 1888: 27). De Strete consigned «20 casks of Gascon wine of poor colour» to the same fate (Bain, 1888: 47). However, Scotland became a viable destination for fine wines. James VI (later James I of England) purchased wines from France, Italy, and the Middle East via London, including «two buttes of Romaneye, four buttes of Malueseye, [and] a barrel of Tyre» (Bain, 1888: 197-198). Henry VIII and Cardinal Wolsey may have enjoyed the finest wine during sumptuous entertainments at court, but James I followed suit with equal aplomb in early 17th century Scotland and England.

A robust wine infrastructure would have ameliorated but not resolved all inequalities in the British marketplace. England could never hope to equal France as a wine producer, but her rulers never formulated policies to develop wine and wine-related products into second-tier industries benefitting British coopers, metalworkers, bottle makers, horticulturalists, enologists, and consumers. Britain's Channel Islands were capable of producing fair wines and excellent apple brandy. Venice ruled the market in fine wine stemware until Britain stumbled upon a method to integrate lead and glass, enabling domestic artisans to produce valuable drinking vessels by the end of the 17th century. The vitality of the English wine market was sapped by failed policies, not low wages and cheap products abroad. But England patronized fine French wine producers based upon narratives of health and connoisseurship dating from classical times.

3. Pragmatic Representations of Renaissance Wine Markets

Renaissance wine markets flourished globally because the quality of vintages could be determined within the bounds of reason. Pragmatic philosophy is well suited to assess the truth in wine narratives given that the success of vintages depends upon taste rather than Platonic ideals. Pragmatists like Richard Rorty have contended that truth is solely a cultural agreement aimed at promoting social progress through reason and morality. Other pragmatists like Hilary Putnam (1985: 79) believe that «[…] there really is such a thing as getting something *right*» even though the truth is impossible to separate from our cultural representations. Rorty (1982: xxxvii) has since modified his position to allow that objective truth matters to the extent that revised philosophical inquiries «[…] come to *seem* clearly better than their predecessors». The difficulties encountered by philosophers in evaluating the truth in narratives should come as a relief to connoisseurs, who rely upon personal experience to assess the excellence of vintages. Rating the quality of wine by region and history is further complicated by the shipment of grafts overseas. French vine clippings exported to the New World were repatriated successfully to restore vineyards decimated by Phylloxera insects in the late 19th century. Renewed French harvests were deemed superior to those abroad using grapes with identical genetic markers. So pragmatic philosophy can help us deflate Hal's idealistic opposition to wine and place a fig leaf on Falstaff's wine-soaked claims to embody classical virtues.

Renaissance diplomacy had no predominant international language, but wine was the principal beverage fueling global relations. Once peace treaties with European competitors like Spain and Holland restored England's access to established wine markets, a remarkably strong bond formed between James I and Spanish ambassador de Acuña, known to Londoners as Gondomar, a controversial figure owing to his extravagant lifestyle. Despite this fast friendship, England and Spain worked assiduously to uncover state secrets. Attorney General Coke accused the Earl of Somerset of treason for sharing with Gondomar «the contents of other Ambassadors' letters, to the great danger of the King and kingdom» (Green, 1858 *a*: 348). James's agents bribed Spanish innkeepers to gain access to letters destined for the King of Spain before they reached his hands. James was informed of Gondomar's unflattering portrayal of his eating and drinking «so recklessly that it is thought he will not be long lived» (Green, 1858 *a*: 199). Notwithstanding harsh diplomatic critiques, James and Gondomar toasted one another warmly during frequent state and private gatherings.

Pragmatism also governed the treatment of French merchants in British courts. René Girault's 120 tuns of French wine were seized by British customs because he hired a Flemish ship to haul his cargo across the Channel. But Girault won his 1622 suit by explaining that, despite his best efforts to find appropriate transportation for his wine barrels, «[…] there was no English nor Scottish vessel of Nantes in which they could be carried over» (Green, 1858 *b*: 467). The British Admiralty relaxed its exacting standards to accommodate

Girault. Moreover, French wines were treated favorably relative to vintages from the Levant, Greece, and southern Spain. The more remote the vintage, the more the English crown asserted its control over imports. This policy allowed James to cultivate relations with the Far East. Ambassador Thomas Roe tells of a diplomatic success resulting from James's gift of wine to Emperor Jahangir and his son in Ajmer, India: «Never saw men so enamoured of drink as the king and prince are of red wine; think four or five handsome cases will be more welcome than the richest jewel in Cheapside» (Sainsbury, 1862: 455). Diplomatic narratives about Far Eastern wealth encouraged British rulers to manage the wine trade with distant regions.

France made a pragmatic decision to invest heavily in agricultural production rather than munitions. Several months before the sailing of the Spanish Armada, Henri IV asked Elizabeth's permission to purchase British stores and armaments for La Rochelle's defenses from «Anthoine Stanleck, marchand de Londres, de charger les vivres et munitions de guerre» (Xivrey, 1853: 321). Butter was the sole agricultural product Henri requested of Britain, indicating that France suffered no shortage of food or wine. Sully confirms that Henri taxed «vins de la province de Champagne» to pay for military expenses (Mallevoüe, 1911: 306). France preferred developing long-established wine markets because arms could be acquired as needed. Wine became one of three agricultural staples underpinning the French economy, whose markets were reported by Thomas Overbury (1651: 77) in 1609 to be the «fairest and richest of all Christendom». Grain from the interior, salt from coastlines, and wine from Bordeaux, Burgundy, and Champagne placed French agriculture on a solid footing. James I discovered to his chagrin the special privilege England assigned to reliable French wines. Sir Edwin Sandys denounced James's excessive taxation of French wine as a violation of a «covenant with the farmers of customs, they comparing their suffering under him […] to those of the Israelites under their task-masters» (Green, 1859: 213).

Pragmatism guided James's leasings of wine monopolies, although he issued them so hastily that their jurisdictions sometimes overlapped, much to the consternation of the English nobility, who expected exclusivity in their importation rights. The Company of the Vintners of London obtained a lease to sell wine in the city, but James granted the same privilege to many individuals and taverns. The multiplication of wine leases involving cities, ports, and the Admiralty in Southampton created a flurry of petitions in England's law courts. James resolved his errors pragmatically rather than attempt to enforce contradictory edicts. The port of Southampton received duties on wine even if the cargo was offloaded in London. In 1613, vintners pressured James to reduce fees by threatening to halt sales of the «wines of Bourdeaux» (Green, 1858 *b*: 342). James's affinity for European alliances and the growing influence of British traders forced him to placate the wine marketplace.

Early modern British rulers accommodated their subjects' desire to consume all available French vintages. Philip Green's inventory of French table wine increased due to the arrival of an unexpected shipment, forcing him to petition Charles I for the right to sell the excess product in London. As Charles's wine merchant, he supplied the first choice in vintages to the crown, followed by the nobility, but his oversupply required him to «vend the same at his private abode by bottle» (Bruce, 1858: 365). Green foresaw the profit in transferring wine from barrels to bottles roughly one century before the vintners of Champagne agreed to undertake this risky «transformation» (Brennan, 1991: 250). Imports of Mediterranean sack (sakke) declined in relative terms, although Falstaff's testimony proves that the market in sweet wines had not disappeared entirely. Sack reached the height of its popularity in the early 15th century, when the supply was so plentiful that exporters accepted two-thirds payment in cloth and one-third in cash. Venetian ambassador Sebastian Giustinian (1854: 46) reports that English traders concealed «deceitful [mixed] cloth» within fine textiles to conclude these transactions with the result that the inferior linen undermined England's vital exports of plain textiles. Yet European exporters of sack cut corners as well by reducing the volume of sweet wine per barrel, confusing tabulations by British customs agents. No ruler stood to gain from subterfuge even though royal levies encouraged marginal players in the wine marketplace to resort to devious schemes. Early modern British wine traders resolved commercial irregularities pragmatically by dealing mainly with elite marketplaces.

4. Mistaken Self-Identity in Shakespeare's Globalized Wine Markets

Both Hal and Falstaff prey upon wine culture in Shakespeare's staging of the difference between marketplaces and a globalized economy. Neither character's morals are fully developed from a pragmatic marketplace perspective. Hal seeks to affirm his legitimacy by breaking the very wine market that finances his regime. His investment in an idealistic narrative about reformation and legitimacy leads him to risk a global economic crisis by threatening France's vineyards with destruction in order to ensure the success of his invasion. He uses the apocalyptic language of war against nature herself. As well, he rationalizes his doubts about his legitimacy by magnifying Falstaff's flaws.

Falstaff engages in petty marketplace fraud and theft to receive wine and conscripts, but he does not reject markets *per se*. Bloom (1987: 2) holds that Shakespeare inaugurates our modernity by representing Falstaff's «supreme immanence» as a body lacking a superego: «We cannot see how original Falstaff is because Falstaff *contains* us; we do not contain him». But Bloom's Freudian analysis ignores Falstaff's identification with classical wine narratives that, on his understanding, surpass all others to such a degree that they represent the truth itself. On the pragmatic level, then, Shakespeare links Hal's mistaken self-identity to an unethical brand of globalization, representations of which contribute to the depression of national economies to this very day.

Hal buffers himself from illegal acts that flow inevitably from aggressive global economic aims. He divests himself of moral responsibility by blaming the destructiveness of war on the personal sins of others. He shows his familiarity with the discourse of the marketplace by misleading us about his intention to profit from the looming civil war: «[…] we shall buy maidenheads as they buy hob-nails, by the hundreds» (1597, 2.4:299-300). Hal restrains his libido but not his desire to globalize wine markets. He proposes sacrificing a prestigious marketplace to justify his narrative of (eventual) moral rectitude, although his preference is to seize France's vineyards. He could just as easily claim that his assault on French agriculture expiates Falstaff's sin of gluttony; however, corn, salt, sauce, and gravy are not as glamorous as wine. Wine is the symbolic elixir that offers Hal the greatest hope that his false narrative might gain a purchase on redemptive truth.

The centuries-old debate over whom we should prefer, Hal or Falstaff, is a reflection of character criticism that fades into inconsequentiality given the play's pragmatic resolution of conflicts between moral ideals and the wine trade. Tom McAlindon (2001: 100) may well be correct that Falstaff's arsenal of biblical quotations derives from Shakespeare's «audacious caricature» of a Protestant heretic (Sir John Oldcastle) executed by the historical Henry V. But Falstaff's self-assured wit owes to his belief in his identity with classical conceptions of wine as the prime mover of health, swordsmanship, and knowledge. Thus, Hal and Falstaff have different reasons for scorning taverns that adulterate sack. Hal's worry is that his drink is a «bastard» variety, while Falstaff reproves Poins for spoiling the taste of his sherry: «You rogue, here's lime in this sack too» (1597, 2.4:64; 2.4:105). Falstaff's observations pertain to quality; however, not even Galen's pragmatic teachings could deflect Hal from his quest for moral redemption. Hal pretends to rise above the market for festive beverages while acknowledging his fondness for small beer (but not wine). Yet his victory over France is conditioned by a narrative whose language betrays his legacy in the wine marketplace.

Hal's narrative justifying his descent into the wine marketplace in order to redeem himself upon his accession to the throne requires him to deny that Renaissance wine traders raise the quality of English culture. Material improvements in the British wine marketplace owe mainly to the professionals themselves. Speaking on behalf of their brethren in other localities, the Vintners of Salisbury demand to know «what measure all Her Majesty's gaugers gauge and measure by» in accounting for wine imports (Green, 1872: 81). Their insistence on marketplace quality complicates Walter Cohen's (2001: 143) cultural materialist narrative that Falstaff obeys a dominant Renaissance «logic of mercantilist exchange» in a «counter-courtly tavern setting» by treating others as commodities. For the excellence sought by Falstaff and British wine traders supervenes upon reductionist economic theories. Indeed, duties collected by the port of Southampton were imposed by Philip II of Spain. Upon arriving in England to wed Queen Mary, Philip was taken aback at the harbor's state of disrepair. As an experienced wine trader who no doubt saw Southampton as a future point of entry for Spanish vintages, Philip understood that wine markets required investments even if Mary did not. Wine traders balked at paying excessive duties but sought out the best products to satisfy their eager clients.

Hal's rejection of Falstaff, wine, and the wine marketplace is central to his myth of redemption. Despite her lack of familiarity with the English language, Princess Katherine of France agrees to an alliance with Hal contingent upon his sparing French markets and culture. Hal remains silent about vacant wine markets and untended vineyards resulting from his invasion, but he cannot suppress old marketplace discourse in his haste to conclude a marriage compact with Katherine that would grant him control of France: «Give me your answer, i'faith do, and so clap hands and a bargain» (1599, 5.2: 124-125). The intrusion of rough marketplace language in the refined discourse of courtship and diplomacy is comical and revealing. Ultimately, Hal cannot alienate himself from wine marketplaces because their cultural value exceeds his false idealism and violent methods of globalization. Chorus's prophecy of the brevity of his reign assures the audience of the continuity of the wine marketplace despite his creation of an artificial global economic crisis.

The true importance of the wine marketplace to Renaissance culture is revealed by a French nobleman on the losing side. Burgundy sues for peace with England to save France's «vine, the merry cheerer of the heart» (1599, 5.2: 41). The dramatic action shows that wine's celebratory value depends upon concerted marketplace activity extending to representations in drama and diplomacy. Shakespeare distinguishes between narratives of sustainable wine markets and those of the global economy, whose representations shroud financial malpractice in secrecy. Although Falstaff fails to adhere to his cherished classical wine narrative by succumbing to the lure of drink, he identifies Hal as a marketplace interloper who fortifies his cold blood with «excellent endeavour of drinking good and good store of fertile sherris, that he is become very hot and valiant» (1598, 4.1: 467-469). Like today's defenders of global economic principles, Hal disclaims responsibility for financial crises by holding hostage popular representations of the most prestigious marketplaces, wine being foremost among them. Philosophers differ on the merits of idealism and natural philosophy, mistaken versions of which Hal and Falstaff adopt as their identities, but pragmatism validates fair representations of vital wine marketplace cultures lasting to the present day.

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Banking on the Brink: The Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis and R. K. Narayan's Novel *The Financial Expert*

Negocios bancarios en el límite: la crisis de las hipotecas basura y la novela de R. K. Narayan, *The Financial Expert*

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ABSTRACT: According to Umberto Eco, «every story tells a story that has already been told» (Eco, 1985: 19). In this context, *The Financial Expert*, a novel written by R. K. Narayan in 1952 shares interesting analogies with significant events and persons in the postmodern world of finance during the last twenty years or so. Narayan's understanding of the world of finance echoes recent phenomena like the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, the Ponzi scheme of Bernard Madoff, a swindler during the 1990s, the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis, etc. This paper traces analogies among them and thus opens up a fascinating world of intersections and cross-references. In this intricate world, the present and the past, the real and the fictional, the existing and the evolving – all interact with each other; and the pathways thus created invite our attention to the recurring economic phenomenon of bubble formation and its eventual burst. This paper rests on the premise that the exploration of the deeply-rooted analogical relationship between various texts can make the understanding of the world of finance more comprehensible.

Keywords: intertext, bubble, shadow banking, Ponzi scheme, moral hazard, securitization, greed.

RESUMEN: Según Umberto Eco (1985: 19), «todas las historias cuentan una historia que ya ha sido contada». *The Financial Expert*, escrita en 1952 por R. K. Narayan, presenta interesantes analogías con acontecimientos y personas significativas en el mundo financiero posmoderno de los últimos veinte años. El conocimiento del mundo financiero por parte de Narayan resuena con los recientes fenómenos de la bancarrota de Lehman Brothers el 15 de septiembre de 2008, el esquema Ponzi del estafador durante los años 1990, Bernard Madoff, la crisis de las hipotecas basura, etc. Este artículo explora las analogías entre tales hechos para descubrir un fascinante mundo de intersecciones y referencias cruzadas. En ese complejo mundo, el presente y el pasado, lo real y lo ficticio, lo existente y lo emergente, interactúan, invitándonos a reflexionar sobre el fenómeno recurrente de la formación y estallido de las burbujas financieras. El análisis de la profunda relación entre textos diferentes puede ayudar en la comprensión del mundo financiero.

Palabras clave: intertexto, burbuja financiera, banca en la sombra, esquema Ponzi, riesgo moral, titulización, avaricia.

> The act of reading, theorists claim, plunges us into a network of textual relations. To interpret a text, to discover its meaning, or meanings, is to trace those relations. Reading thus becomes a process of moving between texts. Meaning becomes something which exists between a text and all other texts to which it refers and relates, moving out from the independent text into a network of textual relations. The text becomes the intertext. (Allen, 2007: 1)

This paper focuses on the complex mechanism the banking business usually thrives on by analyzing R. K. Narayan's novel *The Financial Expert* (1952) as an intertext in dialogue with certain real-life phenomena and crises, like Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme, the Sub-prime Mortgage crisis, the bankruptcy of global banks like the Lehman Brothers, and the global economic crisis. It rests on the premise that textual rendition of these real-life events in media and popular imagination reads dialogically with Narayan's novel, and opens up an interesting discourse on the business of banking that is prone to go awry any time owing to human greed for wealth. The bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the insolvency of Margayya, the protagonist in the novel, and the Ponzi scheme of Bernard Madoff read like curious case histories and lay bare the sensational nature of the banking business when it becomes adventurous. How these micro-failures pave the way for macrofailures in the form of massive crises like the recent ones can be understood more clearly by having a look at the way certain individuals and institutions become adventurous beyond their capacities and wreak havoc for millions in the wake of their downfall.

The Financial Expert, written in 1952 by R. K. Narayan, narrates the financial career of Margayya, a money-minded middle-aged private banker in Malgudi during the 1940s. Written at the time when most countries in the postwar period adopted Keynes' ideas on economic policy, the novel presents a fictional account of money lending and private banking in India at that time. The decade of the 1940s in India was one of the most tumultuous times in her history: fighting its last battle to get freedom from the British, India was an unwilling participant in World War II; its economy was largely market-driven in spite of the late realization by her British masters of the need for state intervention. Actually, the British policy of economic liberalism and a self-regulating market had left people especially from the rural areas at the mercy of *mahajans* (traditional moneylenders in India). These moneylenders were free to charge exorbitant rates of interest to their clients in the form of cash or kind. It gradually resulted in widespread rural indebtedness and land alienation. The late interference of the colonial masters with the financial market in the form of the Co-operative Movement to contain rural poverty and indebtedness lies in the background of the novel. William Walsh (1983: 72) rightly avers that *The Financial Expert* is «an exact account of village usury and city deceit and a controlled probing into the motives of money-making».

Margayya, a reputed financer of Malgudi passes through many stages of mercurial rise in his financial career before he eventually meets his furious fall owing chiefly to his penchant for adventurous banking. The novelist divides the tale of his financial wizardry into three distinct phases which can be equated with Paul Krugman's analysis of the history of banking business in the US. Krugman divides the financial history of the US into the following three eras: (i) before 1930 when banking was an exciting industry featuring a number of larger-than-life figures who built giant financial empires, some of which were based on fraud; (ii) the post-Depression phase between 1930 and 1980 when banking became boring due to tight state regulations; and (iii) the post-1980 phase when banking became exciting again after most of the regulations were lifted and finance again became a high-paying career (Krugman, 2009 *b*). This description of the national history of banking business in the US finds its interesting parallel in the personal history of Margayya in the novel as far as the level of adventure involved is concerned: the first phase depicts Margayya as a commission agent sitting under a banyan tree before the Central Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank in Malgudi, and managing the nitty-gritty of land mortgages for the illiterate peasant-clients of the bank. This business is quite close to his heart as it is full of adventure. He remains at the centre of all the complex transactions of the bank by clearing up the «red-tape» hurdles from the path of customers seeking loans from the bank (Narayan, 2007: 3). His clients hail him as «a wizard» who employs his «contrivance» to enable them «to draw unlimited loans from the Co-operative Bank» (Narayan, 2007: 2). This adventurous phase in Margayya's financial career comes to an abrupt end when the Secretary dismisses him from the courtyard of the Bank and the same day his only son Balu tears off his accounts book at home and throws it in the gutter. After a forty-day propitiation of Lakshmi, the Hindu goddess of wealth, Margayya begins a career as printer and becomes very rich and reputed very soon. However, he finds this printing business too «boring» and «alien» for a «genius» like him (Narayan, 2007: 117). He actually craves for «an adult business» with «sufficient adventure in it» (Narayan, 2007: 118). He subsequently sells his share in the printing business to his partner in order to become a banker in his own right. This brings the second phase of his career to a close. In the third and final phase, he becomes a banker, acquires an office in the Market Road, the busiest street in Malgudi, and starts dealing in the mysteries of money. The whole day now he has «to talk, counsel, wheedle out, and collect money; in fact go through all the adventures of money-making» (Narayan, 2007: 148). That leaves him extremely tired at the end of the day. Still he enjoys his banking business too much. Very soon he «earns» his place «among the elect in society»: people flock to him «for guidance, advice and management» (Narayan, 2007: 124). His reputation as a «Wizard» (this time with capital 'W') among his clients returns. His clients now include the «well-to-do people» as well as «smaller tradesmen and clerks and workers» of the region (Narayan, 2007: 200). Whatever he now says sounds «authoritative and mature»; people listen to him «with respectful attention» (Narayan, 2007: 149). This enviable description of Margayya sitting in his office with his clients surrounding him resonates well with the manner global experts in wealth management appear regularly in the media nowadays to guide people in money matters. Certain institutions even think of conferring on him «a title» for «doing the greatest public service» by making people «happy and secure» through his «help»; the narrator reports that even the Government thinks of giving him «at least a Public Service Medal» for his social services (Narayan, 2007: 200). But one day Margayya's financial house of cards crumbles down to dust within moments when Dr. Pal, his most trusted agent, begins spreading rumour about the former's mental health. As the rumour spreads in the market like a wild fire, people begin to throng Margayya's house demanding their deposits back there and then. By afternoon that day «all the cash in the house was gone» and still there «seemed to be only one theme for all the cries: "My money! My money gone! All my savings gone!"» (Narayan, 2007: 215-16). Ultimately, Margayya has to file for insolvency to save himself and his family from the fury of his clients.

When Graham Greene (1966: viii) describes the novel as a satire on «modern desire for wealth», he brings under scrutiny the human weakness for money much aggravated by laissez faire policy and capitalist economy. The novel reads like an intertext inspiring a series of analogies among various texts which resonate and reverberate in one another. The events and institutions of particular interest in the present context are the Ponzi scheme of Bernard Madoff during the 1990s and the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers driven by the sub-prime crisis in 2008. Interestingly, Madoff and the Lehman are also the sweet but poisonous fruits of adventurous banking, as Margayya is in the novel. The Lehman Brothers, for instance, began as a modest dry-goods store in 1850 and gradually expanded its business in diverse areas before setting its eyes on the business of asset-management during 1990s. The coming times witnessed a dazzling expansion in its assets and workforce. During these times, it emerged as an iconic figure for bankers. Before going bankrupt on 15 September 2008, it had amassed assets worth more than $275 billion under its management. This amount was remarkable in the sense that it was 600% more than its assets just fourteen years before in 1994. In the words of Frei, «Lehman's bosses, led by Richard Fuld, peddled billions of dollars worth of bundled sub-prime mortgages every month and made a mint from fees and commissions» (Frei, 2009). Awed by its spectacular «success» in the world of finance, the organizers of the *2008 ALB China Law Awards* hailed it with such glorious titles as 'Debt Market Deal of the Year' and 'Equity Market Deal of the Year'. Ironically the same year this «too-big-to-fail» institution suffered heavy losses in the share market due to the bursting of «the sub-prime mortgage bubble which it helped to inflate» (Frei, 2009). After that, its impressive goodwill in the market kept on downsliding bearishly. When it realized that the losses it had accrued were beyond recovery, it filed for insolvency and sought bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008. The next morning witnessed unprecedented scenes of Lehman employees removing files and other items with the company logo from its famous World Headquarters in New York. That day the Lehman shares tumbled over 90% in the share market. On September 17, 2008, the New York Stock Exchange de-listed it from its exclusive list of trading companies, thus sealing the fate of this iconic investment bank. Preceding that, however, the Lehman had already set the stage for many more such failures in the coming days resulting into severe damages to the world economy that it still has to recover from.

Like the Lehman, Bernard Madoff, a swindler, who was later sentenced to imprisonment for 150 years by the Manhattan Court, also «had earned a reputation as a trusted money manager with a Midas touch» during the 1990s. Even as the market fluctuated, the clients of his famous «Ponzi scheme» (also called «Pyramid Scheme») garnered steady double-digit returns for decades («Madoff gets 150 years», 2009). But his Ponzi scheme worth $65 billion was essentially a fraud devised to lynch financially his unsuspecting investors. In reality he, like Margayya, never made any investments. He rather used the money from new investors to pay returns to the existing clients and to finance a lavish life-style for his family. The money-spinning frauds like Madoff who have seldom been out of market lie behind Margayya as his real-life prototypes. The novelist himself admits that Margayya is «a combination of two personalities»: one was «a gentleman in Mysore who encouraged people to borrow and spend, shattering once and for all the philosophy of thrift», and the other one was a fraud in the region who «promised dazzling, fantastic scales of interest and dividends on the money entrusted to his care, and he became the only subject of conversation until he crashed and landed in jail» (Narayan quoted in Prasad, 2013: 321). The echoes of the accounts of real-life frauds in the novel betray how the literary text can be intertwined with numerous fibers of other texts, opening it up to networks of meanings.

Within the corpus of Narayan's writings too Margayya is not an isolated case signifying a lethal lure for wealth. He actually vies with some of Narayan's other persona from Malgudi fiction, especially Sampath from *Mr. Sampath* (1949) and Raju from *The Guide* (1958), in his mammoth greed, overambitious cunning and eventual downfall. Narayan's moral outlook gets these Malgudians invariably into trouble by introducing his ethics into his narratives. His typically Indian theological belief that lures of money are always deceptive and hence dangerous comes to the fore when he makes Margayya realize: «But money is not everything» (Narayan, 2007: 95). The same Margayya has earlier averred: «Money was man's greatest need, like air and water» (Narayan, 2007: 22). Money actually fails to give these characters the exact happiness that comes only from satisfaction in life; and every traditional Indian is trained to dream to have this kind of satisfaction in life. Nonetheless, this realization is momentary in the life of Margayya, a typical Hobbesian man, who remains selfish, greedy and cunning throughout the novel in order to spin more and more money.

The novel refers to the exploitation of the gullible rural folks, aggravated by the inscrutable ways of moneylenders, and the illiteracy and conservatism of the common people. In this context, the scene from the Bollywood movie *Mother India* (1960), wherein Birju the protagonist asks for the accounts book when the moneylender comes with his goons to take away his harvest, comes aptly to mind. The moneylender readily puts the book before him. But Birju and, for that matter, everyone in his community fails to decipher the moneylender's privileged knowledge. Margayya's doings seem as inscrutable as the former for his clients. The novel is deeply rooted into the contemporary social, economic, political and cultural reality of India, reflected through the fictional town of Malgudi. This socio-cultural milieu is further enriched through references to the dowry system, drinking, gambling, red-tapism and corruption – the banes of Indian society. In such a society to find money-mongers like Margayya is not a difficult task at all. However, looked at from the perspective of an unprivileged common man, the 1940s and the 2000s are not so different from each other in essence. The ways of private banking still remain inscrutable to laymen in spite of the spread of education. The people of the 1940s in the novel fall victim to moneylenders like Margayya only in dire circumstances, whereas the number of the victims of the Lehman and Madoff stands multiplied in present times owing primarily to the culture of consumerism. In the absence of any moral regulation in the postmodern world human greed for money has also multiplied geometrically. During the 1940s and 1950s India needed to balance her economy for the welfare of the poor millions. In the twenty-first century India and many other countries also need to reorient their state policies to save the poor from the onslaughts of globalized markets. In such a scenario Narayan's novel becomes more contemporary and relevant, fitting into the role of an intertext for the discourse of private banking.

Analogical links between the fictional and actual financial frauds provide eye-opening illustrations of the adventurous banking practices followed by most of the bankers, especially when the regulating agencies are found wanting. These traces also throw a revealing light into the murky realities of the business world, which always keeps the economy vulnerable to frauds and scandals. The recent global financial crisis along with the fictional downfall of Margayya also exposes the inherent weaknesses of any capitalist financial system that leaves the economy at the mercy of the market forces. The market forces, driven blindly by the sole purpose of maximizing their profit, pave the way for bubbles. Institutions like the Lehman Brothers, and individuals like Margayya and Madoff succeed in inflating the bubble every time because they work in tandem to cash in on the human madness for money. They prove time and again that maximum people can be fooled for a much longer time by keeping them allured by promises of hot returns and not letting them have a chance to peep into their actual dealings.[1]

The factors – economic as well as human – that lie behind these kinds of financial frauds, whether at the individual or the institutional levels, are more or less the same. The most obvious economic reason to cause the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis was the indulgence of the multinational iconic banks like the Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, etc., into financial engineering. Prompted to perform better in the form of higher returns in the short term, these banks introduced a computerized system of financing in the form of securitization. Krugman rightly asserts in this regard:

> Underlying the glamorous new world of finance was the process of securitization. Loans no longer stayed with the lender. Instead, they were sold on to others, who sliced, diced and pureed individual debts to synthesize new assets. Sub-prime mortgages, credit card debts, car loans – all went into the financial system's juicer. (Krugman, 2009 *a*)

The computerized system of securitization was too complex for the human mind to comprehend; but it was allowed to go on as it proved to be extremely rewarding for the bankers. Extremely lax government policies and an unusually long span of boom in the realty sector made the operations of securitization affordable for the time being.

Even the seasoned players of the financial world felt tempted to believe, like Keatsean honeybees, that «the warm days will never cease» (Keats, 1993: 363). However, once the market conditions became less favourable, the risks hidden behind the system of securitization began to surface. Very soon there emerged the unenviable situation of systemic risk. By then it became obvious that the system of securitization had actually encouraged a shadow banking system and moral hazard. But it was too late to do anything to contain the damage by streamlining the system due to the elaborate interconnections among the national economies across the globe. These economic factors are merely the visible symptoms of a much serious problem whose roots lie in certain human and cultural factors. Such factors have augmented not only the recent global

1. Once the famous scientist Isaac Newton also became a victim of the speculative market. He invested some money in the share market for hot returns. But he lost his money in the whirl of the South Sea Bubble. After this bitter experience, he opined: «I can calculate the motions of heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people» (quoted by O'Hara, 2008: 14).

financial crisis, but also all the other similar crises in the past. They include, among other things, human love for speculation, poor judgment, lack of trust, dominance of greed over ethics, etc. Frei (2009) rightly states: «Trust broke down between banks, as no one knew just how much money they owed». All these economic and human factors combined together to create «a disconnect from the real world» and led the seemingly robust financial system of the globalized market «to the inevitable collapse» (Rao, 2009). Narayan's novel explores these human and cultural factors in a systematic way, thus enriching its potential as an intertext.

The Financial Expert shows the phenomenon of shadow banking and bubble formation more explicitly when it is read as an intertext. It appears to be a fictional attempt to lay bare the *modus operandi* of the private bankers that push the whole economic system into crises now and then. Margayya, modeled after a real-life cheat,[2] is the fictional representative of all the real life «financial engineers» and «experts» who play havoc with the whole system by reducing their business to the level of a gamble. Stiglitz's observation is worth mentioning here: «But much of the innovation of recent years was little more than accounting, regulatory, and tax arbitrage; it did not lead to better resource allocations or improved risk management» (Stiglitz, 2008). In fact, Narayan also describes Margayya as a «financial engineer» and «a specialist in money» (Narayan, 2007: 134). No doubt, he does not have, unlike his equivalents in the globalized world, any computer software at his disposal to formulate foolproof financial equations. He nevertheless uses his own ingenious calculations as a usurer to exploit the infinite potential money has for him. A glimpse at his ingenious financial engineering might serve as an example: whenever a customer borrows money from him, he holds the first instalment of interest on that amount at the source itself. He re-lends this amount to another customer but, again, only after having deducted the first instalment of interest on that amount at the source itself. He repeats this process till he can lend the smallest amount and, thus, makes a profit in the form of transaction fees as well as multiple interests on the same amount of money. This and many other methods employed by him are, like those of the multinational banks, «too complex for anyone to understand» (Narayan, 2007: 195). Everybody is obviously «puzzled» to see his deposits

2. Iyenger (1999: 377) refers to such another fraud in the following words: «There *was*, three decades ago, the original of Margayya whose rates of interest lured princes and professors, scientists and civil servants, and made fool of them all. Narayan's art lies in giving such a financier an actuality of his own by setting him in a background as fantastic as his personality and career».

multiply overnight. People speculate how «the wizard» does it. But no one has any clue to his money mystique. Guru Raj, one of his customers, calls him «a very great thinker», «a rare man» who has «understood all these matters» related to money (Narayan, 2007: 132). What else were the multinational banks doing in the name of banking immediately before their exposure in 2008?

Margayya, like a shadow banker, provides banking facilities even to those customers who are not entertained by the law-regulated Co-operative Mortgage Bank for their being defaulters. When the Co-operative Bank in Malgudi «expels» Kanda of Somanur for «default» (Narayan, 2007: 153) and refuses to give him a new loan, Margayya manages a loan for him by manipulating the provision for joint-loans. He convinces Mallanna, another customer, to become a party in it. He coerces him to take a loan from the bank in his own name and re-lend it to Kanda on a higher rate of interest. It is due to this ingenuity of Margayya that customers come to him instead of going directly to the Co-operative Bank. He too loves to create these kinds of financial innovations and demonstrate his «wizardry» before his gasping customers. Later on, when the war breaks out, Margayya offers interest rates much higher than those offered by regular banks, and so attracts almost all the money of the region to his safe. In Narayan's world, the regular banks do not connive with Margayya in his adventurous banking and, hence, the aftermath of his insolvency remains confined to his clients only. Unfortunately, this did not happen in the real world of 2008. Then, almost everybody was found neck-deep in the murky dealings of shadow banking. And hence the sub-prime mortgage crisis devastated the world economy like a tsunami.

Like the much-publicized global banks of today, Margayya too views himself as «a saviour of mankind» (Narayan, 2007: 27) for his skills to resolve the financial difficulties of his customers. Very much like them, he too thinks his job «strenuous» and feels that he deserves «the difficult income» (Narayan, 2007: 08) he earns in the form of fees and commissions. He considers his enormous wealth in the form of «gold bars in the safe at home and the cash bundles and the pass-book» not heaven sent but the result of his own «application» (Narayan, 2007: 185) and his boldness to take «risk on half-secured loans» (Narayan, 2007: 186). Interestingly, Krugman reports the case of the real-life bankers who were behind the crisis in the following words: «So why did some bankers suddenly begin making vast fortunes? It was, we were told, a reward for their creativity – for financial innovation» (Krugman, 2009 *c*). That innovation also included the unethical practice of advancing NINJA loans.

The ensuing economic crisis exposed their claims of hard labour for the sake of public service as a brazen lie. It became clear that their sole interest lied not in the service of mankind but in the fees and commissions generated through their financial cunning. They actually flourished by flouting the rules and ethics of the business of banking. Like any globalized bank, Margayya does not believe in advocating thrift among his customers, which was the aim of the Co-operative movement in India, as Margayya's own living depends upon people taking more and more loans. Besides, he never bothers to know what happens to all the money his customers borrow. Actually, he dislikes the clients who are sincere in paying back their loans in time. He calls such clients full of «ingratitude» (Narayan, 2007: 152). Clients like Kanda of Somanur are his favourites for they are ready to put everything they possess in his hands. How he welcomes Kanda with a demand for another loan is significant: «I am glad you have come back to me, Kanda. I will put you out of your difficulties» (Narayan, 2007: 153). It again reminds the reader of the hot and glamorous welcome one receives at the gaudy reception counters of any multinational bank nowadays. That their sparkling fronts are actually façades for their ugly rears hardly strikes the imagination of the mesmerized customer. These banks, like Margayya, lend «easily» (Narayan, 2007: 181) without making any fuss about «legalities» (Narayan, 2007: 182). But once a customer is trapped, they charge fees and commissions and interests «in so many subtle ways» that the customer is «more or less finished» (Narayan, 2007: 183). Happily, the frugal people of Malgudi, unlike most of the modern-day consumer-clients, borrow from Margayya «only under stress» (Narayan, 2007: 182) as they know that once a client is gripped in his clutches, he will not hesitate even to impose foreclosure on him/her if s/he fails to pay back the loan. Many of them borrow to meet the demands of the dowry at the time of their daughters' marriage; and a few borrow for gambling and drinking. Whenever Margayya finds his clients «crazed and unhappy» (Narayan, 2007: 183) over the orders of the courts, he never bothers about them. He rather dismisses them by saying: «It is all in the business» (Narayan, 2007: 183). He even nullifies the provisions of «debt relief laws and such things» first by making everything look «correct on paper», and then by conniving with the law-enforcing people who are usually «enthusiastic collaborators in his scheme» (Narayan, 2007: 183). Kanda's case is worth mentioning: he used to be a well-to-do farmer with twenty acres of fertile land, a house and cattle; but now, he is finished as all of his property lies tied up in mortgages – mostly through Margayya's advice and assistance. Same was the fate of the customers of the globalized banks in the USA who invested in the realty sector by borrowing from banks on easy instalments, leading to the sub-prime crisis.

Like any other money launderer, Margayya does not trust anybody, including Madan Lal, his partner, Shastri, his accountant, and Dr. Pal, the principal instrument in his mercurial rise and furious fall. His tendency to be suspicious of everything and everybody keeps him constantly on high alert, so much so that he even begins «to doubt» (Narayan, 2007: 166) the very police inspector who helps him locate his runaway son Balu. Guru Raj's offering of an office on rent without any fuss surprises him as he is «unused to such brisk and straightforward transactions» (Narayan, 2007: 131). Narayan portrays in Margayya's over-alertness a lack of trust and nervous anxiety many businessmen suffer from. Such pattern of behaviour can be observed among the real-life players in the financial market also. This lack of trust makes any system highly fragile and susceptible to breakdown at any moment. The recurring crises in the history of finance are a fact to take into account in this regard. Every time a crisis occurs and experts analyze it in retrospect, lack of trust surfaces inevitably as one of the main causes. Even an uncreditted rumour is enough to ruin the reputation of any institution or individual within moments. Margayya also falls prey to this feature. He enlists Dr. Pal's services to build up public trust in his financial wizardry and engineering. But gradually, he finds his interests clashing with those of Dr. Pal. When one night he loses his temper and beats him out of anger, the consequences wreak havoc for him. The very next morning, Dr. Pal turns out to be his nemesis as he visits a few of Margayya's clients and narrates the incident ambiguously suggesting: «Things are probably not going smoothly there» (Narayan, 2007: 214). Taking a cue from this statement, the irrational human behaviour finds another chance to perform its tricks. Without verifying the facts, people begin to flock at Margayya's door to withdraw their deposits. Margayya begins to return their money. But very soon all the cash in the house is gone and the crowd still keeps on increasing. Ultimately, he sends for the police and a lawyer in order to file for insolvency. He spends the next three or four months «attending courts, lawyers, inventories and so on and so forth» (Narayan, 2007: 217). Ultimately, everything is gone. Even the house where his pampered son Balu is living with his family is «attached» (Narayan, 2007: 217). This description of Margayya's insolvency in the novel brings to the reader's mind the images of the tumultuous scene outside the main office of the Lehman on 16 September 2008 when the officials began to vacate the building after the firm's bankruptcy.

Margayya's indulgence in speculation by attracting people with black money presents another impeccable parallel to the work-culture of most of the multinational companies in the global world. Margayya knows that, due to the circumstances generated by the ongoing world war, there is an overflow of «unaccounted and unaccountable» money lying «hidden in bundled-up currency notes in dark boxes» (Narayan, 2007: 193) with merchants, contractors, drug stockists, military men, go-betweens and busybodies. As he sees in it a golden opportunity to make undreamt of profit, he, like Bernard Madoff, begins to offer twenty percent interest rates, much higher than the regular banks' meager three percent. People, who are interested only in their returns, do not bother to find out how Margayya manages to pay such a high interest rates. They rush towards him with their easy as well as hard money. In this way, Margayya's indigenous Ponzi scheme skyrockets him to «the undreamt heights of financial success» (Narayan, 2007: 191). He receives thousands of rupees every day. He, however, does not have any scheme to invest this huge money into some more productive business in order to sustain its productivity. He, like any speculator, keeps it stored up in his house and relies on his fanatical calculation: «If I get twenty thousand rupees deposit each day and pay fifteen in interest, I have still five thousand a day left in my hands as my own» (Narayan, 2007: 195). Before going bankrupt, he has money hoarded in his house not only in an iron safe but also in «the cupboards, the benches and tables, the space under the cot, and the corners» (Narayan, 2007: 200). Narsimhan (2008) rightly observes in this regard: «Forgotten in the euphoria of this financial alchemy is the basic tenet that financial sector has no standing of its own. It derives its strength and resilience from the real economy». Margayya forgets it; Madoff forgot it; the Lehman Brothers and the likes also forgot it. As their financial «innovation» failed to ensure a better resource allocation or improved risk management, they, despite all their wizardry, engineering and mysticism in money-matters, fell down the very moment most people hardly expected it. Only a few wise people like Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago acknowledged that the bubble was already too inflated and was waiting just for an excuse to burst. Dr. Pal in the case of Margayya, and the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the Lehman one, just pressed the metaphorical «reset button» (Dewan, 2009) to let the bubble deflate.

Harold Bloom says: «A single text has only part of a meaning; it is itself a synecdoche for a larger whole including other texts» (Bloom, 1975: 106). In this context, the striking parallels discussed in the previous pages between the dealings of actual people and institutions like Bernard Madoff and the Lehman, on the one hand, and those of the fictional Margayya, on the other, open up before the reader a fascinating world of «intense intertextual references and allusions» (Allen, 2007: 201). In this intertextual world, the present and the past, the real and the fictional, the existing and the evolving, interact with each other, and the intertextual pathways they create invite the reader's attention to the recurring phenomenon of bubble formation and its eventual burst causing pain for millions in their wake. At the end of the novel, the reader beholds Margayya preparing to begin his business afresh from under the same banyan tree before the Co-operative Bank as at the beginning of the novel. Iyenger (1999: 377), in describing him as a «Napoleon of finance», rightly discerns this scene as an instance of Narayan's comic irony, that invests the persona of his protagonist with a Napoleon like resilience and incorrigible will to move on in spite of colossal failures. Read dialogically, this ending finds its real-life reverberations in the decisions taken by the leading national governments over the world to bail out, instead of punishing, the sick banks for their wrong-doings. In the words of Paul Krugman, the authorities seem to believe that «once investors calm down, securitization – and the business of finance – can resume where it left off a year or two ago» (Krugman, 2009 *c*). It actually amounts to encouraging individuals, institutions and regulating agencies to keep on playing not only with the investors' money, but also with their trust in the system. And the common man, caught in «a crisis of culture» (Johnson quoted by Dewan, 2009) will remain destined to bear the real brunt of such crises in the future too. Arindham Chaudhury accuses common people also of their willy-nilly involvement in these kinds of crises. According to him, people driven by a culture of consumerism – a culture of use and throw – facilitate «the western, diehard, capitalistic, greed-driven materialism» that thrives by creating «artificial demand» and converting consumers into «material dustbins for the profits of a handful of corporations» (Chaudhury, 2009).

After having witnessed various crises during the last twenty-five years, William Walsh (1983: 72) should revise his suggestion that the subversion of «strong Victorian-British emphasis on the qualities of self-help and thrift» into «help yourself» is what constitutes «the Indian sensibility». The fact that Narayan takes up the issue of private banking and deals with it in great detail in his novel should not encourage anyone to confine the issue exclusively to the realm of the Indian ethos. The more or less similar accounts of the goings-on in the banking sector at a global level are enough to highlight the universal greed of usurers and private bankers especially when faced with the lack of uniform regulations.

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La crisis en 140 caracteres: el discurso propagandístico en la red social Twitter*

The crisis in 140 characters: propaganda discourse in the social network Twitter

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RESUMEN: El objetivo de este trabajo es el estudio de las representaciones de la crisis económica en el contexto español que pueden encontrarse en Twitter. Es esta una red social que permite una elevada *presencia ciberespacial* (Zhao y Rosson, 2009), de ahí que sea aprovechada por empresas, medios de comunicación, formaciones o líderes políticos y plataformas de reivindicación para difundir sus mensajes. Como trataremos de demostrar sirviéndonos del marco teórico sobre el discurso de la propaganda desarrollado por Charaudeau (2012), estas instancias enunciadoras recurren a etiquetas como #crisis, #austeridad, #banca, #escrache, #stopdesahucios o #paro para hacer que sus textos lleguen a un mayor número de internautas. Además, el análisis de un corpus formado por un total de 1.800 *tuits* en los que se incluyen *hashtags* que guardan relación directa con la situación de crisis en España nos ha permitido identificar distintas estrategias que apuntan a la existencia de una *retórica de la persuasión* en Twitter. Por último, identificamos los tipos de discurso propagandístico más frecuentes en relación con las etiquetas empleadas.

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Palabras clave: propaganda, crisis económica, análisis del discurso, discurso mediado por ordenador, redes sociales, Twitter.
ABSTRACT: In this paper we analyse the (re)presentation of the economic crisis with special reference to Spain in messages on the electronic platform Twitter. As a social network, Twitter allows for an enormous cyberspace presence (Zhao and Rosson, 2009) and is therefore used as its preferred means of communication by companies, mass media, political parties and their leaders in order to spread their messages. By following the theoretical framework of propagandistic discourse developed by Charaudeau (2012), we will show why the use of hashtags such as #crisis, #austeridad, #banca, #escrache, #stopdesahucios or #paro guarantees accessing a wider number of cybernauts. Furthermore, the analysis of a corpus consisting of 1,800 tweets containing such hashtags can be taken as evidence for the existence of a rhetoric of persuasion on the electronic platform Twitter. Finally, we have identified the most common types of propaganda speech in relation to the hashtag used.

Keywords: propaganda, economic crisis, discourse linguistics, computer mediated communication, social networks, Twitter.

1. Introducción

Por su omnipresencia y actualidad temática, Twitter puede caracterizarse como el sismógrafo del mundo moderno. Es esta una plataforma en línea que ofrece la posibilidad de enviar y publicar mensajes de hasta un total de 140 caracteres desde un sitio web, o por medio de SMS, mensajería instantánea y aplicaciones creadas *ad hoc* para móviles. Es decir, constituye lo que se denomina una red de *microblogging* o *nanoblogging*, pues de forma similar a las bitácoras –aunque en un espacio mucho más restringido–, permite crear contenidos que, al tiempo que se muestran en la página del perfil del usuario, son difundidos de manera inmediata a otros internautas que han elegido la opción de recibirlos. De ahí que Twitter suela identificarse también como una red social ya que, al igual que sucede en Facebook o LinkedIn, se basa en la creación de un perfil susceptible de actualizarse periódicamente mediante el envío de mensajes que el emisor puede mostrar públicamente o restringir a miembros de su círculo de amigos.

En este trabajo abordamos el análisis de algunas de las numerosas representaciones de la crisis económica global que pueden encontrarse en Twitter.

Si bien, por la amplitud del corpus disponible, hemos decidido acotar nuestro trabajo al contexto español. Para ello nos centramos en el estudio de diversos *hashtags* que han llegado a convertirse en *trending topic* en España. Orihuela (2011: 34) define el *hashtag* o 'etiqueta' como una palabra clave que, precedida del signo de la almohadilla (#), sirve para identificar el tema de un mensaje.[1] Cuando esta es utilizada de manera recurrente en un gran número de *tuits* durante las últimas horas puede llegar a convertirse en *trending topic*, es decir, en 'tema del momento' en un determinado país, o en una ciudad concreta.

En realidad, el uso de las etiquetas no es exclusivo de Twitter, sino que existen otras plataformas de comunicación digitales que también las utilizan. De hecho, como explica Menna (2012: 37), la almohadilla fue empleada por primera vez con una intencionalidad similar a aquella con la que hoy se usa en Twitter en los chats, donde servía para identificar canales y temas de carácter global –frente a aquellos de alcance local, que se marcaban con el símbolo &–. Actualmente, en la Web 2.0 los usuarios se sirven del signo # para indicar metadatos, es decir, elementos capaces de proporcionar información adicional a un mensaje, facilitando así su clasificación. Para Zappavigna (2011), en Twitter el *hashtag* extiende el significado potencial de un mensaje, permitiendo la creación de un *ambiente de afiliación* entre aquellos usuarios que «conversan» sobre un mismo tema.[2] Por tanto, además de como hiperenlace interactivo, actúa también como mecanismo de búsqueda, ya que la recopilación de todos los *tuits* que poseen una misma etiqueta permite consultar la miríada de contenidos y opiniones generadas en torno a un determinado asunto. Esto hace que puedan otorgársele funciones discursivas que analizaremos en este trabajo desde una perspectiva pragmalingüística.

2. Metodología

2.1. Corpus y procedimiento

Para llevar a cabo nuestro estudio hemos recopilado un corpus de 1.800 *tuits* publicados entre mayo de 2012 y octubre de 2013 en los que se incluye,

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1. Cfr. también la caracterización de las etiquetas y los consejos para utilizarlas correctamente ofrecidos por el Centro de Ayudas de Twitter: <https://support.twitter.com/articles/247830-que-son-las-etiquetas-simbolos#>. Última consulta: 26-10-2013.
2. Como explica la propia investigadora: «[…] the hashtag, a typographic convention on Twitter, has extended its meaning potential to operate as a linguistic marker referencing the target of appraisal in a tweet» (Zappavigna, 2011: 1).

al menos, alguna de las principales etiquetas que guardan relación directa con la crisis económica en España. Entre ellas hemos seleccionado las siguientes, por encontrarse entre las que se utilizan de manera más recurrente, lo que las ha llevado a convertirse en *trending topic* nacional en reiteradas ocasiones: #austeridad, #banca, #crisis, #crisiseconomica, #desahucios, #economistas-frentealacrisis, #EPA, #escrache,[3] #euco, #Eurogrupo, #pah, #paro, #pensiones, #recapitalización, #recesión, #rescates, #stopdesahucios y #15M. Es preciso advertir que el objetivo de nuestro trabajo no radica en contabilizar el número total de *tuits* que hacen uso de una u otra etiqueta pues, dada la actualización constante de esta red social, tal porcentaje se encuentra sometido a variación diaria. Por ejemplo, en el momento de llevar a cabo esta investigación, el número de mensajes que contenían la etiqueta #stopdesahucios era de 144. Sin embargo, durante la revisión de este artículo para su publicación tres meses después pudimos comprobar que esta cifra prácticamente se había triplicado. Dado que estas fluctuaciones considerables del número de *tuits* por *hashtag* se encuentran motivadas por la actualidad noticiosa, hemos considerado de mayor interés para la investigación que presentamos a continuación ofrecer una muestra homogénea de las dieciocho etiquetas mencionadas más arriba. De ahí que el corpus analítico se encuentre conformado por una selección de cien *tuits* por cada *hashtag*.

La significación excesivamente amplia del término *crisis* hace que bajo este marbete se incluyan mensajes que abordan contenidos tan variopintos como la crisis del biodiésel o la acontecida en Venezuela tras la muerte de su presidente Hugo Chávez. Sin embargo, hemos analizado exclusivamente aquellos textos que tienen una vinculación estrecha con la situación económica española. Así, en muchos de ellos los usuarios de Twitter comparten con sus seguidores noticias que confirman que el país continúa en recesión,

> Borja_Colón (@borjacolon). El Nobel de economía Joseph E. Stiglitz recuerda que «un país con 25% de paro sigue en #recesión» http://bit.ly/17kgHq4 #crisis. 08-10-2013. *Tuit.*[4]

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3. De acuerdo con el *Diccionario de americanismos* (Asociación de Academias de la Lengua Española, 2010) el *escrache* es una «manifestación popular de denuncia contra una persona pública a la que se acusa de haber cometido delitos graves o actos de corrupción y que, en general, se realiza frente a su domicilio o en algún otro lugar público al que deba concurrir la persona denunciada». Cfr. «*Escrache* y *escrachar*, términos adecuados», *Fundéu*, 27-03-2013, disponible en: <http://www.fundeu.es/recomendacion/escrache-y-escrachar-terminos-adecuados/>. Última consulta: 26-10-2013.
4. Seguimos aquí el formato propuesto por la Modern Language Association (MLA) para la citación de *tuits*. Además, reproducimos todos los *tuits* tal y como fueron publicados, sin

y libros que tratan de explicar el origen de esta:

> Jesús Larena (@JMLarena). Leo #DiariodelCrasch del profesor @sninobecerra y entonces comprendo como hemos llegado a donde estamos, y como lo avisó #crisis. 09-10-2013. *Tuit.*

Además, algunos se sirven de la segunda persona del singular con valor impersonal para comentar lo que parece ser una vivencia personal,

> José María Carmona (@JoseMCarmona). La #crisis le empieza a pasar factura a la educación de muchos. Ahora te saludan o no dependiendo de tu situación laboral. 15-10-2013. *Tuit.*

o manifiestan su asombro ante la bajada de los precios en la hostelería con el fin de incentivar el consumo:

> Dani G. C. (@DaniGCorvo). Nunca pensé que se podía comer tan barato fuera de casa. Hoy he visto hamburguesa de 1 € para dos con dos vasos de agua #crisis. 08-10-2013. *Tuit.*

Mientras que otros internautas recurren a esa misma etiqueta precisamente para poner en duda la existencia de la crisis:

> Paco Vázquez (@pakvazquez). Vale sí, está muy bien pero no estábamos en crisis? En Málaga esta oferta se agotó el mismo día que salió... #crisis pic.twitter.com/K7aumpQH4s. 08-10-2013. *Tuit.*

También el sintagma nominal fusionado para constituir el *hashtag* #crisiseconomica se encuentra en mensajes que dan cuenta de sus consecuencias en distintos países, como Estados Unidos, Japón, México o Venezuela. Sin embargo, nos centraremos aquí únicamente en el estudio de aquellos que, por ejemplo, tratan de explicar las medidas puestas en práctica por el Eurogrupo para hacer frente a los problemas de la banca española,

> Alejandro Pacheco (@Ale_Pacheco). El Eurogrupo cree innecesario prorrogar el programa de rescate de la banca española http://adf.ly/XXkVq #Crisiseconómica @Ale___Pacheco. 15-10-2013. *Tuit.*

omitir los errores ortográficos ni aquellas otras muestras representativas del subcódigo escrito que está difundiéndose en Internet.

o en los que difunden informes de organismos internacionales que tienen que ver con las previsiones económicas de España:

> Generacioncero (@generacion0cmnt). El FMI asume que España cumplirá el objetivo de déficit en 2014 http://ow.ly/pDiWG #crisiseconomica #generacion0cmnt. 08-10-2013. *Tuit.*

Incluso hay internautas que exploran desde su ámbito profesional las consecuencias que la crisis puede tener en la población:

> Psic. Covarrubias (@covarrubitas). La persistencia de preocupaciones económicas reduce las capacidades cognitivas - http://goo.gl/Oy1H3d #CrisisEconómica. 10-10-2013. *Tuit.*

Esto ha hecho que adquieran una enorme difusión en esta red social un conjunto de artículos y monografías elaboradas por economistas para tratar de explicar las principales causas de la recesión, o con el fin de proponer medidas que puedan ayudar a hacer disminuir sus efectos, lo que ha dado lugar a la etiqueta #economistasfrentealacrisis:

> Jaime Bravo (@JaimeMAD). Mañana sale mi artículo «Los peligros de la desregulación» publicado en @MadridEco #economistasfrentealacrisis. 25-12-2012. *Tuit.*

Algunas instituciones recurren también a la etiqueta #factordesostenibilidad para difundir información de carácter especializado que pueda interesar a aquellos internautas que deseen saber, por ejemplo, cómo se calcula el porcentaje de los presupuestos generales destinados a las pensiones en diversos países europeos,

> Instituto Aviva (@InstitutoAviva). Consulta cómo se aplica el #Factordesostenibilidad en otros países europeos http://bit.ly/REUjVm. 18-06-2013. *Tuit.*

proporcionando incluso enlaces que les permitirán descargar documentos como el informe elaborado por un comité de expertos para asesorar al Gobierno español sobre la reforma de las pensiones:

> Pablo Sanjuán García (@pasangar). El comité de expertos entrega el informe http://www.lexdiario.es/noticias/200524/informe-del-comite-de-expertos-sobre-el-factor-de-sostenibilidad-del-sistema-publico-de-pensiones …

sobre el #factordesostenibilidad de las #pensiones http://www.lexdiario.es/noticias/200526/el-comite-de-expertos-entrega-el-informe-sobre-el-factor-de-sostenibilidad-de-las-pensiones… 10-06-2013. *Tuit.*

Véase cómo en el mensaje anterior se hace uso tanto de la etiqueta #pensiones como de la de #factordesostenibilidad, que identifica la temática del *tuit* de manera más precisa, pues este informa sobre la propuesta de modificar el factor mencionado para calcular cómo se han de pagar las pensiones del sistema de la Seguridad Social a partir de 2014.

Según puede apreciarse en su estructura morfológica y su contenido semántico –tanto individual como en conjunto–,[5] las etiquetas contribuyen a la conformación ideológica del concepto de crisis. Así, a través de ellas los actores discursivos manifiestan su perspectiva enunciativa. Por ejemplo, *hashtags* como #paro o #desahucios poseen connotaciones negativas. En especial la lexía de carácter polisémico *desahucio*, que en los mensajes que pueden encontrarse en nuestro corpus adquieren un valor emocional que trasciende el significado del término jurídico.[6] Por otra parte, desde un punto de vista pragmático, determinadas etiquetas como #Eurogrupo, #euco o #banca suelen adquirir en los *tuits* analizados carácter peyorativo, al ser utilizadas para hacer alusión a aquellos a los que se atribuye la responsabilidad de la crisis económica. Por el contrario, #stopdesahucios, #pah, #15M y #escrache actúan como eslóganes propagandísticos, símbolos de la lucha contra los efectos de la crisis y sus causantes. Además, con ellas los autores de estos *tuits* incitan a la acción. A veces de manera implícita, como puede interpretarse en el *hashtag* #escrache, o incluso de forma explícita mediante una estructura morfológica apelativa, como en #stopdesahucios.

Por otra parte, con frecuencia las etiquetas no se sitúan en una posición marginal, sino que se integran en el mensaje como un sintagma nominal más en el que sus lexías pueden presentarse fusionadas:

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5. Así, con frecuencia se incluye en un *tuit* más de un *hashtag*, y al ser combinados y *retuiteados* estos se reúnen en el mundo virtual y llegan a formar una superestructura semántica y temática en la conciencia colectiva, que contribuye también a determinar el campo conceptual del término *crisis*. De forma que al combinar distintas etiquetas se refuerzan además tanto el efecto de actualidad como el de interconexión, llegando a vincular varias comunidades de interés (*community building*).

6. Cfr. el *Diccionario de la Lengua Española* (Real Academia Española, 2001), que en su primera acepción define el verbo *desahuciar* como: «Quitar a alguien toda esperanza de conseguir lo que desea». Disponible en: <http://lema.rae.es/drae/?val=desahucio>. Última consulta: 27-10-2013.

> Pedro Lázaro Gómara (@plazaro67). Los expertos proponen q #factordesostenibilidad entre en vigor entre 2014 y 2019 pero q no se bajen nominalmente las #pensiones actuales. 07-06-2013. *Tuit.*

Si bien esto no siempre ocurre, como demuestra el siguiente texto con el que la periodista Susanna Griso pretende dar a conocer ante una audiencia potencial uno de los contenidos que se abordarán en su programa de televisión:

> Susanna Griso (@susannagriso). El gobernador del Banco de España recomienda planes de pensiones privados. El gobierno los estimulará. Hoy en @EspejoPublico. #pensiones. 20-06-2013. *Tuit.*

Adviértase cómo, en los casos en los que la etiqueta aparece al final del mensaje, es decir, sin integración sintáctica alguna, permite que esta sea visualizada de manera más rápida, y al mismo tiempo resume a modo de eslogan el contenido del *tuit*. Y es que muchos de estos *hashtags* persiguen una finalidad fundamentalmente propagandística, como trataremos de demostrar a continuación.

2.2 Marco analítico

Para el análisis de los tipos de discurso propagandístico que pueden encontrarse en los *tuits* recopilados nos apoyamos en primer lugar en el marco teórico desarrollado por Charaudeau (2012: 127). De acuerdo con este investigador, el discurso propagandístico es aquel que «incita a hacer» y que se caracteriza por la posición de autoridad que adopta el locutor, por su voluntariedad, por el hecho de que la meta se constituya siempre en una instancia colectiva, y por el doble esquema cognitivo según el cual se organiza. Este tipo de discurso puede localizarse en nuestro corpus, donde encontramos numerosos mensajes en los que se pone en práctica una estrategia para ubicar al alocutario en posición de «deber creer». Por ejemplo, con el siguiente texto la Asociación de Usuarios de Bancos, Cajas y Seguros insta a los usuarios de Twitter a aprender de sus consejos para llevar a cabo un consumo responsable que les permita ahorrar dinero:

> ADICAE (@ADICAE). Mira y aprende cómo un consumidor responsable gana 450 euros eligiendo bien dónde pone su #dinero: http://ow.ly/kGbWc #banca. 03-05-2013. *Tuit.*

Su asesoramiento se presenta por tanto como esencial para lograr uno de los principales fines perseguidos por los ciudadanos en momentos de crisis, que no es otro que el de economizar en las compras.

Otro de los rasgos definitorios del discurso de la propaganda es su intencionalidad, que hace que el locutor pueda ser responsabilizado de las acciones que promueve con su enunciación. Así, de ser cierto que el número de teléfono que se recoge en el siguiente mensaje pertenece realmente al presidente del Banco Santander, los autores de este *tuit* podrían ser detenidos:

> Anonymous Action (@AnonymousAction). ¿Qué tal si le acosamos telefónicamente como hacen ellos con nosotros? Emilio Botín TELF: 942 27 13 52 http://www.anonpaste.me/anonpaste2/index.php?44d479bcffa040ec#hj7CG9yHnLyPbLzD1seqTvg1g6XWaK9sMUlafVvj738= …#Escrache. 29-04-2013. *Tuit.*

Y es que la revelación de información personal sobre un sujeto de relevancia pública a través de las redes sociales es un delito tipificado en el Código Penal español que ha llevado ya a la cárcel a algunos usuarios de Twitter.[7] Tal vez por eso los responsables de este mensaje se escondan tras un seudónimo utilizado en todo el mundo por diferentes grupos, con el fin de realizar en su nombre acciones de protesta. En este caso, los gestores del perfil @AnonymousAction se sirven del espacio público de carácter virtual que genera la etiqueta #escrache entre aquellos internautas que la siguen, para constituir una instancia de recepción colectiva, tratando de esta forma de que su incitación al acoso del conocido banquero tenga acogida entre un mayor número de personas.

Por último, el discurso propagandístico se caracteriza por su doble condición de producto narrativo y argumentativo. La narración permite seducir al alocutario sin que este sienta que se le está sometiendo a ningún tipo de exigencia, mientras que el objetivo de la argumentación no es otro que el de persuadirlo imponiéndole un modo de razonamiento que invalide las posibles objeciones respecto al esquema narrativo. Dada la limitada extensión de un *tuit*, creemos que la dimensión narrativa solo puede identificarse en el conjunto de los mensajes de un perfil que comparten un mismo referente. Por ejemplo, desde la

7. Cfr. por ejemplo la siguiente noticia: «Detenido por difundir en Twitter datos personales de Rosa Díez y Tony Cantó», *El Correo*, 17-05-2013, disponible en: <http://www.elcorreo.com/vizcaya/20130517/mas-actualidad/politica/detenido-difundir-twitter-datos-201305171115.html>. Última consulta: 20-10-2013.

cuenta creada por @Doafund[8] se informa periódicamente de la situación por la que atraviesa cada mes una misma familia:

> Doafund (@doafund). Una nueva familia se integra hoy a Doafund. La familia Sempere Gómez. Conoce su perfil entrando a http://bit.ly/149pRal #desahucios. 26-06-2013. *Tuit.*
> Doafund (@doafund). «Tanto yo como mi esposa no queremos otra cosa que trabajar. Hoy corremos el riesgo de perder el piso» Sempere Gómez http://bit.ly/149pRal. 16-07-2013. *Tuit.*
> Doafund (@doafund). A la familia Sempere Gómez les quedan 3 días para completar su cuota. Patrocina entrando a http://bit.ly/149pRal o ayuda haciendo RT. 19-07-2013. *Tuit.*
> Doafund (@doafund). Iniciamos la semana con buena noticia. La familia Sempere Gòmez ha completado su cuota. Gracias a todos http://bit.ly/15ALDa9. 22-07-2013. *Tuit.*
> Doafund (@doafund). A la familia Sempere Gómez les quedan 6 días para completar su cuota. ¿Le ayudas? Patrocina ahora http://bit.ly/1cRSDTj Haz RT. 16-08-2013. *Tuit.*
> Doafund (@doafund). Buenos días. Estupenda noticia. Los Sempere pagarán la hipoteca este mes gracias a Lucía, Eva y un anónimo. Gracias. http://ow.ly/p6zFq. 22-09-2013. *Tuit.*
> Doafund (@doafund). La familia Sempere Gómez consiguió pagar la hipoteca y así lo agradeció a sus patrocinadores http://ow.ly/pcS90 #patrocinaunafamilia. 25-09-2013. *Tuit.*

A la dimensión narrativa que subyace en esta secuencia de mensajes cabe superponer una dimensión argumentativa, pues la finalidad última de tal relato es la de promover la colaboración económica desde el perfil con el que esta asociación cuenta en Twitter. Para ello se lleva a cabo la estrategia *slice of life*, bien conocida en Teoría de la Publicidad (Bassat, 1993). Además, mediante la información periódica sobre cómo es la situación de estos mismos beneficiarios cada mes, desde el perfil @Doafund se ofrece una imagen de transparencia.

Charaudeau (2012: 127) define el discurso propagandístico como «difusión y de circulación del discurso en el espacio público para llegar al mayor número posible de personas (*propagare*)». Sin embargo, esta consideración del término *propaganda* en función de su sentido etimológico se nos antoja en cierto modo insuficiente para el estudio de la multiplicidad de objetivos persuasivos subyacentes en los discursos actuales. Especialmente aquellos de

8. Organización dedicada a prestar ayuda promoviendo las donaciones a quienes no pueden afrontar el pago de su hipoteca en España.

tipo ideológico formulados en el contexto de las redes sociales. Así, etiquetas como #crisis, #banca, #escraches o #stopdesahucios son claramente ideológicas, ya que remiten a concepciones o visiones del mundo muy diferentes, con las que se ponen de manifiesto los contrastes entre el modelo neoliberal y los modelos económicos y políticos alternativos. De ahí que seamos conscientes de la necesidad de abordar el análisis de este tipo de *tuits* desde una perspectiva interdisciplinaria, sustentada por ejemplo en la dimensión cognitiva constructivista desde la que sociólogos como Thompson (2001), Castells (2009; 2012), Curran (2011) o Johnston (2011), entre otros, abordan el análisis del discurso del poder.

3. Tipos de discurso propagandístico

Entre la tipología de discursos cuya finalidad principal es la de incitar a cometer una determinada acción se encuentra el publicitario.[9] En nuestro corpus apreciamos una diferencia sustancial respecto al discurso publicitario que prolifera en los medios de comunicación tradicionales. Así, de un modo similar a como sucede en algunas bitácoras, con frecuencia en la red de *microblogging* Twitter se prescinde de la actividad profesional realizada comúnmente por agencias de publicidad, para convertir a la propia empresa en instancia de enunciación encargada de difundir las bondades de sus productos. No obstante, los recursos de carácter persuasivo no difieren en exceso de los utilizados de manera habitual por la instancia del publicista. Por ejemplo, el gestor del perfil de una compañía en Twitter se sirve de testimonios de clientes satisfechos utilizados a modo de argumentos de autoridad (Robles, 2007) para acreditar las garantías que ofrece un producto,

> Habitissimo ‏(@habitissimo). «Habitissimo nos ha ayudado en tiempos de #crisis y estamos muy agradecidos», Pere Marques, cliente @Habitissimohttp://ow.ly/pBUFz. 08-10-2013. *Tuit.*

o se presenta como un benefactor capaz de ayudar al alocutario a satisfacer sus necesidades:[10]

9. Cfr. por ejemplo López Eire (1998), Ferraz (2000), Robles y Romero (2010), Adam y Bonhomme (2012) o Janich (2013), entre otros.
10. Puede llamar la atención la intertextualidad de este texto, que guarda gran similitud con los anuncios clasificados difundidos habitualmente en periódicos de información general, algunos

> Cardea Tecnología (@CardeaT). ¿QUIERE MANTENER SU NEGOCIO A FLOTE DURANTE UNA #CRISIS? La #Continuidad administrada protege sus datos y su negocio. http://www.cadea.mx. 07-10-2013. *Tuit.*

Véase cómo en los mensajes precedentes las empresas utilizan en beneficio propio una etiqueta creada por los internautas fundamentalmente para debatir sobre los efectos de la crisis. Esta práctica podría calificarse como uso «parasitario» –análogo en cierto modo al *spam* que prolifera en los correos electrónicos– e intrusivo, que se inserta entre la miríada de opiniones que ese *hashtag* congrega en torno a sí mismo. Más aún si este se ha convertido en *trending topic*, con lo que el número potencial de destinatarios del *tuit* de carácter publicitario se verá incrementado exponencialmente.

Un poco más adelante nos detendremos en analizar el discurso mediático. No obstante, merece la pena comentar el siguiente *tuit* publicado por un medio de comunicación:

> Expansion_orbyt (@expansion_orbyt). La #banca dejaría de ingresar 1.137 millones sin suelos hipotecarios http://expansionpro.orbyt.es/2013/06/13/banca_y_finanzas/1371156600.html …. 13-06-2013. *Tuit.*

El diario *Expansión*, dedicado a la difusión de contenidos especializados en el ámbito económico, posee tres perfiles en Twitter: @expansioncom, @expansionbolsa y @expansion_orbyt. En los tres se publican *tuits* que recogen los titulares de las informaciones más destacadas de la edición digital de este periódico junto con enlaces que remiten a las propias noticias, con la diferencia de que en la última de estas cuentas el internauta que acceda a dicho enlace será conducido a la sección con la que *Expansión* cuenta en el quiosco digital multisoporte Orbyt, una plataforma que solo permite consultar sus contenidos previo pago. De forma que el usuario de Twitter que, atraído por el contenido de este mensaje, haga clic en el enlace, podrá leer únicamente el titular y un breve extracto del *lead* de la noticia. Para acceder al resto de la información tendrá que comprar la edición de *Expansión* para Orbyt.

Por tanto, *tuits* como el anterior responden más a una finalidad publicitaria que a la meramente informativa. Especialmente si se edita el titular para convertir una de las lexías que lo conforman en una etiqueta, como sucede en el mensaje antes mencionado con el término #banca. Esta podría considerarse

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de los cuales pueden encontrarse en <http://www.lahistoriadelapublicidad.com>. Última consulta: 27-10-2013.

también una doble estrategia publicitaria encaminada, por una parte, a otorgar mayor visibilidad a la empresa periodística –incrementándose de manera exponencial si este *hashtag* llega a convertirse en tema del momento– y, por otra, a seleccionar entre todos los usuarios de Twitter a los interesados en la temática de carácter financiero. Además, los propios consumidores de este tipo de publicidad se convierten en «cómplices» de esta sutil campaña de márquetin al *retuitear* tanto el titular como el enlace que conduce a la noticia de pago, aunque su propósito sea únicamente manifestar su punto de vista sobre la información recogida:

> Mónica Melle (@monicamelle). Pues q ganen un poco menos....La #banca dejaría de ingresar 1.137 millones sin suelos hipotecarios http://expansionpro.orbyt.es/2013/06/13/banca_y_finanzas/1371156600.html …. 13-06-2013. *Tuit.*

Ya Lara (2008) ha puesto de manifiesto cómo la conectividad con las audiencias es una de las principales motivaciones que llevan a los medios a situarse en las redes sociales –cfr. también Helfrich (en prensa)–. De hecho, Johnson (2009) asegura que en un futuro no muy lejano todo gran canal de información será *tuiteado*. Precisamente una de las funciones que Orihuela (2011) atribuye a Twitter es su uso como plataforma de publicación, lo que ha llevado a numerosos periodistas a servirse de esta red de *microblogging* para cultivar la relación de proximidad con sus lectores, creando la sensación de que comparten con ellos intereses e inquietudes dentro de una misma comunidad. Por ejemplo, en el siguiente *tuit* Ramón Lobo –colaborador de *El Periódico*, *InfoLibre* y la Cadena Ser– no se limita a dar a conocer mediante un enlace la fórmula creada por un comité de expertos para calcular las pensiones en los próximos años, sino que trata de manifestar a sus seguidores su convicción de que sea como sea dicho cálculo les va a perjudicar:

> Ramón Lobo (@ramonlobo). Si no entiendes la fórmula del cálculo de las #pensiones, no preocupes: pase lo que pase, bonanza o crisis, pierdes pic.twitter.com/MDdgWhn2HD. 07-06-2013. *Tuit.*

Y de esta forma apela a los seguidores de la etiqueta #pensiones uno de los tertulianos del debate televisivo *Al Rojo Vivo*, para pedir su colaboración al tiempo que promociona el programa:

> Fernando Berlín (@radiocable). Venga, echadme una mano estamos en @DebatAlRojoVivo hablando de las #pensiones. I¿deas?. 07-06-2013. *Tuit.*

Índice

Asimismo, como puede apreciarse en el siguiente mensaje del director editorial de *Infolibre*, algunos periodistas se sirven de los *hashtags* para anunciar la publicación de columnas de opinión elaboradas por sus colaboradores,

> Jesús Maraña (@jesusmarana). «Los otros escraches», por @manuelrico en #infolibrehttp://bit.ly/13EcKku #desahucios#PAH. 29-03-2013. *Tuit.*

o incluso para otorgar mayor difusión a sus propios artículos:

> Vicente Vallés (@VicenteVallesTV). El #Príncipe, la #crisis y los otros... http://ow.ly/pJ6oW. 11-10-2013. *Tuit.*

Aunque entre las finalidades del discurso mediático se encuentran fundamentalmente la de ofrecer información o interpretar la actualidad noticiosa desde una posición de saber acerca de los asuntos políticos y sociales del mundo que otorga legitimidad a la instancia informativa, creemos que en mensajes como los anteriores impera también un propósito propagandístico. No en vano, los periodistas insertan en sus mensajes una etiqueta que saben que otorgará mayor difusión a su trabajo, haciendo que este sea conocido por una audiencia potencialmente interesada en temas como la crisis, los desahucios o la situación de la banca española. Una práctica similar siguen las empresas periodísticas como *El País*, que difunde de esta forma la crónica de una de sus corresponsales:[11]

> EL PAÍS Política (@elpais_politica). El PP se queda solo en la aprobación de la nueva ley antidesahucios. Una crónica de @anabeldn. #desahucioshttp://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/04/18/actualidad/1366292843_530574.html …. 18-04-2013. *Tuit.*

Es cierto que este *tuit* difiere del de @expansion_orbyt que analizábamos más arriba, pues contiene un enlace que permite acceder a la noticia completa sin necesidad de pagar por consultarla. Además, incita a los interesados en la etiqueta #desahucios a acceder a la página web del medio de comunicación

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11. Aunque véase cómo en el texto no se recoge su nombre, sino el que identifica a su cuenta en Twitter. Tal vez porque, a juzgar por sus más de 25.000 seguidores, se la considera lo suficientemente conocida en esta red social como para mencionar únicamente su nombre de usuario. También podría identificarse este recurso como una muestra de publicidad semiescondida, ya que no conviene olvidar que el nombre de usuario es un elemento multimodal que funciona como enlace, capaz de dirigir a los lectores del *tuit* directamente al perfil de esta periodista.

para consultar una crónica cuyo titular ha sido modificado ligeramente, quizás en un intento de llamar la atención de un mayor número de internautas:

> «El PP aprueba solo la ley de desahucios tras intentar atraer a algún grupo», Anabel Díez, *El País*, 18-04-2013, disponible en: <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/04/18/actualidad/1366292843_530574.html>. Última consulta: 24-10-2013.

Y al comparar este otro mensaje difundido por la agencia de noticias Europa Press,

> EP_Economía (@EPEconomia). #ÚLTIMAHORA. De Guindos limita a 2.000 millones las necesidades adicionales de capital de la #banca española - http://goo.gl/TEHDu. 18-06-2013. *Tuit.*

con el titular de la noticia mencionada –a la que puede accederse directamente mediante el enlace que recoge el *tuit*–

> «De Guindos dice que la banca necesitará 2.000 millones adicionales», *Europa Press*, 18-06-2013, disponible en: <http://www.europapress.es/economia/finanzas-00340/noticia-guindos-limita-2000-millones-necesidades-adicionales-capital-banca-espanola-20130618122721.html>.Última consulta: 24-10-2013.

advertimos cómo el verbo de habla introductor de discurso referido *decir* ha sido sustituido en Twitter por el verbo *limitar*, lo que conlleva una interpretación añadida por parte del gestor del perfil desde el que se ha difundido la información en esta red social.[12] Asimismo, además del *hashtag* #banca, se ha escogido el de #últimahora, quizás en un intento de atraer a otros lectores ávidos de conocer la actualidad. Una estrategia muy utilizada también por otros medios de comunicación, que recurren a esa misma etiqueta de vago contenido referencial, lo que explicaría que esta suela aparecer acompañada por otras que identifican el tema del mensaje de manera más precisa:

> 20minutos.es (@20m). #ultimahora La PAH quiere retirar su ILP contra desahucios porque la propuesta del PP «desvirtúa» el texto #pah #desahucios. 18-04-2013. *Tuit.*

12. Como recuerda Méndez (2000: 150), para ciertos autores –como Palmer (1986)– «existe una modalidad lingüística específica, la citativa, que marca la falta de compromiso del hablante en la verdad de su proposición. Sin embargo, la existencia de una gama tan amplia de verbos de habla introductores de discurso referido es la mejor prueba de que hay interpretación».

Vamos a centrarnos ahora en el análisis de otro tipo de discurso esencialmente propagandístico: el político.[13] El uso de Twitter como herramienta de propaganda electoral cobró gran relevancia durante los comicios presidenciales norteamericanos de 2008.[14] A partir de entonces las redes sociales han modificado la forma tradicional de hacer campaña, reduciendo los costes de la comunicación directa con el ciudadano, y modificando las relaciones entre las élites políticas y los electores (Miller, 2008). En España, durante la campaña electoral de noviembre de 2011 Twitter logró la hegemonía de la comunicación política en la Red, en perjuicio de otras redes sociales (Mancera y Pano, 2013). Pero en la actualidad los *tuits* no solo son utilizados como medios de propaganda política durante los comicios, sino también como instrumento de comunicación habitual entre políticos e internautas. Así, esta red social se ha convertido en una herramienta de gestión de la imagen de los gobernantes –o de aquellos que aspiran a serlo–, muy eficaz para ayudarles a alcanzar el poder y a mantener una comunicación más fluida con los ciudadanos. En nuestro corpus las manifestaciones del discurso político pueden clasificarse en dos grandes grupos. Por una parte se encuentran los mensajes de apoyo hacia las políticas llevadas a cabo por el Gobierno para hacer frente a la crisis. Estos son publicados por líderes del Partido Popular, por los perfiles institucionales del propio partido o de sus delegaciones regionales, así como por organizaciones afines, como Nuevas Generaciones del PP de la Comunidad Valenciana, que en el siguiente mensaje recurre a la etiqueta #austeridad para alabar la gestión del presidente de dicha comunidad, Alberto Fabra, representante de esta formación:

> NNGG C. Valenciana (@NNGG_CV). #Austeridad El Consell de @AlbertoFabra ahorra 2 millones con eficiencia energética en los edificios públicos http://www.larazon.es/noticia/7951-el-consell-quiere-bajar-un-22-5-el-gasto-de-luz-de-los-hospitales …. 26-11-2013. *Tuit.*

Por otra parte, muy distinta es la perspectiva adoptada por los partidos y por los políticos en la oposición, que recurren a Twitter para criticar tanto al Gobierno como a quienes atribuyen la responsabilidad de la crisis. En su mayoría, los *tuits* de este corpus pueden caracterizarse como discurso populista del tipo manipulación débil que, según Charaudeau (2012: 132), se presta

13. La bibliografía en español dedicada a analizar este tipo de discurso es muy numerosa. Cfr. por ejemplo Coseriu, 1994; Fernández Lagunilla, 1999a y 1999b; Van Dijk, 2002; Blas Arroyo, 2011, entre otros.

14. Cfr. Cornfield (2008) o Gutiérrez-Rubí (2008).

especialmente bien para contextos de crisis social. Igualmente representativos de este contexto son los actos de (auto)defensa y justificación. Entre los primeros destacan aquellos *tuits* con los que un dirigente pretende poner de relieve gestiones positivas llevadas a cabo por él mismo en el pasado –de ahí el uso constante del verbo *recordar*–, con el fin de presentarse como el único que combate la crisis con medidas eficaces:

> Partido Popular (@PPopular). Recordamos que el Gobierno de @marianorajoy ha sido el primero en legislar contra los #Desahucios. 05-06-2013. *Tuit.*

Compárese también el mensaje en forma de testimonio personal *–os dejo–* del alcalde de Gandía, Arturo Torró, en el que recurre a términos como *ahorrar* y *austeridad*, que en momentos de crisis otorgan a su gestión connotaciones positivas,

> Arturo Torró (@arturotorro). Os dejo la noticia de Canal 9 sobre mi decisión de renunciar al sueldo como alcalde de #Gandia para ahorrar #austeridadhttp://ow.ly/cILoO. 03-09-2013. *Tuit.*

y este otro con el que UPyD Asturias anuncia la puesta en práctica de una medida de ahorro con la que se felicita indirectamente, mostrando que ha sido iniciativa suya:

> UPyD Asturias (@UPyDAsturias). Los portavoces de la Junta General del Principado renuncian a los coches oficiales a iniciativa de @UPyD - http://www.asturiasmagenta.es/administraciones-publicas/los-portavoces-de-la-junta-general-del-principado-renuncian-a-los-coches-oficiales-a-iniciativa-de-upyd/ …#austeridad. 04-05-2012. *Tuit.*

En los ejemplos de nuestro corpus se incluyen también hiperenlaces que remiten a recursos multimodales de distinto tipo –fotografías, vídeos, documentos o mensajes publicados en otras redes sociales, como Facebook–, que pretenden exhibirse tanto como (auto)justificación como prueba de acusación, según la autoría del mensaje. Asimismo, es frecuente que el hilo argumentativo se refuerce con estadísticas como la utilizada por el exalcalde socialista de San Sebastián, Odón Elorza, para dañar la imagen positiva (Brown y Levinson, 1978) del adversario político:

> Odón Elorza (@odonelorza2011). STOP a las políticas d #austeridad y recortes sociales. España tendría un 40% de pobres dentro de diez años. http://www.

diariovasco.com/rc/20121213/mas-actualidad/sociedad/poblacion-espanola-sera-pobre-201212131659.html …. 17-12-2012. *Tuit.*

Por último, entre los tipos de discurso propagandístico identificados por Charaudeau (2012) se encuentra el promocional, con el que se persigue prevenir una calamidad o persuadir a la población para que se comporte de una determinada manera o adopte ciertos hábitos. En nuestro corpus abundan los mensajes en los que organizaciones y plataformas de reivindicación dirigen apelaciones a los usuarios de Twitter instándolos, por ejemplo, a acudir a una manifestación:

> Juventud SIN Futuro (@juventudsin). #YaDeberíasSaberQue el viernes hay un nuevo #escrache en Madrid. 19H en la glorieta del metro de Rubén Darío. ¡Vente! pic.twitter.com/JlFqFxVpPU. 24-04-2013. *Tuit.*

En el mensaje precedente Juventud Sin Futuro (JSF)[15] se sirve de la segunda persona del singular para apelar directamente a cada internauta, instándole mediante un imperativo y un pronombre personal en posición enclítica a que acuda a una manifestación frente al domicilio de un gobernante para reprobar su comportamiento. De ahí que recurra al *hashtag* #escrache. Llama además la atención el uso de la etiqueta #YaDeberíasSaberQue para presentar el contenido del *tuit* como información consabida por el ciudadano, al que implícitamente se le atribuye el deber moral de estar al tanto de esta acción reivindicativa. Asimismo, encontramos una nueva muestra de comunicación multimodal en el enlace que remite a una fotografía con los datos y el eslogan de la convocatoria, una estrategia más de carácter persuasivo.

También en el siguiente *tuit* la etiqueta #escrache es utilizada por la organización Democracia Real Ya Madrid (DRYMadrid)[16] para incitar a la población a manifestarse. Si bien en este caso el *hashtag* forma parte del propio lema de la convocatoria –«De la indignación a la rebelión: Escrache al sistema»–[17] y el

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15. Un colectivo surgido en abril de 2011 para mostrar la situación de precariedad de la juventud en el ámbito laboral. Cfr. <http://juventudsinfuturo.net/sample-page/>. Última consulta: 25-10-2013.
16. Cfr. <http://madrid.democraciarealya.es/contacto/> para conocer su ideario. Última consulta: 25-10-2013.
17. Cfr. por ejemplo la noticia que informaba sobre esta convocatoria en el diario *El País*: «Bajo el lema: «De la indignación a la rebelión: Escrache al sistema»», *El País*, 11-05-2013, disponible en: <http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/05/11/album/1368288064_397106.html#1368288064_397106_1368383142>. Última consulta: 25-10-2013.

enlace no remite a una imagen, sino a una página web en la que se proporcionan los datos necesarios para poder acudir a la convocatoria:

> DRYmadrid (@DRYmadrid). De la Indignación a la rebelión. #Escrache al sistema. http://mayo2013.tomalaplaza.net/ #Plántate15M. 03-05-2013. *Tuit.*

En este sentido véase cómo, al contrario de lo que sucedía en el texto anterior –en el que se aportaban los datos fundamentales sobre el acto de protesta–, este mensaje tiene un carácter exclusivamente persuasivo. Algo que puede apreciarse además en el imperativo de la etiqueta con la que concluye, un eslogan en el que sus lexías se presentan fusionadas: #Plántate15M.

En algunos de estos textos la incitación a participar en un *escrache* no procede de los perfiles de organizaciones o movimientos sociales, sino de usuarios individuales de Twitter que se sirven incluso de insultos para tratar de persuadir a otros internautas:

> CarlosNavarroMerino (@CNavarroMerino). Hay que hacer #Escrache 24 horas al día hasta que dimita a la incompetente y déspota @mdcospedal por su insultante y temeraria actitud. RT. 18-04-2013. *Tuit.*

Con el uso de los adjetivos calificativos *incompetente*, *déspota*, *insultante* y *temeraria*, el autor del mensaje realiza actos de amenaza a la imagen (Brown y Levinson, 1978) de una persona de relevancia pública, como es María Dolores de Cospedal, secretaria general del Partido Popular. Sin embargo, no alude a ella haciendo uso de su nombre propio, sino del perfil con el que esta gobernante cuenta en Twitter, lo que convierte la actividad promovida en un acto de habla amenazante.[18] Además, mediante la inclusión de la abreviatura de *retuiteo* (RT) se insta a los lectores del *tuit* a reenviarlo para que sus *ataques ad hominem* cuenten con una mayor repercusión.

Los ejemplos de este tipo, en los que se hace uso de la agresividad e incluso de la violencia verbal podrían multiplicarse con facilidad. Sin embargo, Twitter también puede ser utilizado como herramienta para difundir valores positivos como el respeto a los animales. Por ejemplo, el siguiente mensaje

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18. El uso del nombre del perfil de Twitter de M.ª D. de Cospedal, en lugar de su nombre real, no solo es una forma de ahorrar algunos caracteres, sino también una manera de hacer que el mensaje aparezca recogido en la sección *Menciones*. Este es un apartado especial en la cuenta de un usuario que permite ver fácilmente qué personas han mencionado, por las razones que sean, su *nick* en esta red social. En este sentido la amenaza es más directa, pues el emisor tiene cierta garantía de que el mensaje llegará a su alocutario.

recurre a un conocido modismo que conlleva implícitamente la personificación de los animales de compañía. Le sigue un enunciado exclamativo con el que se insta a no «traicionarles» –de nuevo, un término que «humaniza» a los referentes–, y otro en modalidad declarativa que destaca el tema principal de una noticia disponible a través de un enlace que se adjunta al final del propio *tuit*:

> Advantix® España ‏(@Advantix). Si donde comen 2, comen 3, ¡no los traiciones! La #crisis agudiza el abandono de #perros. Evítalo, sé responsable: http://ow.ly/pc5Y7. 01-08-2012.*Tuit.*

En principio podría pensarse que el contenido de este texto es promocional, pues mediante las formas imperativas *evítalo* o *sé responsable* se pretende inscribir a la instancia de recepción en una ética de responsabilidad. Sin embargo, su finalidad es esencialmente publicitaria. Así, dicho mensaje ha sido difundido por el perfil comercial de Advantix® España.[19] Por tanto, aunque su contenido sea informativo –pues difunde una noticia publicada ese mismo día en el diario *ElEconomista.es*–, y adopte fórmulas recurrentes en el discurso promocional, en realidad estamos ante una estrategia publicitaria común en esta red social. Y es que resulta frecuente que desde la cuenta de usuario de una empresa comercial se envíen *tuits* que permiten asociar la imagen de la marca con valores positivos. Además, este tipo de perfiles ofrece a sus seguidores noticias que los mantiene informados sobre la temática que más les interesa. Por otra parte, el texto analizado responde también a la necesidad inherente en cualquier cuenta de usuario de Twitter de mantener una presencia realmente activa. Así, con el objetivo de no provocar un rechazo en el alocutario con continuos mensajes publicitarios, se recurre a la difusión de noticias que se encuentran en su horizonte de interés, y que proporcionan por tanto un valor añadido al perfil de la empresa –y por ende, a su imagen de marca–. Por último, mediante el uso de etiquetas como las que aparecen en este *tuit*, @Advantix pretende difundir su mensaje no solo entre los internautas interesados en el cuidado de los canes –#perros–, sino también entre aquellas noticias que contengan el *hashtag* #crisis. De esta manera un solo mensaje se sitúa en la confluencia de dos coordenadas muy diferentes, una vinculada al campo semántico de los intereses de la empresa, y otra a la actualidad mediática. Por tanto, creemos que Twitter ha modificado en gran medida las condiciones del *contrato de comunicación* (Charaudeau, 1992) por el que suelen regirse los discursos propagandísticos.

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19. Un producto creado por los laboratorios Bayer para combatir la *leishmaniasis* canina.

En la siguiente tabla mostramos el número de *tuits* que poseen contenidos de carácter propagandístico, clasificándolos en función de los cuatro tipos de discurso que hemos identificado en las páginas precedentes:

<table>
<tr><th colspan="6">CÓMPUTO DE TUITS</th></tr>
<tr><th></th><th colspan="4">Con contenido propagandístico</th><th rowspan="2">Sin contenido propagandístico</th></tr>
<tr><th>Etiquetas</th><th>Publicitario</th><th>Mediático</th><th>Político</th><th>Promocional</th></tr>
<tr><td>#austeridad</td><td>2</td><td>31</td><td>23</td><td>1</td><td>43</td></tr>
<tr><td>#banca</td><td>14</td><td>48</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>31</td></tr>
<tr><td>#crisis</td><td>5</td><td>37</td><td>3</td><td>7</td><td>48</td></tr>
<tr><td>#crisiseconomica</td><td>4</td><td>48</td><td>11</td><td>3</td><td>34</td></tr>
<tr><td>#desahucios</td><td>4</td><td>55</td><td>4</td><td>14</td><td>23</td></tr>
<tr><td>#economistasfrentealacrisis</td><td>30</td><td>43</td><td>5</td><td>2</td><td>20</td></tr>
<tr><td>#EPA</td><td>10</td><td>15</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>66</td></tr>
<tr><td>#escraches</td><td>2</td><td>24</td><td>16</td><td>21</td><td>37</td></tr>
<tr><td>#euco</td><td>0</td><td>29</td><td>11</td><td>7</td><td>53</td></tr>
<tr><td>#Eurogrupo</td><td>2</td><td>75</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>21</td></tr>
<tr><td>#pah</td><td>5</td><td>34</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>41</td></tr>
<tr><td>#paro</td><td>7</td><td>57</td><td>6</td><td>6</td><td>24</td></tr>
<tr><td>#pensiones</td><td>9</td><td>62</td><td>6</td><td>2</td><td>21</td></tr>
<tr><td>#recapitalización</td><td>13</td><td>64</td><td>6</td><td>0</td><td>17</td></tr>
<tr><td>#recesión</td><td>6</td><td>68</td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>21</td></tr>
<tr><td>#rescates</td><td>7</td><td>43</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>49</td></tr>
<tr><td>#stopdesahucios</td><td>3</td><td>27</td><td>6</td><td>36</td><td>28</td></tr>
<tr><td>#15M</td><td>1</td><td>13</td><td>7</td><td>12</td><td>67</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2"></td><td>124 (10,72 %)</td><td>773 (66,86 %)</td><td>129 (11,15 %)</td><td>130 (11,24 %)</td><td rowspan="2">644 (35,77 %)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">1156 (64,22 %)</td></tr>
<tr><th colspan="6">Número total de tuits: 1800</th></tr>
</table>

Índice

Como puede apreciarse, la mayor parte de los mensajes que conforman nuestro corpus analítico ostenta carácter propagandístico –el 64,22 %–, y apenas un tercio de ellos –el 35,77 %– carece de este tipo de contenidos. Estos últimos suelen contener valoraciones de los internautas acerca de aspectos relacionados con la crisis, o informaciones sobre cuestiones de la actualidad noticiosa vinculadas con la etiqueta mencionada en cada caso. Por tanto, dichos textos nada tienen que ver con el concepto de propaganda que hemos presentado al inicio de esta investigación.

Por otra parte, de los cuatro tipos de discurso propagandístico que identificábamos, el más recurrente en los *tuits* estudiados es el que hemos denominado *mediático*, con el que las empresas periodísticas aprovechan su presencia en Twitter para difundir entre los seguidores de esta red social sus contenidos, instándolos a acceder al enlace de una determinada noticia publicada en su página web, o con el que los propios comunicadores publicitan los contenidos elaborados por ellos mismos. Estos mensajes constituyen el 66,86 % del total de *tuits* con contenido propagandístico, mientras que las otras categorías discursivas identificadas tienen una representatividad mucho menor. Así, el discurso *promocional* podemos localizarlo en el 11,24 % de los textos, el *político* en el 11,15 % y el *publicitario* apenas en el 10,72 %.

De las dieciocho etiquetas en función de las cuales hemos recopilado los 1800 *tuits* que analizamos, las utilizadas de manera más frecuente por periodistas y medios de comunicación para hacer propaganda de sus contenidos son #Eurogrupo (75 *tuits* representativos del discurso *mediático*), #recesión (68), #recapitalización (64) y #pensiones (62). Estas son aprovechadas por las empresas periodísticas para difundir noticias en relación con las decisiones adoptadas por los ministros de Economía y Finanzas de los países que constituyen la denominada «Zona Euro», o para informar acerca de las medidas adoptadas por España para superar el descenso en su actividad productiva y la reforma de las pensiones. Por otra parte, nada extraña que #stopdesahucios (36 *tuits* característicos del discurso *promocional*), #escraches (21) y #desahucios (14) sean los *hashtags* más utilizados por los internautas para difundir contenidos de carácter promocional, con los que instan a la movilización con el fin de paralizar la expulsión de sus viviendas de aquellos que no pueden pagar la hipoteca, o a manifestarse frente al domicilio de los líderes políticos para denunciar su gestión de la crisis. Lógicamente, el significado de la etiqueta #escraches hace que sea también una de las más utilizadas en la propaganda política (16 *tuits*), si bien la más recurrente en los discursos de este tipo que conforman nuestro corpus es #austeridad (23). Por último, es #economistasfrentealacrisis el *hashtag* más representativo del discurso publicitario (30), pues es aprovechado por los miembros de dicha asociación de economistas para recomendar a los seguidores de esta red social que adquieran los libros sobre la crisis publicados por este grupo de expertos.

4. Conclusiones

Según Castells (1996) nos encontramos en una *sociedad red* que se caracteriza por un estado mental colectivo en el que las conciencias de los ciudadanos son redes neuronales que interactúan con otras mentes y con otras redes del entorno social y natural. De hecho, las redes sociales operan como un *sistema sináptico* (Orihuela, 2011) que facilita la organización espontánea de sus participantes. Ya Negroponte (1995) advirtió del inmenso potencial que poseen las redes sociales para la democracia, debido a que la *hiperconectividad* que promueven permite construir conglomerados de relaciones, y descubrir patrones de pensamiento comunes. Esto se hace especialmente patente en los mensajes publicados en Twitter, gracias a los que el internauta logra un nivel elevado de *presencia ciberespacial* (Zhao y Rosson, 2009) o, como explica Yus (2010: 161), «una sensación de "estar ahí" [que permite] obtener otro nivel de conexión con los amigos y el mundo en general».

En primer lugar, esta presencia constante que permite la publicación diaria de *tuits* resulta especialmente beneficiosa para las empresas, pues les ofrece la oportunidad de difundir las bondades de sus productos en esta red social (Schaefer, 2012). Con este fin intentan atraer la atención de potenciales clientes incluyendo en sus mensajes etiquetas que pueden llegar a convertirse en temas del momento debido al alto interés social que generan –como son, por ejemplo, #crisis, #pensiones o #paro–. La inserción de este tipo de *hashtags* no solo otorga mayor repercusión a sus mensajes, sino que ofrece un valor añadido a su imagen de marca, al mostrarse como compañías al tanto de las principales preocupaciones de sus clientes en momentos de dificultades económicas.

Un tipo especial de compañías ha suscitado también nuestro interés: las empresas de comunicación. Tanto para estas como para los profesionales que en ellas trabajan, la interacción con su audiencia potencial en Twitter permite otorgar mayor difusión a sus productos periodísticos o audiovisuales. Además, para Charaudeau (2012) el discurso mediático es esencialmente propagandístico, ya que la instancia de enunciación persigue *hacer saber* al alocutario, basándose en la legitimidad que le confiere su posición de conocedor de la actualidad noticiosa. Esto lleva al perfil de un periodista o al gestionado por un medio de comunicación a la publicación constante de mensajes con los que demuestra que se encuentra permanentemente al tanto de las últimas noticias. Lo que por añadidura puede lograr atraer a la página web del medio a internautas deseosos de conocer la información de última hora, incrementando de esta forma su número de visitas. Como en el caso anterior, el uso de etiquetas vinculadas con aspectos que guardan relación con la crisis económica incrementa el interés de los ciudadanos por sus mensajes. Según hemos podido apreciar en nuestro análisis, muchos de ellos llegan incluso a *retuitear* sus textos, lo que actúa como un refuerzo añadido de la actividad propagandística del propio medio de comunicación.

También para las formaciones y los líderes políticos –siempre deseosos de mostrarse en «primera línea» del debate público– Twitter ofrece la oportunidad de interactuar de forma directa con internautas ante los que no dudan en solicitar su voto, y de manifestar sus puntos de vista formulando incluso actos de amenaza a la imagen de sus principales oponentes. Con frecuencia, para reforzar su argumentación se sirven de recursos multimodales de distinto tipo, y de etiquetas como #austeridad, con las que ensalzan sus iniciativas o sus gestiones en el Gobierno para hacer frente a la crisis.

Por último, organizaciones y plataformas de reivindicación creadas para luchar contra la crisis formulan desde sus perfiles en esta red social discursos promocionales con los que tratan de incitar a los ciudadanos a desarrollar conductas solidarias o a acudir a distintas manifestaciones. Para ello recurren también a etiquetas en las que sintetizan eslóganes como #Plántate15M o #escrachealsistema.

Sabido es el sentido negativo que el uso cotidiano otorga a la noción de *propaganda*, ya que con frecuencia se concibe como un sinónimo de *manipulación* –o «comunicación estratégica», de acuerdo con el marco teórico de Habermas (1984 [1989]) –. Esto es algo que hemos podido apreciar en nuestro corpus, especialmente en los *tuits* de carácter político, que tratan en su mayoría de perpetuar las estructuras de poder vigentes.

Sin embargo, son muchos los individuos y los grupos que se sirven de manera sistemática de su cuenta de Twitter para «construir» un marco cognitivo –en el sentido de Lakoff (2007)– distinto al hegemónico. De esta forma intentan contrarrestar los mensajes sobre la crisis difundidos tanto por la Troika como por el Gobierno español. Así, frente al marco metafórico de «un país, una familia» –al que corresponden consideraciones como la de que los españoles han vivido por encima de sus posibilidades, o la de que es necesario «apretarse el cinturón»–, los miembros de ATTAC, Equo, AI, Juventud Rebel, DRY u Oxfam, entre otros, aprovechan su perfil en esta red social para la difusión de una contra-argumentación respecto a tal interpretación de la crisis. Esto podría considerarse una muestra de lo que ya Laclau y Mouffe (1987: 213) denominaban «estrategia de construcción de un nuevo orden», vinculada con intentos de «instituir puntos nodales diferentes, desde los cuales puede procederse a una reconstrucción positiva distinta del tejido social». No en vano, para Castells (2012: 233) los movimientos sociales en red son «nuevas formas de movimientos democráticos […] que están reconstruyendo la esfera pública en el espacio de autonomía creado en torno a la interacción entre sitios locales y redes de Internet». Sin embargo, el medio no es el mensaje. Ni siquiera un medio de extraordinaria difusión, como es Internet y, en particular, una red social del alcance de Twitter. Por eso tampoco debe olvidarse que la forma de conexión entre los individuos es multimodal, y que tal interacción abarca tanto redes *online* como *offline*, ya existentes en los medios de comunicación y en la sociedad en general. De ahí esa estrecha vinculación que los discursos mediáticos, políticos y promocionales de nuestro corpus guardan en ocasiones con los publicitarios. Tal vez porque todos ellos se sirven de lo que podríamos denominar una *retórica de la persuasión* en Twitter. Esta se fundamenta en dos coordenadas básicas: el perfil de los usuarios y los *hashtags* que se utilizan. Podríamos decir que la mayoría de las cuentas que hemos analizado en nuestro corpus constan de un doble componente. Por una parte se encuentra el nombre de usuario y el avatar que lo identifica, que puede ser más o menos corporativo. Por otra, el contenido discursivo desarrollado por el gestor de este perfil a lo largo del tiempo, que responde a dos objetivos muy diferentes: el primero de ellos es el de crear, desarrollar y consolidar una imagen positiva; y el segundo consiste en ofrecer un canal de comunicación especializado que permita atraer al mayor número de seguidores posibles. Asimismo, la segunda coordenada que hemos mencionado anteriormente la constituyen las etiquetas, cuya función no es solo la de facilitar la clasificación de contenidos por su temática, sino también la de crear una red de mensajes, y por añadidura de usuarios que publican, leen y contestan a esos mensajes, llegando incluso a *retuitearlos* o a conectarlos a su vez con otros *hashtags*. Por tanto, el éxito de un perfil creado con una finalidad propagandística depende en gran medida del buen uso que se haga del singular arte de la persuasión que impera en Twitter.

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Utopia in a liberal world facing crisis. Analysis of the new «grammars of change»

La utopía en un mundo liberal enfrentado a la crisis. Análisis de las nuevas «gramáticas del cambio»

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ABSTRACT: The decline of utopia in some western intellectual environments has become an object of interest for scientists and essayists in these last few years. Yet, little has been done to analyze the common sense production of utopias or dystopias. This article will make use of the results of a statistical survey (n=2774) to describe what can be called, in reference to Wittgenstein's philosophy, «the grammars of change», *i.e.*, a more or less shared representation of «what is wrong» with society, but also of the real or illusionary possibilities to transform society. The article focuses on a striking line of tension. While some people still value political action as the bearer of a possible change, most interviewees consider it obsolete and unreliable. These people, who are so skeptical about politics, tend on the contrary to (over)invest in the idea that the power of change lies within the individual, in everybody's changing their own values and attitudes.

Keywords: sociology of individualism, grammars of change, self-help, utopia, faith in politics, liberal societies.

RESUMEN: El declive de las utopías entre ciertos sectores intelectuales occidentales se ha convertido en objeto de interés científico y ensayístico en los últimos años, a pesar de lo cual no se han realizado suficientes análisis sobre la producción del sentido común en relación a las utopías y distopías. El presente artículo utiliza los resultados de una encuesta estadística (n=2774) para describir lo que podrían denominarse, siguiendo la filosofía de Wittgenstein, las «gramáticas del cambio», es decir, la representación, en mayor o menor medida, común de «lo que está mal» en la sociedad, aunque también de las posibilidades reales o ilusorias de transformación de la misma. El artículo se centra en una notable línea de

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tensión: mientras que algunas personas todavía valoran la acción política como motor posible de cambio, la mayoría de los entrevistados la consideran obsoleta y poco fiable. Estos últimos, escépticos con la política, tienden, por el contrario, a (sobre)valorar la idea de que el poder de cambio reside en los individuos, en que cada uno cambie sus propios valores y comportamientos.

Palabras clave: sociología del individualismo, gramáticas del cambio, autoayuda, utopía, confianza en la política, sociedades liberales.

1. Introduction: On the merits of a sociological view of lay usage of the discourse about «the crisis»

Asserting that the world is in crisis will produce very little disagreement today. The language of crisis has indeed permeated most aspects of our lives. It carries with it representations of the worlds, upwellings of our imaginations as to what drags the world into a crisis, but also statements about possible ways of exiting the crisis.

What is a crisis? As of what moment can one speak of a «state of crisis»? Unlike what a positivistic perspective might lead one to believe, there are no objective criteria or cut-offs for defining the moment that one enters a crisis. This is particularly by true of economic crises. As Frederic Lordon (2009, 2011) shows, the economic sciences themselves have great difficulty *thinking through* what a crisis is. This makes it one of the most poorly constructed concepts in existence. From a social science perspective, studying a «crisis» is thus inseparable from studying the way the crisis fits into the layperson's social representations. In other words, we must ask, in the manner of the pragmatist philosopher William James, what difference the presence of this notion in our representations and social affects makes in the way we live.

What does this concern about the «crisis» span when it comes not from scientists, philosophers, politicians, or opinion leaders, but from «John and Jane Doe»? We can assert without going too far out on a limb that whilst the idea of «crisis» is the subject of academic debate, it is still infinitely fuzzier in its common sense acceptation. For the ordinary citizen, it is as much economic as it is social, environmental, moral, civilizational, and so on. The abundance of meanings around the concern that is labelled the «crisis issue» is such that the expression could be termed a «floating signifier», to borrow from the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss's concept (1950). There is nothing pejorative about this term. It merely highlights the following fact: the effectiveness of a notion, that is to say, its success in a culture, is at least partly connected to the multiplicity of its possible uses or, to state it differently, to the intrinsic semantic vacuum that characterizes it. Indeed, in common parlance, the notion of crisis, even if it is qualified as an economic one, is used to refer to much more than a problem of resource distribution or structural contradictions in the capitalistic system. In using it, people speak of unbridled liberalism, individualism, loss of landmarks, materials, etc.

The general thesis of this article is precisely that «crisis» terminology is a cultural resource (Illouz, 2008) that serves as a pressure valve for expressing the various worries that are specific to individualistic liberal-democratic societies (Ehrenberg, 2010). This discourse makes it possible to visualize and to retranslate certain (real or assumed) difficulties of living together into the liberal vocabulary of *autonomy, individual responsibility,* and the *common good.*

The sociological dissection of the ways the notion of «crisis» is used enables one to reveal a «grammar of change» amongst its users, *i.e.*, a more or less shared representation of «what is wrong» with society, of the «causes of the uneasiness» or «crises» that it experiences, but also of the real or illusionary possibilities for transforming society in a more or less well-thought-out and organized manner. This prompts us to challenge our indigenous conceptions of «the good life» and «living together in the world».

The article is organized as follows: first, I shall present my methodological approach, along with a discussion of the positions that the specific corpus led me to take. Second, I shall present this «grammar of change.» Thirdly, I shall focus on a particularly interesting question, namely, upon whom, depending on the individual, does responsibility for resolving the crisis lie? One line of tension is of particular interest in this regard, namely, the one that concerns the place of politics and political action (in these representations of common meanings) as a potential agent of change in society. Finally, in the fourth and last part we shall see what these grammars of change borrow from the liberal atmosphere that has swept through our society at the same time as they take this (neo-)liberalism as a main target of criticism.

2. Methodology and survey material

This demonstration is based on the results of a recent Internet survey. The questionnaire comprised some 150 questions concerning the respondents' values, representations, and behaviours primarily in the fields of the economy, ecology, political involvement, involvement in associations, multiculturality, self-development, and spirituality.

Specifying the population segment targeted and the way the data were collected is indispensable so as to avoid misunderstandings about the *scope* of the findings presented here. The survey effectively targeted mostly Belgian individuals who could be assumed to be socialized with regard to (even interested in) a discourse of social change. The survey was effectively publicized via channels (magazines, newsletters, associations and agencies, etc.) likely to reach people involved in sustainable development, forms of alternative economies, or even think-tanks about the future of the world, ecology, and so on. The questionnaire could be consulted on the Internet during the first few months of 2012. In all, 2741 respondents filled out the questionnaire validly.

However, the large sample size must not lead us astray: the survey cannot claim to have any «representativity» (in the statistical sense of the term). The sample was not constructed by means of a random procedure for the simple reason that the target group, *i.e.*, people already sensitized to issues of social change, is not identified. No database making it possible to construct a random sample (or to correct for bias in the sample) for such a segment exists. Consequently, given the way the survey was conducted (open access on the Internet), it is inevitably subject to the well-known problem of self-selection bias, since the respondents themselves chose to be part of the sample by answering the questionnaire (see Frippiat & Marquis, 2010). There is no certainty that these respondents are representative of the individuals who did not take part because they either did not have access to the survey or did not want to answer the questions.

While keeping this point in mind, we must nevertheless guard against embracing a «fetishist» vision of statistical representativity. Like Olivier Martin (2009), I propose here to look at the issue from the opposite angle: while this survey cannot claim to speak for a population that is not defined, it is nevertheless an exploratory study that makes it possible to approach such a population for the first time. My wager is that it reveals more clearly than in other groups the symbolic logics that have the status of an ideal type as defined by Weber. Consequently, to be correct, I shall thus take care to talk about «proportion of the sample» rather than «proportion of a population» that cannot be defined by any other means.

Table 1 gives a better idea of the sample's distribution with regard to some conventional socio-demographic variables. Notice the large proportion of women and of people having completed higher education (more than twelve years of schooling), as well as the small proportion of people under 30.

Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample

Variable	No. of valid respondents	Percentage of total
Gender		
Female	1891	69.0
Male	849	31.0
Total	**2740**	**100**
Age bracket		
Under 30	393	14.3
30-49 years	1148	41.9
50+	1199	43.8
Total	**2740**	**100**
Net monthly income		
0-1000 EUR	609	22.2
1001-2000 EUR	1429	52.2
2001 EUR or more	1220	44.5
Total	**2738**	**100**
Highest completed level of instruction		
9 years or less	122	4.5
12 years	473	17.3
more than 12 years	2137	78.3
Total	**2732**	**100**
Place of residence		
Brussels	751	28.1
Wallonia	1525	57.0

Variable	No. of valid respondents	Percentage of total
Flanders	88	3.3
Out of Belgium (mainly France)	311	11.6
Total	**2675**	**100**

The overwhelming majority of the respondents presented themselves as being better informed, more aware of, and more concerned about societal problems. What is more, many of the subjects declared that they were engaged in «work on themselves»: indeed, close to 90% agreed with the idea that they had embarked on a path of «personal development». The majority also agreed with the statement that they were sensitive to «the spiritual dimension of existence» (76.1%), working on upgrading their «human potential» (82.2%), working on their relationship with their own body (68.8%), engaged in therapy (68.3%), or even engaged in work on thinking about the «feminine and masculine values that inhabit them» (75.4%). Finally, the majority of the respondents tended to think of themselves as *different* from others, better informed and more active than the average citizen, and even had no qualms asserting that they did not see eye to eye with the population at large.

3. Grammar of change

The term «grammar» is borrowed from the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (2004). A grammar structures what the philosopher calls «a language-game». This can be understood to be a set of terms that a group of individuals belonging to one culture mobilizes often spontaneously to give meaning to the surrounding world. The study of these language-games thus enables us to grasp our cultural and socially situated «forms of life». The idea of a «language-game» is to show indeed that one cannot understand an utterance or a way of representing the world if one is not aware of the social environment in which it takes place. It is definitely not a matter of determining whether individuals are right or wrong, but of understanding how they use cultural resources and discourse to fashion the world in which they live, and to determine the opportuneness of an action. To do this, Wittgenstein said, one must study the meanings of words as one would an engine, that it to say, when it is running. In our case, that means perceiving our respondents' reactions to various propositions about the state of the world.

3.1. The idea of crisis and the causes of the general uneasiness

In the grammars glimpsed in our respondents' answers, the idea that we are living in a society *in crisis* is definitely the most widespread idea, as is shown by the massive agreement with the deliberately fuzzy proposition «We are heading for disaster if we continue to live like this» (only 7.6% of the individuals said that they rather disagreed or disagreed completely with this statement).

«We are heading for disaster if we continue to live like this»

		Number	Percent	Running total of percentages
Valid responses	Disagree completely	10	0.4	0.4
	Rather disagree	37	1.3	1.7
	Neutral	160	5.8	7.6
	Rather agree	677	24.7	32.3
	Agree completely	1857	67.7	100.0
	Total	**2741**	**100.0**	

The degree of agreement with this proposition shows well the dominance of the common representation according to which we are at an unprecedented turning point in our history. It is nevertheless interesting to observe that, beyond this plebiscite, the respondents show themselves to be much more divided when they had to answer more specific questions about the nature of this crisis. Here, two aspects bear mentioning:

The first one can be expressed as follows: Is it possible to change the current system «from inside» by adding new principles to those that already exist, *or* is the only solution that of revolutionizing the current system's fundamentals to rebuild the system on new foundations? More specifically, is it possible to reconcile a capitalistic economy's interests and ecological needs? Our respondents' answers to this question are extraordinarily varied, to the point where this variable has the largest standard deviation in the battery of questions: 44.3% of the respondents disagreed with the idea, 17.5% were indifferent to it, and 39.2% supported it. Other variables questioning the possibility of changing the current system without a fundamental overhaul yielded identical distributions. The apparent agreement about the need for change thus must not mask the different ways that individuals envision the *magnitude* of said change.

«It is possible to reconcile the interests of a capitalistic economy and ecological needs»

		Number	**Percentage**	**Running total of percentages**
Valid responses	Disagree completely	528	19.3	19.3
	Rather disagree	687	25.1	44.3
	Indifferent	480	17.5	61.8
	Rather agree	640	23.3	85.2
	Agree completely	406	14.8	100.0
	Total	**2741**	**100.0**	

The second aspect completes the first one. Beyond the general feeling of «crisis», the respondents' opinions as to the main *causes* of the situation that we are in were more divided. When they were asked to rank the threats that loomed over our world by order of importance (with 1 being the most important and 7 the least important), there was a general plebiscite for the predominance of the economic system as the leading threat. Second (and well behind the first one) came environmental destruction, followed – with the same interval – by the item concerning the increasing scarcity of resources available for humankind. The idea of a loss of meaning was in the middle, just after the problems linked to resource allocation, whilst the lack of personal development was seen as the least threatening item.

The main threats facing our world are...

	Mean	Standard deviation
The predominance of the economic system	2.6746	1.68459
Destruction of the environment	3.0467	1.66414
Overpopulation, causing global famine, and the problem of access to drinking water	3,4677	1.73357
The loss of meaning and the ambient materialism	3.5108	1.89322
Violence generated by conflicts and terrorism	4.2999	1.75419
Poverty in rich countries	5.3491	1.50071
Absence of personal development in the population	5.6512	1.62985
N valid responses	2741	

3.2. Is there still room for utopia?

Exploring the grammars of change also entails looking at the two semantic dimensions of practical or indigenous representations of *utopia* as *eutopia, i.e.*, «the good place», «the ideal society», and *u-topia,* «the place that does not exist», «the society that is impossible to achieve». Before dwelling on this point, a quick flash-back is required. For many intellectuals, the 20th century was marked by three hiatuses in the production of utopias in the Western world, to the point where catastrophe was seen as «the bad conscience of modernity» (Foessel, 2012 *a*: 666).

First, the completion of the separation between Church and State, which began with the philosophy of the Enlightenment and was confirmed in France by the Briant Act of 1905, confined belief in Heaven to the private sphere once and for all (Gauchet, 1985) and gave way to the celebration of *Reason,* which was supposed to enable man to free himself from the shackles of his «minority status» (Kant, 1792, *Was ist Auflkärung?*). The utopia of a «beyond» was replaced by a utopia made possible solely by the development of *human* abilities.

The second break corresponds to the fall of the «secular ideologies (or religions)» of Nazism and Marxism, each of which encapsulated hope for a new world accessible here below. Two notable consequences of this fall were discussed at length. First was the blow that the discovery of the atrocities that Hitler's and Stalin's regimes committed – rationally – struck the rationalist programme initiated by the Enlightenment (Dumont, 1976; de Lara, 2008). Second, the triumph of liberalism, crystallized by the end of the Cold War and fall of the Berlin Wall, was freed of the threatening alternative of Communism (De Munck, 1999). So, the world gradually became more and more disenchanted as «ideologies» – as Destutt de Tracy put it – disappeared. It would appear that the only thing remaining was a (neo-)liberal system that could destroy or take on board the criticism levelled at it (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999) and the stated utopia of which – actually a dystopia – was that of a Darwinian world in which collective structures had disappeared, everyone struggled against everyone, and exploitation knew no bounds (Bourdieu, 1998).

The third break consists of the gradual awareness of what could be called «the world's finiteness», in which it is understood that humankind henceforward has the power to destroy itself, as we have been led to believe by the development of weapons of mass destruction (see Anders, 2008), industrial and technological disasters (such as the Chernobyl accident – see Beck, 2001), and of course the many facets of the environmental problem (depletion of resources, pollution of the biosphere, destruction of the ozone layer, increase in the human population, etc.).[1]

What place can be given to utopias in this context? If we read what philosophers and sociologists have to say, three attitudes are currently competing on the field. The first one is that of *cynicism.* As revealed by Sloterdijk (1987) and Castoriadis (1975), it is the attitude espoused by those who, no longer believing in anything, not even in the possibility of progress through human reason, give up investing in change to *adapt* to the current

1. As attested by, for example, the report *The limits to growth*, published by the Club of Rome think-tank in 1972, several aspects of which reactivate some neo-Malthusian arguments (for more on this doctrine's resurgence, see Lemaître, 2009).

world, whilst gleaning as much personal advantage as they can as long as such possibilities are given them. The second attitude allegedly results from the transition from a social utopia (such as presented by More or Rabelais) to a «techno-utopia» (Musso, 2010). In this case, utopia is torn from the socio-political field to be nurtured by a scientism that prophesises that humankind's well-known problems will be solved by the development of knowledge («technoprophets»). The third attitude is that of «catastrophism» – also a dystopia – foreseeing a bleak future for humankind that is unable to understand and manage itself.

The opposition between «technoprophetism» and (biological or economic) «catastrophism» is highly visible in many discussions today. Although they share the reference to a current insufficient state (and to the *crisis* vocabulary), the announcement of a massive (imminent or more remote) change along with strong criticism of the fatal argument of *necessity* (which basically says, «If you'd been in our shoes, you wouldn't have done it differently» (Stengers, 2009)) is used by the leaders in place to justify all forms of *status quo*; the holders of each attitude accuse each other of unawareness and the inability to argue their case. Catastrophism puts itself forward as the emblem of a new lucidity, whereas its critics see in it only a form of conservatism that one must continue to counter by the search for progress that began in the Enlightenment. Some philosophers (*inter alia* Lecourt, 2003) believed that they could sum up this tension in the opposition between a specific form of humanism (confidence in human beings' abilities to think up new solutions, especially technical ones), which sees salvation in investing in research and development in particular and, more generally, in an «appeal to intelligence», on the one hand, and an unavowed form of anti-humanist asceticism (Gauchet, 1990), on the other hand, with catastrophism imagining humankind's self-limitation, even denial, of what it currently is as a necessity, whether humans impose this on themselves voluntarily («best-case scenario») or it occurs uncontrollably.

The corpus of material at our disposal enables us to discuss the picture outlined above to show that the grammar of change that was revealed by our respondents actually corresponds to none of the three typical attitudes (cynicism, techno-utopia, and catastrophism) described above.

3.2.1. Optimist

First of all, the concern for a world in crisis expressed by the respondents and crystallized in the idea that «we are heading for disaster if we continue to live like this» was generally accompanied by a form of enchanted optimism foreign to both the cynical attitude and the catastrophist perspective. The majority of the respondents believe in the possibility of an accessible «change for the better» for the world, humankind, and each of its members and stated that they could already see the seeds of such change. So, only 16.4% of the respondents stated that they did not agree with the idea that «something good will ultimately come out of the current context of crisis», whereas close to 50% said that they saw initiatives that showed that we were «on the right track».

«I think that something good will ultimately come out of the current crisis context»

		Number	Percent	Running total of percentages
Valid responses	Disagree completely	98	3.6	3.6
	Rather disagree	351	12.8	16.4
	Indifferent	823	30.0	46.4
	Rather agree	1166	42.5	88.9
	Agree completely	303	11.1	100.0
	Total	**2741**	**100.0**	

3.2.2. The paths of change

How do these individuals imagine the ways that this change, which was recognised as necessary by all, and possible by the majority, come about? The following table gives the respondents' rankings of the most probable paths of change (1 being the most probable and 8 the least probable).

The most probable paths of change are…

	Mean	Standard deviation
a change in the way the economy works	2.9792	1.98827
community action and new social movements	3.1609	1.65115
actions taken individually by each of us as citizens/consumers	3.4593	1.74263
inner work by a large number of people	4.0595	2.21057
the decisions taken by political entities	4.8070	2.19363
a larger place taken by women	5.2149	1.79358
scientific and technological progress	5.5418	1.93550
actions taken by other entities that do not depend on people	6.7775	1.83640
N valid responses	2741	

Several elements are worthwhile singling out for attention. First of all, a change in the way the economy works clearly stands out at the top of the ranking, just as the threat that the predominance of this system represented did in the previous ranking. The current context of economic crisis in which the world has been enmeshed since 2008 and the discourse that this generates definitely have weight in this plebiscite. Secondly, the «techno-utopia» mentioned above does not seem to strike a chord with the respondents, since scientific and technological progress was ranked next to last (mean ranking of 5.54 out of 8). Thirdly, the fifth place given to «decisions taken by political entities» (4.8/8) is surprising. Not only is this item in the bottom half of the table, but it is also preceded by three singular items, namely, community action, individual action, and inner work by a large number of people. So, whilst the absence of personal development was not perceived as threatening the world's future, working on oneself and individual and collective action are seen as having the ability to produce change well beyond the credibility that politicians can enjoy. This line of tension appears to be particularly interesting. That is why I propose to dwell upon it here and shall try to draw some conclusions from its examination.

4. Who will be the hoped-for agent of change?

For many commentators and essayists who have examined the current situation (see, for example, Lordon's writings), the main question still up in the air is whether the crisis context will be a factor of paralysis in the struggle and a vector of divestment from the common weal by individuals too busy saving the little that they can scrounge for themselves (in this sense, a door opening onto a new «state of nature», one of war on everybody), or, on the contrary, will blaze a trail to action and lead to *catastrophe* in its etymological meaning of *revolution.* Here it is once again interesting to examine the grammars of change to see how our respondents assign responsibility for the change(s) to come.

4.1. Disavowal of politicians

Our respondents' rapports with «politics» in general are interesting to analyse, for they are highly revealing.[2] The respondents were massively interested in local and global political issues (close to 80% of them agreed with this proposition). Yet, the lack of trust in «politics in general» is impressive. As the following table shows, only 6.1% of the respondents stated that they had faith in politics.

«Generally speaking, I have faith in politics»

		Number	Percent	Running total of percentages
Valid responses	Disagree completely	1275	46.5	46.5
	Rather disagree	868	31.7	78.2
	Indifferent	432	15.8	93.9
	Rather agree	158	5.8	99.7
	Agree completely	8	0.3	100.0
	Total	**2741**	**100.0**	

2. There are obviously statistically significant differences between the positions of the 16% who are political activists and the remaining 84% of the sample. Unfortunately, we do not have room here to expound upon all aspects of this rich corpus and thus must treat these two subsamples together.

This mistrust inevitably affects the belief in the possibility of changing things through political activism, to which only 43% of our respondents adhered. What is more, the readability and relevance of the system's categories were also challenged, for close to 40% of our respondents said that they felt that they belonged neither to the right nor the left, and more than 50% asserted that they considered the notions of right and left to be obsolete. However, the fact that politicians were considered overall to be untrustworthy and incapable (for example, 68% of the respondents thought that government could no longer regulate the economy) did not prevent the respondents from continuing massively to make many demands of their politicians: government *should* take steps to regulate financial transactions and businesses better, to control resources, to improve the educational system, and so on.

This disavowal of politics seems to be accompanied by the promotion of means of action, to wit, community action and «new social movements» on the one hand and individual actions (including work on oneself and personal development) on the other hand, that could be called apolitical, to the extent that their value comes precisely from the fact that they do not use the pathways of political action.

4.2. Community action and new social movements

It is easy to pick out from the respondents' positions the idea that the «Archimedes point» at which it becomes possible to produce change is «outside the system» – and, from their standpoint, politics seems to be part of the system. The respondents readily see themselves as members of a «new generation» and have the feeling of «belonging to it», of being «where the action is». They actually think of themselves as the linchpins of the change to come. So, 77% of them concurred with the idea that their activities (outside their work) participated in building a better world. The social movement that they envisioned would thus operate outside conventional institutionalized pathways (hence the frequent use of the adjective «alternative») and according to the model of contagion or capillarity up until an overall tipping point was reached (see the metaphor of the last drop). As the following table shows, close to 80% of the respondents believed that a minority of individuals could change things on its own.

«A minority that thinks differently can make things change»

		Number	Percent	Running total of percentages
Valid responses	Disagree completely	47	1.7	1.7
	Rather disagree	218	8.0	9.7
	Indifferent	357	13.0	22.7
	Rather agree	1376	50.2	72.9
	Agree completely	743	27.1	100.0
	Total	**2741**	**100,0**	

4.3. Working on oneself

Even more astonishing is the number of respondents who seem to engage in individual action, self-help, personal development, or working on oneself as a factor of social change. Faith in the minority is backed up by faith in the individual and her/his abilities. For the needs of this article, personal development can be defined as a logical scheme (of meaning and action) whereby the individual, acting alone or in a group, can work on her/himself in order to mobilize until then unexplored «inner resources» for the purpose of improving certain aspects of her/his life and the world in which s/he lives.[3] Whilst personal development may have a bad reputation in certain social strata, it was not at all perceived as something negative in this sample: only 10% of the respondents agreed with the proposition «personal development is above all the action of individuals who are concerned about themselves only», while 77% rejected it (and 13% said that they were «Indifferent»). On the contrary, personal development enjoyed the «anti-establishment» connotation in which it is often wrapped. Why is self-improvement seen as having the virtue to change the world? The respondents gave several reasons (for example, 91.2% feel that «our future will hinge on the quality of human relations»), but they can be subsumed under the banners of «practical anthropology» and «practical

3. For a more extensive discussion of how it is possible to define «personal development» in social science, see Marquis (2012).

cosmology» (Marquis, 2012) that are revealed by the respondents' grammars. These widespread symbolic formations can be understood as ways of conceiving human beings and the world to make them accessible to action. For most of our respondents, human beings were «basically good» (only 27.4% disagreed with this proposition), but «society is what warps certain human beings» (only 15% disagreed with this proposition). In this representation of the world, the respondents reactivated a very common old scheme of thinking that pits the «good savage» against the «bad product of civilisation». The sociologist Claudine Herzlich had already identified this scheme in 1969 in the general discourse surrounding health and illness: «society», in its common acception, is yet another floating signifier that is used to explain many problems. It is on the side of the artificial that contaminates us, whereas our inner being is the reservoir of what is natural and pure. So, it is interesting to observe that the majority of our respondents did not feel that the social environments in which they moved respected their inner beings.

«I have the impression of living in a social environment that respects my deepest inner being»

		Number	**Percent**	**Running total of percentages**
Valid responses	Disagree completely	434	15.8	15.8
	Rather disagree	1019	37.2	53.0
	Indifferent	602	22.0	75.0
	Rather agree	545	19.9	94.9
	Agree completely	141	5.1	100.0
	Total	**2741**	**100,0**	

Two consequences of this symbolic representation should be noted. First, the respondents assert a more monistic approach against the naturalistic ontology that separates man from nature (Descola, 2005): 95.2% shared the view that «Earth is a huge organism with which we must live harmoniously», and 92.8% agreed with the proposition «The human being is part of nature and must not try to control it». There, too, «society» is what allegedly perverts human beings by cutting them off from a symbiotic relationship with the environment that it is imperative to restore.

The second consequence is even more interesting. In the respondents' grammar it is thus meaningful to work on oneself (on one's identity, inner being, values, true relationship with one's body or others, etc.) to «(re)find oneself», even – and even more so – if this work entails distancing oneself from «society», from «the system». As we have seen, a large proportion of the respondents in this sample announced that they were effectively engaged in personal development, in upgrading their human potential, etc. From their point of view, that is not a choice that we are free to make. «Developing oneself» is rather an obligation, as the following table shows.

«Generally speaking, all human beings should try to develop themselves throughout their lives»

		Number	Percent	Running total of percentages
Valid responses	Disagree completely	11	0.4	0.4
	Rather disagree	15	0.5	0.9
	Indifferent	175	6.4	7.3
	Rather agree	885	32.3	39.6
	Agree completely	1655	60.4	100.0
	Total	**2741**	**100.0**	

This obligation is not just a matter of self-respect; it is also a matter of living in society. For these respondents, speaking of «the social responsibility of personal development or of working on oneself» is not an oxymoron. Indeed, it is possible to detect in this practical anthropology an equation between personal development and social development, as shown by the very broad support for the cliché[4] according to which «being oneself already changes things».

4. There is nothing pejorative about this term. It is to be understood simply as an expression able to reflect a certain spirit of the times.

«Being oneself already changes things»

		Number	Percentage	Running total of percentages
Valid responses	Disagree completely	33	1.2	1.2
	Rather disagree	111	4.0	5.3
	Indifferent	463	16.9	22.1
	Rather agree	1075	39.2	61.4
	Agree completely	1059	38.6	100.0
	Total	**2741**	**100.0**	

5. The elective affinities between personal development and the decline of politics

Is there a connection between the decline of politics and politicians' credibility and (over)investment in the individual's or group's abilities seen in this grammar of change? That is what we shall analyse now. There are two complementary ways of interpreting the link between these two representations. The first one has to do with the structure of society (this time in the sociological sense of the term), and the second one has to do with our world's moral environment.

5.1. How to act in a complex world?

According to this first interpretation, we must look for the reason for this (new) way of envisioning social change in the hypercomplexity of modern society, in which the «causal chains» (to use Georg Simmel's expression) have become so long that it is often very difficult for us to understand who is responsible for what happens to us. So, a personnel manager may fire employees because s/he must meet profitability targets set on another continent to please a myriad of unknown, invisible shareholders (who might even include the fired employees!). So, we are often subject to systemic effects that no one truly controls (even though, of course, some have infinitely more possibilities than others to gain from them rather than suffering their consequences (see Boltanski, 2009)). Our respondents seem to share this feeling of an opaque society in which we no longer know very well where to act and whom to pressure to effect changes. The disparity between the responses to the following two assertions, which were presented one after the other in the questionnaire, is striking:

		«I want to act on society»			«I have the impression of having a hold on the world as it currently exists»		
		Number	**Percent**	**Running total of percentage**	**Number**	**Percent**	**Running total of percentage**
Valid respon-ses	Disagree completely	40	1.5	1.5	348	12.7	12.7
	Rather disa-gree	146	5.3	6.8	869	31.7	44.4
	Indifferent	661	24.1	30.9	847	30.9	75.3
	Rather agree	1264	46.1	77.0	540	19.7	95.0
	Agree com-pletely	630	23.0	100.0	137	5.0	100.0
	Total	**2741**	**100.0**		**2741**	**100.0**	

Whereas close to 70% of the respondents stated that they wanted to act on society, only 25% had the impression that they had a hold on the world as it is today. How do they reconcile this feeling of powerlessness with their faith in the possibility of a social change in which they might play a part? The answer seems obvious: by working on what is workable, that is to say, oneself to start off with, and possibly on our near and dear. From this point of view, believing in the virtue of personal development or of the action of small groups to produce social change turns out to be the logical, rational, and sensible consequence of the feeling of powerlessness that is generated by society's opaqueness. Similarly, their distrust of politics and politicians seems above all to mark disbelief as to the possibility of a conventional *political plan* being able to change a society on which it, too, ultimately has few holds.

Even though this answer appears to be obvious, understandable, and rational once it is put back into the context of complex societies, it has nonetheless upset many (French-speaking) sociologists for years. For such sociologists, there is a clear link between divestment from politics and overinvestment in work on oneself. The interesting writings on this subject include R. Castel's (1981) *La gestion des risques*. Thirty years ago this author was already wondering about the consequences of the following:

> [...] when economic, social, and political options are beyond the subject's control, the psychological is endowed with a form of reality that is autonomised, if not autonomous. *We are now facing a subjectivity that is all the more "free" as it manages only issues of minor importance.* As social life has already divested, in many sectors, from options that go beyond staging the personal economy, the establishment of a psychologically saturated sociability creates the last theatre in which a relational culture unfolds, a culture that in such a case can have no other purpose than to reproduce itself. (Castel, 1981: 191 [italics added]). This thesis is definitely stimulating, but must be updated.

5.2. A common foundation: the liberal understanding of the world

I believe that this first interpretation must be backed up by a second one, an interpretation that adds the *moral* context (in Durkheim's sense of the word, *i.e.,* shared mores) in which we live. We can posit that there is a much deeper elective affinity between the discourse around personal development and the grammar of change that is revealed by our respondents' remarks.

I should like to defend here the idea that if these sensitivities seem to a certain extent to go hand in hand, it is because they are rooted in the same philosophical tradition, that of liberalism.[5] This may seem paradoxical, given that «liberalism» (once again a hollow signifier) is indeed a clear adversary, and claimed as such, of many of the individuals in the survey. Yet the grammars of change presented here support Ehrenberg's (2010) thesis, according to which the moral environment in which we live is paralysed with liberal representations from political philosophy (Locke, *inter alia)* at times,

5. Unfortunately, we do not have space here to go into the difference between economic and political liberalism, or even the difference between the American and French takes on liberalism.

from the representation of society as a market (Smith, *inter alia)* at other times, or from doctrines celebrating the individual in action (Calvin's puritanism, Emerson's American transcendentalism, A. Maslow's humanist psychology, the currently popular currents that stress the *power of the mind* over ourselves and the world in general, such as psycho-cybernetics and positive psychology, and many other doctrines)[6] at still other times. All of these representations have moulded our ways of representing ourselves and of claiming certain qualities.

Our moral environment can be called liberal because in it a certain type of behaviour is expected of individuals, that of autonomy. Ehrenberg (2010) describes our societies in a stimulating way as being societies of «autonomy as a condition», in which autonomous behaviour is no longer a state that one strives for (as was the case during the three decades of post-war prosperity), but a standard, a desirable social expectation, a *presumed* ability of each individual that the individual is asked to activate in a series of circumstances. The individual must thus be responsible for her/himself; otherwise s/he is liable to more or less formalised social sanctions. The social sciences have for years concerned themselves with the consequences of these new representations and practices in the area of the redistribution of wealth by the State. So, several sociologists have produced critiques of what today goes by the name of the «active social Welfare State», in which aid is no longer unconditional but contingent on the recipient's being able to prove her/his autonomous behaviour aimed at taking control of her/his life (see, for example, Vielle *et al.*, 2005).

It is striking to see how much sociologists' often worried and critical views on this liberal moral environment and its hypothetical consequences differ from the way that our respondents readily endorse the structure of this discourse to apply it to other swatches of their lives (but, it is true, where the leitmotif of autonomy and individual responsibility does not take the form of a requirement imposed by others, as is the case of social aid in the age of the active social Welfare State). Indigenous representations of social change seem to be one of these swatches. They attest to the way that people think of the possibility for human beings to produce their own fates in the context of societies of «autonomy as a condition». Whether this is presented in an esoteric or non-esoteric, psychologising or non-psychologising vocabulary, the *autonomous* individual is considered in the grammars of change dissected here to be the basic atom of action (which can become collective by spreading from relation to relation). Of course, this is not a scientific hypothesis put forward by the respondents, but a *moral* proposition that refers to the practical

6. See Ehrenberg (2010) and Marquis (2012) for a presentation of these connections.

anthropology and cosmology described earlier. From their points of view, the role of the politician who has failed in his mission of staving off a world in crisis and is now part of the «system» from which we must escape to have hopes of a change coming about, is limited to that of setting up the conditions of this *individual action*[7] based on *each person's inner resources,* to the extent that this individual action seems to be the only believable, even possible, way out.

But how is it possible not to see that in these grammars, the most probable, the most *effective* agent of change is ultimately *taking individual responsibility,* for which indeed our respondents are clamouring? And that each of us can and must give proof of this by taking charge of ourselves for our own benefit as well as for the common good?[8] How can we overlook the fact that the respondents seem to make the advent of a new world a matter of *individual efforts* and of *aggregated personal determination?* How, consequently, can we fail to grasp the proximity between the conventional representation of the market (based on autonomous individuals who own their liberty and act according to their consciences) and the idea that social change will result from the aggregation of *individual changes* (or those made by small groups) in our *representations* and *mentalities?*[9] Would not the world be better if it finally returned to a society of fundamentally good and responsible, free individuals, which would end up in getting each of us to work upon ourselves? Autonomy, individual responsibility, effectiveness, personal effort, freedom, mentality (and also the

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7. This is what the vocabulary of «*empowerment*» expresses. To illustrate this, we can point out that 91.2% of the respondents agreed with the idea that «The State should put subjects such as better self-understanding and relations with others on the same footing as academic knowledge and training». This can be heard as a distant echo of the liberal philosopher Benjamin Constant's maxim celebrating the «negative freedom» of the Moderns: «Let them [government] confine themselves to being just. We shall assume the responsibility of being happy for ourselves» (1819). It is thus important to see that the political sphere has not been totally abandoned by the respondents. Rather, it remains an important *regulatory* factor (and they continue to make many demands of it and to criticise it for its assumed inability to fulfil these missions). What they do seem to have lost faith in, however, is the political sphere's ability to back a *plan* of substance for society (or a utopia).
8. Moreover, this exact same idea triggers reams of reactions when it is applied in the world of business, or in the «active social Welfare State», where individuals are gauged by their ability to take charge of themselves. Indeed, it is interesting to note that only 13.9% of the respondents to this survey stated that they did not agree with the proposition «I think that when it comes to all the people in difficulty, the community should help first those who are doing their utmost to get by».
9. This vision is not at all new; a typical formulation of it can be found in the New Age current (Garnoussi, 2007).

power to think), and so on: this is indeed the vocabulary of liberalism, and it is mobilised in manifestations of liberalism that we perceive as desirable at certain times and detestable at other times.

6. Conclusions

These grammars attest to ways of expressing worries and hopes that are specific to individualistic societies (for which the individual is the supreme value[10]). However, isn't the «ambient individualism» precisely what is incriminated in the grammars present in lay discourse (and in certain scientific writings) as the cause of the crisis? According to Ehrenberg (2010), there is nothing paradoxical in that. In comparing the United States and France he managed to advance the hypothesis that criticising individualistic societies, that the fear of the possibility of living together's melting away, is *consubstantial* with such societies' functioning. Becoming aware of this does not by any means disqualify this criticism any more than it justifies it.

Recognising that the grammars of change are situated in a liberal moral context makes it possible, however, to shed a different light on the issue of depoliticisation. This term must not be understood as qualifying a withdrawal from action, but rather as disqualifying certain forms of action, mainly collective ones. It also shows that whilst fingers are often pointed at «liberalism» in everyday parlance, we cannot detach ourselves so easily from its vocabulary and representations, which we have learnt to love over the centuries. So, even the formulation of indigenous utopias (as they are commonly understood) cannot do without them. On the contrary, it draws inspiration from there to imagine what both «the good life» and «living together in the world» should look like.

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Feminist Finance: Recessionistas, Debt and the Credit Crunch

Finanzas feministas: *Recesionistas*, deuda y la crisis crediticia

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ABSTRACT: This article offers an opposing argument to the «man-cession» narrative that has dominated the press in recent years and explores what makes this particular economic context crucial for contemporary women's fiction, offering a view into the recession's impact on women's lives, reading, consumption patterns, and self-identity in today's post-credit-crunch world. The credit crunch has reignited debates about gender and the workplace in twenty-first century society. This article proposes that tensions between gender and debt have been played out in popular culture post-2007, most notably in publishing, through the emergence of a new genre of literature – Recessionista fiction. In Recessionista fictions, cocktails and heels are eschewed in favour of financial practicality, as shopaholic heroines confront a harsh new reality, forced into a position where they must take stock of their lives and start again from the midst of financial ruin, divorce or a major career change. As part of this process, Recessionista fiction foregrounds the impact of the credit crunch on female identity. This article examines a range of Recessionista fictions to explore how, why and with what effects the heroines of these novels intern and reify the attitudes of society during and after the global credit crunch. Examining an evolution in contemporary fiction that brought a taste of reality to an outdated chick lit genre in danger of extinction, the article analyses representations of gender and debt and the possibilities for personal transformation brought about by the global economic downturn.

Keywords: credit crunch, chick lit, women's fiction, debt, contemporary literature.

RESUMEN: Este artículo ofrece una visión alternativa a las narrativas de «man-cession» (desempleo masculino) que han dominado los medios de comunicación en años recientes y explora las condiciones que hacen de este contexto económico un elemento crucial para la novela femenina contemporánea, presentando una imagen del impacto de la recesión en la vida de las mujeres, sus lecturas, pautas de consumo e identidad personal en el actual mundo post-crisis crediticia. La contracción del crédito ha reavivado los debates de género sobre el lugar de trabajo en la sociedad del siglo XXI. Este artículo explora las tensiones entre deuda y género en la cultura popular post-2007, especialmente en el sector editorial, a través de la aparición de un nuevo género literario –la novela *recesionista*–. En las narrativas *recesionistas* se desechan los cócteles y los tacones en favor del pragmatismo financiero cuando las heroínas adictas a las compras se enfrentan a una nueva y agria realidad, y se ven forzadas a ocupar una posición en la que deben hacerse cargo de sus propias vidas para comenzar de nuevo en medio de la ruina financiera, el divorcio o cambios profesionales significativos. Como parte del proceso, la narrativa *recesionista* incide en el impacto de la crisis crediticia sobre la identidad femenina. Este artículo examina en un conjunto de novelas recesionistas cómo y por qué las heroínas de estas ficciones rechazan y glorifican las actitudes sociales durante y después de la crisis crediticia global. Al analizar la evolución de la narrativa contemporánea que ha proporcionado un toque de realidad al género pasado de moda de una literatura romántica en peligro de extinción, el artículo aborda las representaciones de género y deuda en relación con las posibilidades de transformación personal derivadas del deterioro económico global.

Palabras clave: crisis crediticia, literatura romántica, literatura femenina, deuda, literatura contemporánea.

Occupying a majority of roles in some of the sectors hardest hit by the global economic downturn – including retail, services, local government and the public sector – the independence and equality of women in the workplace became one of the first threats of the twenty-first century credit crunch. In the UK in the year leading up to October 2008, 53,000 women lost their jobs, while the gender pay gap increased from 17% in 2007 to 17.1% on the basis of mean full-time hourly earnings. As journalist Ruth Sutherland argues in her analysis of the unseen impact of the crunch on women, «to the many thousands of female workers who have lost their jobs, the recession may well look like a case of highly-paid men creating a mess, and low-paid women suffering the consequence» (Sutherland, 2009). The popular press also sought to understand the causes and consequences of the credit crunch through a specifically gendered response, measuring the impact of the recession on women's shopping, socialising and spending habits. The so-called «lipstick effect» became associated with periods of economic downturn post-9/11. The term refers to the continued sales of expensive make-up products during times of recession and is concerned with examining how and why economic recessions influence women's consumer behaviour.

In her feminist blog *The F Word*, Carolyn Roberts conducted her own small scale survey of press headlines connecting the credit crunch and its effect on female consumption and identity. She found a depressing range including: «a story about an overweight woman who lost her job, started her own business and lost five stones»; «the reassuring news that the credit crunch is not affecting cosmetic sales» (apparently because women would rather go without food than makeup – or more accurately, women shopping on a beauty product website); a cosmetic surgery company's announcement of a 135% increase in breast augmentation procedures, with the tasteful statement, «as the economy is going bust, UK women are boosting theirs». These appearance orientated stories were completed by a range of articles on ways to beat the credit crunch, strategies for continuing to dress stylishly and have expensive haircuts whilst apparently on a budget. Roberts concluded that «even in recession, a woman's appearance is perceived as her most interesting facet. Articles aimed at women assume that our interest in finance begins and ends with whether we can still afford to buy lipstick» (Roberts, 2008).

Articles in women's magazines quickly appeared asking their readers how the credit crunch had affected their beauty regime and crunch-inspired fitness plans (including the use of workout DVDs and gym balls to avoid «those costly gym memberships»). Articles examined how readers were learning to make home-made cocktails or reasons for the apparent rise in the popularity of dinner parties and home cinema nights as an alternative way of surviving and socialising through the crunch. Occupied with credit crunch diets – based on own brands and lower fat alternatives – cut price holidays and credit crunch Christmas plans, the message of the popular press was clear: women should look on the bright side of the global economic downturn, more time with their partner (now unemployed), losing weight (thanks to a distinct drop in the number of restaurants visited), greater food economy (with no spare cash for luxuries or waste) and a new found appreciation for the little things in life.

The publishing industry was not immune from the crunch. Post-2007, some chick lit authors claimed that the recession had caused the death of their genre as a direct result of the change in social circumstances it had brought about. Author of best-sellers *Bergdorf Blondes* and *The Debutante Divorcee*, Plum Sykes, argued that she could «not set another book in modern-day America because of the credit crunch» because the crunch «just doesn't work» as a context for social comedies. For Sykes, the crunch brought with it the last «sex and shopping book as a publishing phenomenon» because it made chick lit seem «out of date […] not only because of the economic reality but because it's been done to death» (Sykes in Mesure, 2009). However, from this new economic reality, «Recessionista fiction» developed from a set of emergent tropes, plots and, as a new publishing category, surfaced from the credit crunch and the legacy of chick lit that had dominated the previous decade of fiction. These novels come from both US and British authors and examine the impact of a global recession on the lives of women in the countries' most iconic capitals of consumption, New York and London.

Recessionista fiction compares to the novels of economic downfall published in very different eras (such as Trollope and Wharton) in that it seeks to understand the wider impact of market shifts through a close focus on the lives of specific individuals who fall victim to its immediate after effects. What makes this particular economic context crucial for contemporary women's fiction is both the role of literature as a means of shaping and making sense of seemingly impossible real-life events but also making visible the effects of the crisis of a generation of women for whom many of the advances of the past thirty years were now under threat. In the wake of a twenty-first century credit crunch, women's fiction became the appropriate venue for these socioeconomic fears to be aired, explored and rationalised.

Exploring excessive spending and conspicuous consumption, Recessionista fictions can be seen a logical development of the «sex and shopping novels» of the 1980s that emerged under Thatcher and Reagan. These novels represented heroines concerned with wealth and excess, luxury, glamour and self-presentation through purchase power. Promoting the dominant ideals of the period – individualism and independent enterprise – «S&F» heroines were marked by self-interest and a rejection of any perceived value in terms of sisterhood or feminism as personal ambition instead reigned supreme and objects and labels dominated friends and feminist politics. The 1990s witnessed a further development from this trend in the growth of chick lit as a recognised genre of fiction, led by the emergence of Bridget Jones as literary and social phenomenon. The heroine of the chick lit novel, like those of the «S&F» fictions, had a career and was financially independent but did not define herself through her work, instead using employment to fund her lifestyle choices. As Deborah Philips argues, chick lit heroines take «great pleasure in conspicuous consumption […] and the opportunities afforded by the multiplication of consumer goods for women who are in a position to afford them» (Philips, 2006: 116).

Yet these women are also deeply unsatisfied, and often search for a man or love interest as a perceived plug to fill this void. As Mallory Young argues, «chick lit usually responds through comedy to real situations confronting real women» (Young quoted by La Ferla, 2009). Unlike the convivial Romance genre, chick lit «recognizes and responds to the world outside» (La Ferla, 2009). Recessionista fiction continues this outward looking awareness of socio-economic and political contexts but draws on the global economic crisis in structure and subject matter. Focussing on the social fallout of the credit crunch and using female characters to examine a wider social and economic transition from lives of sex and shopping to monogamy and austerity, these explicitly cautionary tales (with many even using this term as a subtitle) follow yummy mummies forced to cut up their credit cards, with husbands in prison for fraud and financial mismanagement. Recessionista fiction explores a change of situation and lifestyle as well as a perceived fall from grace: social, economic or political.

The term «Recessionista» may imply a lifestyle choice but is actually exposed by these fictions as an insulting term for those who have no choice and are forced into the role by circumstance. Recessionista fiction reflects «the biggest story of the last two years», according to Jonathan Segura, deputy editor at *US Publishers Weekly*. He argues that «it would be impossible to write contemporary glitzy women's fiction without taking the recession into account» and predicts a future «flood of new fiction dealing specifically with the big meltdown» (Segura in La Ferla, 2009). Keshini Naidoo, commissioning editor at Avon, also argues that Recessionista lit «perfectly fits the mood of the times». Naidoo suggests that traditional chick lit of the 1990s could never hope to survive into the new circumstances of the post-crunch. She reflects that «after the downturn in the economic climate, blockbusters that glorified excessive, conspicuous consumption threatened to look both in poor taste and deeply out of touch with what readers are experiencing». Centering on social and economic struggles, Recessionista fictions are instead aimed at readers who now have zero sympathy for the shopaholic protagonists of previous best-sellers. Rather than signaling the demise of the chick lit genre that dominated bookshop sales for so long, Recessionista fiction has injected it with new lifeblood. Naidoo argues that while some readers consider characters that simply shop and spend to be inappropriate in a post-crunch period «there is still a thirst for glamorous fiction that details an aspirational lifestyle», but also an increasing market for novels «that show the tarnish behind these gilded lifestyles» partly fuelled by «a sense of *schadenfreude* on the part of readers» (Naidoo in Mesure, 2009).

Recessionista fiction develops a long standing fascination with the excesses and deviant behaviours of the other half of society. In «this spate of new fiction [...] tackling the recession and its attendant woes» darkly funny tales of divorce meet even darker explorations of debt and excessive spending as the credit crunch overshadows characters» lives (La Ferla, 2009). However, unlike its «S&F» and chick lit predecessors, Recessionista fiction has an added feminist dimension to this development through female characters who are forced into a position where they must take stock of their lives and start again after the crunch causes them debt, divorce or a major career change.

In Recessionista fiction, the credit crunch functions as an occasion for female characters to stop these binges and examine their own sense of self. The heroines of Recessionista fiction are used to tackling their doubts through purchase power, employment or relationships. In the wake of the crunch, they are forced to re-consider the sources from which they draw their identity and define both themselves and their purpose in the post-crunch world. Faced with doubt and a perceived void of purpose post-crunch, consumption as a form of agency no longer offers these women an easy means of constructing the self. In *Hedge Fund Wives*, this is confronted through the power of purchase as Marcy reflects on how she is drawn to shop because «the saleswomen treated you the way you wish your husband still did» (Boncompagni, 2009: 136). As part of the construction of self, consumption operates in Recessionista fiction to define the heroine during a point of change or flux. Set in and written by a UK author, in *Confessions of a Reluctant Recessionista* protagonist Cassie goes on shopping sprees with her credit card to get over losing her job, the agencies not taking on people and splitting up with Dan. Shopping takes the place of work in her day to day life but also offers a new sense of purpose, focus and identity – an option denied to her by the depressed employment market of the twenty-first century. However, these identity-searching spending sprees also position Cassie in a huge amount of debt.

Recessionista fiction focuses on «debt's harmful behaviour» (Atwood, 2009: 42) and the effects this can have on the psychological and social standing of the female protagonist. Western society is heavy with metaphors of debt and informed by the language of debt or owing. Debt, Margaret Atwood argues, is «like air», we are surrounded by it and therefore «never think about it unless something goes wrong with the supply» (Atwood, 2009: 9). Attitudes towards debt are «deeply embedded in our entire culture» (Atwood, 2009: 10) and are also a product of that culture. Debt also carries with it connotations of shame and social judgement. From the debtors prisons and workhouses of the nineteenth century to the credit card companies and payday loan advances of the present, «Debt is the new fat» (Atwood, 2009: 40) of the twenty-first century, a source of anxiety, stigma and debate but also an increasingly important element of personal identity.

Atwood pays particular attention to the poisonous activities brought on by readily available credit and in particular its effects on women. She recalls

> accounts of shopaholic binges during which you don't even know what came over you and everything was a blur, with tearful confessions by those who've spent themselves into quivering insomniac jellies of hopeless indebtedness, and have resorted to lying, cheating, stealing and moving cheques between bank accounts as a result. (Atwood, 2009: 42).

Following this binge and purge model, there then follows «a penance imposed – snip, snip go the scissors on the credit cards – followed by a strict curb-on-spending regime; and finally, if all goes well, the debts are paid down, the sins are forgiven, absolution is granted, and a new day dawns» (Atwood, 2009: 42). In the shadow of the crunch even the wives of bankers, hedge fund managers and private equity partners were forced to curb their designer habits. One senior female investment banker said: «some of these women were in La-La land. When their husbands told them to cut back on the Chanel, they didn't listen, they just didn't seem to know what was going on, but they have had to stop spending now» (La Ferla, 2009).

Such conspicuous consumption is often a target of criticism in the popular press, but in Recessionista fiction it is also a catalyst for change. As Susie Mesure suggests, the new heroine of Recessionista fiction has «had to cut up her credit cards, take her kids out of private school, and, gasp, even think about finding a job to try to plug the gaping hole in the family finances» (Mesure, 2009), confronting the rapid period of growing up experienced by many in the wake of the crunch and the drying up of ready credit for consumption and excessive lifestyles. Witnessing the excesses of her spending sprees and the credit card bills that follow, Cassie is forced to consider the reasons behind her consumption binges. The objects she purchases and the bills documenting her actions function to make this problem visible to her friends, who stage an intervention. Instructed that she «can't just spend your way out of every problem you ever have» (Silver, 2009: 99), Cassie realises the need to go on an «anti-extravagance drive» (Silver, 2009: 105) and live within her means. She reasons that, «for as long as I was unemployed, for as long as this blasted recession lasted, I was going to have to stop living like a rich person» (Silver, 2009: 149). This involves experimenting with new sources of identity such as a «clothes swap party» (Silver, 2009: 165) in which the participants can literally try on alternative lifestyles and adopt a general «Less Is More spirit» (Silver, 2009: 166) of austerity and economy more in keeping with the times. Rejecting a previous reliance on «totems of excess», Recessionista fiction follows heroines as they battle with the trauma of a loss of consumption and the identity it brings (La Ferla, 2009). Confronted with reduced circumstances, a crisis of self and professional and emotional breakdowns of relationships, the women of Recessionista fiction use life-changing events as catalysts to awareness raising activities. Moving through an arc of anger and denial to depression and acceptance, this new form of recession literature is characterised by motifs of empowerment and realigned values, as female characters rediscover the value not just of things, but of people and behaviour.

The collapse of the banking system is echoed in Recessionista fictions by the breakdown of personal relationships. When Cassie is dumped by trader Dan, she is forced to re-evaluate her situation and lack of aspiration in the workplace. Breaking up with her trader boyfriend leads Cassie to a realisation that the financial world is «shallow and consumerist, they're obsessed with money and cars and clothes and things. Things, things, things. The men are pigs and the women know that unless they fit in with the boys they'll be harassed to within an inch of their loves, so most of them end up being pigs too» (Silver, 2009: 201). An important part of this realisation is Cassie's reignited sense of ambition and passion for her own career. Despite working in the financial industry all her life, her relationship breakdown and newly unemployed state make her realise that she

> was never interested in how the markets work, how the traders make their money. I didn't care what a derivative was or whether Bank X merged with Bank Y and what the implications of that would be. My mother was right. Mothers usually are. I had to get myself a job in a field that I was at least vaguely interested in. (Silver, 2009: 205).

Cassie goes on to explore a wide range of career options, including temping (difficult in times of economic downturn), walking dogs for money, and volunteering. She finally hears about an administrative role in an independent wine company through her dog walking contacts, making a shift from a large corporate organisation to an start-up company where she earns her stripes and is rewarded with promotion. At the end of the novel Cassie is «moving on to greater things» (Silver, 2009: 313), away from the city, traders and Louboutins.

Financial recompense is presented as the ultimate consolation in Recessionista fiction, often as a form of payment for services given. Written by an American author and set in Northern America, *Hedge Fund Wives* uses the paratext of the novel to advertise its tale as situated deep «in the throes of the credit crunch». While the financial downturn and its immediate effects in America dominate the text, the novel is equally framed by the divorce of the protagonist and the emotional as well as financial fallout from the crunch. Marcy, a heroine newly arrived in New York as the wife of a hedge fund manager from Chicago, finds herself «surrounded by hedge-fund wives» in a city where there is, initially at least, «nothing but the promise of pleasure» (Boncompagni, 2009:1). However, as an ex-financier herself, Marcy is quick to realise that conditions are changing. While the other wives turn their heads she reflects that

> although no one spoke of it, the economy had begun to sour and every day brought fresh tales of falling fortunes. Most of the women assumed that their vast monetary reserves would protect them from having to alter any aspect of their enviable lives, but of course they were wrong. Wealth is relative by nature, and if one day you have a hundred , billion dollars and the next you have only fifty, the things that were once within reach […] are suddenly out of it. Under such circumstances, it's not long before a marriage built around material possessions and predicated upon the shared responsibility of their care and maintenance, begins to crumble. (Boncompagni, 2009: 2-3)

As our voice on the credit crunch, Marcy reminds the readers that the «long run of American prosperity was coming to an end» (Boncompagni, 2009: 32) and that this would be most sharply felt in «hedgefundlandia» (Boncompagni, 2009: 39).

When the crunch hits, Marcy's husband John develops a cocaine addiction and to painkillers to cope with pressure but refuses to allow Marcy to return to work, perceiving a working wife as a reflection on his own financial shortcomings. Marcy is unable to understand her husband's desire to make «money for the pure sport of it» and wishes he could instead «manufacture a product». As she watches, the wives carry on spending «despite the darkening economic clouds, despite the millions of foreclosure signs popping up across the country like little red flags. A storm was coming, but no one wanted to see it, least of all, of course, the wives» (Boncompagni, 2009: 67). Marcy reflects on «feeling worried about the world in general» (Boncompagni, 2009: 171) on several occasions before the revelation that her husband has cheated on her and impregnated another hedge fund wife while he was supposed to be trying for a baby with her. The behaviour of her husband, and the betrayal by a so-called fellow hedge fund wife, motivate Marcy to take stock of her new life in New York, to re-focus on herself, return to the world of work and begin to work as a writer again. It is only when she is happy at work, successfully divorced and settled with her son that Marcy meets her dream man and remarries. She ends the novel with her own business, pregnant with another child and conveniently married to a billionaire. The message is simple – Recessionistas who heed the call of debt and ride out the crunch are rewarded with personal, professional and emotional success.

Recessionista fiction also highlights a hitherto unrepresented creature – the female trader. In Silver's novel, Cassie literally looks in on the trading floor as a PA and explains to readers that there are a

> handful of women on the floor […] They have to work seventy-hour weeks in what is sometimes an unbearable environment – the stories you hear about misogyny and bullying in the City are fairly accurate. The pretty girls spend their time fending off the unwanted advances and the less pretty girls have to put up with incessant cruel remarks» (Silver, 2009: 24). Cassie's trader friend Ali has apparently resigned herself to «being one of the boys, which is virtually a job requirement when you do what she does, that she sometimes forgets the impact she makes of the opposite sex. (Silver, 2009: 2).

While women de-sexualise themselves on the trading floor men consume female traders as the ultimate spectacle in these novels, pouring over and analysing them in an attempt to decode why they would end up in such a masculine environment.

Ali ends the novel balancing work and a child as a single mother, with the support of Cassie and her employment but struggling to «have it all». Recessionista fiction is concerned with interrogating the reality of balancing a job and children for the twenty-first century career conscious female. In *Hedge Fund Wives*, Marcy is told in hushed tones about a type of HFW «the Workaholic», who «like her husband […] is married firstly to her high-powered job as a magazine publisher/ interior decorator/ real-estate broker/ corporate lawyer. She has no children and has talked herself into believing that she'll be able to easily reproduce up until the age of fifty» (Boncompagni, 2009:17). The world of employment in *Hedge Fund Wives* is also littered with anecdotes about women betraying other women in the pursuit of marriage or careers. Marcy is «screwed over» for promotion by a female colleague in her old bank and asks «Why is it that women turn against each other like that? We should be supporting each other, not masterminding each other's firings» (Boncompagni, 2009: 300). When she meets a young business woman, Justine, she is not surprised at her complaints that «none of the guys want to date me because I'm too smart […] the fact that I graduated magna cum laude from Yale is actually an impediment. Jesus, I just want to find a husband, you know?» (Boncompagni, 2009: 301). Fuelled by these experiences, the betrayals of her husband, and women who chose to operate like men in the workplace, Marcy uses the proceeds from her divorce to set up «Demeter and Co. […] a female friendly working environment» in which it is «easier for the moms […] to balance motherhood and work» and sends «a handful of our most promising interns […] through college via the scholarship program» (Boncompagni, 2009: 346-7).

The focus *Hedge Fund Wives* takes on matters of employment, independence and sisterhood was central to the stated aims of author Boncompagni in creating a Recessionista novel. She argues

> I'm a big believer that all married women should keep working and networking even if they don't «have» to, because not only will their husbands respect them more for it, but they will respect themselves more for it, too […] One of the main themes of *Hedge Fund Wives* is how foolish it is to depend on a man for your emotional and financial security. (Boncompagni, 2009: 358)

Boncompagni uses Recessionista fiction to examine the impact of the crunch on «women whose lives revolved not around status but money and the consumption of material goods» (Boncompagni, 2009: 355). Mining the meaning of such a period proved an appropriate context for fiction, since «periods of great economic volatility are rich with drama». Deliberately setting the novel in such «a period of tremendous uncertainty», she was conscious that «the economic downturn would change the dynamics» (Boncompagni, 2009: 356) of the text, enabling her to explore the ways and means by which female characters handled the redistribution of capital in the wake of the financial crisis. *Hedge Fund Wives* accordingly ends with a narrative outlook beyond the credit crunch, to an envisioned time when «Americans started saving more and spending less, and the national average household debt began to decline for the first time in dozens of years» (Boncompagni, 2009: 351).

As «quite literally a man-made disaster, a monster created in the testosterone-drenched environment of Wall Street and the City», the credit crunch has been offered as the logical product of a male dominated banking sector (Sunderland, 2009). In an article in the *Financial Times* in 2008, Gillian Wilmot speculated that if women occupied more top positions in the banking world then the credit crunch might never have happened. She argued that «the more financially rewarding the task the more men», and that the credit crunch in particular saw «a lethal combination of testosterone, complexity and greed» bring the UK «to its knees» (Wilmot, 2008). This lack of representation at the highest levels of the sector at the centre of this crisis has become the subject of widespread debate centring on gender imbalances at the heart of banking. In 2007, women held 13 executive directorships on the boards of FTSE 100 companies, or 3.6% of the total. There were 110 female non-executive directors, 14.5% of the total (Sutherland, 2009). Anna Cecilie Holst, a board director on several companies with 26 years' experience in the financial and venture/start-up industry, summarised this argument in her statement that «basically by nature, women are more risk averse. I don't think Lehman Sisters would have taken the same risks as Lehman Brothers» (Holst in Casu Lukac, 2008).

Índice

In Recessionista fiction, women do not function to domesticate the world of finance and business, but navigate the credit crunch to participate as equals on the trading floor, direct their own careers and households and cultivate successful relationships. These texts are significant because they take a pronounced feminist stance on the credit crunch and its aftermath: heroines end up not with more money, but with a more developed sense of self, taking charge of their own identities. In doing so, their authors have achieved a deeper connection to a situation that more accurately mirrors the situation of the reader. Ultimately, Recessionista fiction offers irony, agency, independence and economic acumen as key to surviving the crunch and its aftermath. The women of the crunch are not represented as heterogeneous like the men of the trading floors and hedge funds, but as diverse and responsive to the after effects of the crunch. Even *Cosmopolitan* magazine suggests that Recessionista fiction is finally «something good […] to come of this recession after all. Bring on the tales of women who are drowning in debt, unlucky in love and actually have to go to work to earn a living» (Cosmo Team, 2009). Bringing a taste of reality to a chick lit in danger of extinction, Recessionista fiction calls for less heels and more financial and feminist awareness in contemporary literary representations of working women.

Complicit in creating the crunch and credit culture but more restorative and adaptive in its wake, the heroines of Recessionista fiction stand independent of their male counterparts who remain in the wounded financial sector. Instead, these women use their own cultural and economic capital for social good, empowering themselves, other women or smaller, independent businesses to ensure that diversity and sustainability become the foundations for future success. Recessionista fiction is significant not only for making visible and analysing the relationship between gender and debt in the twenty-first century, but also because it offers a model for the potential of the financial world as a hitherto underused setting in contemporary women's fiction. Faced with shrinking finances and fallouts from diminished incomes through divorce, the crunch and unemployment, the heroines of Recessionista fiction mobilise their reduced resources and transform misfortune into a muse and draw upon reserves they didn't know they had, to enable personal transformations in the wake of the global credit crunch.

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Economic Citizenship in Online Financial News: Affect and Argumentation in Eurocrisis News Coverage

Ciudadanía económica en las noticias financieras digitales: afecto y argumentación en la cobertura periodística de la Eurocrisis

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ABSTRACT: This paper evaluates the practices of online news media in representing citizens in the midst of the Eurozone crisis from the perspective of civic participation. Our special focus is on the interplay of argumentation and affect as crucial sources of political action. The empirical analysis examines affective and argumentative framing in two multimodal story types, captioned photo galleries and video reviews, and evaluates their capacity facilitating or hindering political agency. Video reviews construct news narratives that incorporate both affective and argumentative elements. Photo galleries, by contrast, emphasize affect at the cost of argumentation and voice resulting in alienation and silencing. The analysis gives grounds to suggest that dramatized visual news narratives about the financial crisis echo discourses of war on terror and unspecific threat. Such discourses legitimize pre-emptive action (austerity measures, police force), which, in effect, participate in producing what it is supposed to fight (economic inequality, social unrest, violence).

Keywords: Economic citizenship, Eurozone crisis, online financial discourse, visual news coverage, affective and argumentative framing, the politics of threat.

RESUMEN: El presente artículo evalúa las prácticas utilizadas por los medios digitales para representar la ciudadanía desde la perspectiva de la participación cívica en el epicentro de la crisis de la Eurozona. Nuestro enfoque se centra en la interacción de la argumentación y el afecto como fuentes cruciales de activismo político. El análisis empírico examina el encuadre afectivo y argumentativo en dos tipos de relatos multimodales, las reseñas videomáticas y las leyendas de las colecciones fotográficas, y evalúa su capacidad de facilitar u obstruir la agencia política. Las reseñas videomáticas construyen narrativas sobre las noticias que incorporan elementos afectivos y argumentativos. Las colecciones fotográficas, por el contrario, enfatizan el afecto a costa de la argumentación y la voz, propiciando la alienación y el silenciamiento. El presente análisis permite sugerir que la dramatización de narrativas gráficas sobre las noticias relacionadas con la crisis financiera repite los discursos sobre la guerra contra el terror y las amenazas latentes. Tales discursos legitiman las acciones preventivas (medidas de austeridad, fuerza policial) que, en consecuencia, entran en connivencia con lo que se supone deberían criticar (desigualdad económica, descontento social, violencia).

Palabras clave: ciudadania económica, crisis de la Eurozona, discurso financiero digital, cobertura periodística gráfica, encuadres afectivo y argumentativo, políticas de la amenaza.

1. Introduction

The continuing financial turmoil has had an accelerating effect on the lives and possibilities of ordinary people in many ways, while the need to understand, explain and participate in economic discourses has become more pressing. In web-based media, discourses of financial crises are extensively realized in forms of multimodal texts that persuade audiences through selections of facts, analyses of processes and trends, comments and interviews as well as depictions of everyday reality. Online news packages, such as crisis «guides», timelines and chronicles, also include representations of citizens in forms of video interviews, photographs, and citations. These representations are to a significant extent included in the reports of street-level civic activism, such as demonstrations, protests, and violent clashes, prompting the question of the positions available for ordinary citizens in the face of the economic crisis and the role of the media in mediating citizens' voices and facilitating political agency.

The media plays a central role in making sense of economic phenomena. Specifically, media representations create the conditions of possibility for moral and political action, enacting possible forms of agency, which may or may not be followed up by media publics (Chouliaraki, 2008: 832). In this paper, we focus especially on the mediated practices and preconditions of *economic citizenship*, i.e. the roles and positions that members of the public assume and that are prescribed to them in mediated economic discourses. The aim of the paper is to evaluate how the different (audio)visual and verbal framings of the crisis in the Eurozone may guide and constrain the potential forms and practices of economic citizenship: What kinds of frames are evoked, and what kind of roles, identities and possibilities do they propose and prescribe for members of the public as economic citizens?

In web-based news media, the identity and personal voice of referents as well as the emotional intensity of depicted situations are conveyed by verbal as well as (audio)visual means. The use of images and audiovisual material within the financial crisis news relay requires careful attention and consideration. In addition to «true-to-life» documentation and inbuilt point-of-view, lens based images, and especially photographs (Sontag, 2003: 19, 21, 23), are capable of triggering our mental stocks of images, the collection of «memory freeze-frames». Moreover, by chasing and depicting dramatic moments, visual news coverage activates emotions effectively.

The paper examines representations of citizenship especially in two multimodal story types: captioned photo galleries and video reviews. We analyze media frames and the way they tend to guide the perceptions and interpretations of members of the public as economic citizens along two different dimensions, one related to identification and the level of individual voice and reasoning (*argumentative framing*), and the other related to the emotional intensity of representation (*affective framing*); and introduce an integrative analytical tool that connects these dimensions. From a variety of visual themes that define and prescribe economic citizenship in the financial crisis imagery, we focus on the coverage of demonstrations, protests and riots, which emerge as prominent themes in addressing the citizen's role in the crisis. The analytical framework, which we call the Affect and Argument Map, is tested and illustrated through the empirical examples of video reviews and photo galleries related to online news about the financial crisis.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework of the study. Section 3 describes our analytical tool, developed and applied for evaluating emotional intensity as well as identification and personal voice in multimodal texts. Section 4 introduces research material and the analytical process of the study. Section 5 describes and discusses the central findings of the research, and finally, section 6 presents our conclusions of the current state of the study.

2. Theoretical framework: affect, argumentation, and framing

In current politically oriented media and discourse studies it is broadly acknowledged that both «reason» and «emotion», i.e. both logico-discursive and affective signification constitute important sources of moral and political action and that they are, in effect, indissociable in such discursive work (ten Bos & Willmott, 2001; Laclau, 2005; Massumi, 2010). While logico-discursive reasoning is generally regarded as the nucleus for democratic participation (e.g. Habermas, 1962/1989), studies on cognitive and affective responses to media messages suggest that emotional responses also play a role in public opinion and political judgment (Cho et al., 2003: 324). Silverstone (2007) incorporates this interplay in his notion of «mediapolis», by which he refers to the mediated public space of appearance, where we appear at others and others at us: «in the mediapolis, the issue is not just the rationality of human communication, but a recognition that communication is grounded in a feeling for the world, and in the condition of being in the world among others» (Silverstone, 2007: 43). Thus, the media may enhance political participation or agency through facilitating the processes of both identification (creating a sense of relatedness, connectedness) and affect (creating the sense of emancipation, freedom, the possibility of change). In this study, we examine the interplay of affect and argumentation in terms of media framing.

2.1. Media framing

Media frame can generally be regarded as a «central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events» (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987: 143). Frames are persistent patterns of selection, emphasis, and exclusion where certain aspects of reality are promoted over alternatives. The empirical analysis of media framing rests on the idea that media texts, or their particular attributes, can be interpreted as pointing towards certain meaning systems, thereby priming audience towards certain interpretations (Griffin, 2004: 384). Attributes, which are analyzed as cues or framing devices, vary according to the mode of communication. Thus, media frames operate by persuading audiences to interpret news by emphasizing certain ideational and interpersonal markers, using visual, verbal and auditory resources.

Visual framing may be understood as ways in which images or their attributes (e.g. camera angle, composition, depicted objects) work as framing devices through referring to culturally available signifying practices and meanings. Correspondingly, auditory framing and verbal framing refer to ways in which sounds (e.g. a piece of music, a tone of voice, a whistle of tear gas grenade) and linguistic choices (e.g. vocabulary, person, tense) are used to evoke such practices and domains.

It has been assessed that, compared with verbal messaging, part of the power of images as framing tools derives from their less intrusive nature, as well as the general impression of lens-based images referring closer to reality (Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011: 50). Following Messaris and Abraham (2003), visuals, and particularly lens-based images, have three characteristics that create both challenges and opportunities to their potential to frame news: 1. the analogical quality of images, 2. the indexicality of images, and 3. the lack of an explicit propositional syntax in images. In addition, images, and as Sontag claims specifically photographic images (2003: 19), have the ability to create a high level of emotional intensity and capacity.

These characteristics make the lens-based images, effective tools for framing, especially as it has been demonstrated that visual framing does not seem to affect the evaluation of journalistic objectivity by the audience (Brantner et al., 2011: 533). In addition, it has been argued that visual modes of communication, especially metaphor-rich «narrative visualizations» (Fry, Wilson & Overby, 2013) may have heightened capacity to influence economic behavior through evoking emotional resonance and appealing to intuitive reasoning. Therefore, the use of images in signifying complex and controversial topics such as the financial crisis and its implications should be carefully considered, and ideally, verbal content and visual imagery should be analyzed in conjunction.

2.2. Affective fact, simulation and meaning contamination

The relationship between affect and democracy is far from simple, and practices of expressing and representing affect in the media vary in terms of their democratic and moral potential. It has been argued that representations that merely dramatize or visualize the antagonistic, exclusive or unfair nature of social relations make little intervention in the world but may instead work to restate or reproduce the current social order. In order to facilitate democratic processes and the possibility of change, cultural or media forms would therefore need to reflect also the inherent contingency of social relations and structures, and the potentially «terrifying» experience of freedom and emancipation resulting from this contingency (Laclau, 1996; Gilbert, 2011).

The exhilarating fear inherent to freedom differs drastically from another kind of terror – the paralyzing, discouraging fear connected to the threat of arbitrary injustice and violence described by Massumi. Massumi´s (2005, 2010) idea of *affective fact* refers to the ways in which the creation of affect by the media precedes and intertwines with argumentative and empirically based reasoning in the creation of «facts», which may, once established, be uncritically used to justify pre-emptive action. It is argued that the media, and especially the rhetoric of neoconservatism in the media, evoke emotions first, based on fear, disruption, repetition, and «the looming uncertainty of ill-defined threat» (Massumi, 2005: 8). After creating affect, and only then, media produces content and meaning for it (Massumi, 2005; Terranova, 2007).

Following Massumi, the mechanisms and rhetoric of affective fact are based on alien, unknown threat, and the bending of temporal dimensions. Thus, affective fact is especially about a state of alarm and preemption. It is concerned with *future anterior*, reversal indexicality, where the smoke is no more an indexical sign, a prediction of the fire. Instead, the smoke causes the fire (Massumi, 2005: 8). In other words, as Terranova (2007: 133-134) defines a mechanism of passage between affective and empirical facts: «we would be dealing, then, with a dispositif of power that grasps knowledge not as the result of abstract logical games affecting the sphere of truth, but as the secondary result of a certain hold on the body». Thus, it can be argued that within contemporary media tactics, the cognitive perception and the field of knowledge are frequently enclosed with strategic intervention in a public consciousness with affective facts. Consequently, one of the objectives of our research is to analyze the passage between affective and empirical facts within representations of individuals as economic citizens.

Massumi (2010: 84) notes that «the affective reality of threat is contagious», meaning that once the affective fact of fear has been created, it works to signify objects and people as threatening with little regard to their actual or empirical ties to the (imagined) source of threat. This research discusses the possibility of meaning contamination on the level of narrative structure, conceptualizing it as internal resonance between individual visuals and other semiotic resources within news narratives. Our aim is to discuss how and to what extent representations may derive their meanings internally from the narrative whole that they are a part of.

Visuals, and especially loosely captioned still photographs, as semiotic resources in the news media are inexplicit and flexible in meaning, and may thus easily work as floating signifiers, losing part of their characteristic indexical gravitation on the «real» referent and gliding toward the state of simulation (Baudrillard, 1994). Simulation refers to mediation without the referent, it is «the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal» (Baudrillard, 1994: 1). In addition, simulation may be understood as «representation of already existing spectacles of mass fascination» (Chouliaraki, 2008: 833). Thus the concept draws attention to the ways in which, in contemporary mass media, signs may refer to existing cultural narratives and meanings more than to any real referents.

3. Affect and Argument Map as an analytical framework

These theoretical premises and initial observations from the empirical material guided us in the construction of our analytical framework, titled the Affect and Argument Map (Figure 1). Empirical phenomena that we wanted to subject to closer examination included especially the dominance of affective, dramatic imagery in the photo galleries of demonstrations, the tension between anonymous and identified referents, and the apparent differences in tone between photo slide shows and video reviews referring to similar events. We analyze the representations of citizens in financial news discourse in terms of *affective framing* and *argumentative framing*; analytical devices for describing these dimensions were gathered especially from the literature of multimodal discourse analysis and visual framing (Fahmy, 2004; O'Halloran, 2006; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Bock, 2012).

Affective framing in this study refers to the ways in which visual, verbal, and auditory attributes evoke emotional states, practices, or atmospheres in representations of economic citizens. We analyze cues for emotional frames of each (audio)visual unit of texts on three levels based on the metafunctional principle (Halliday, 1994; Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006). First, interpersonal emotion markers that work as cues for the relationship between the viewer and the depicted referent include contact (gaze), attitude/subordination (camera angle), distance, orientation, as well as verbal and auditive cues. Second, ideational emotion markers include cues to the representation of emotions: the emotional state of the represented citizens, signaled by facial expression, posture, movement, verbal and auditive cues, and the emotional atmosphere of the situation/text as a whole, signaled by verbal cues, auditive cues (e.g. music), and certain ideational motifs and effects (e.g. fire, smoke, clothing, gear). Third, we assess the interplay of visual components and other semiotic resources of each (audio)visual unit of texts, i.e. visual and intersemiotic compositions that relate interpersonal and ideational meanings to each other (e.g. salience, frames).



Figure 1, the caption: The affect and argument map

Argumentative framing refers to the ways in which the attributes of multimodal news texts point to culturally available practices and forms of identification, such as socio-cultural roles and identities, or symbolic figures or characters. It includes the ways in which citizens are identified or left anonymous in media texts, as well as the presence (or absence) and quality of the voice. Argumentative framing is examined by assessing the amount and quality of identity markers shown or verbally indicated in a representation. These include personal and demographic markers (e.g. name, gender, age) as well as different indicators of personal voice: the audiovisual presence of citizens, citations, or visual presence of banderoles or other signs.

4. Research material and analytical process

The study is part of a larger project examining the signification of finance in online environments. For the project, we have compiled a dataset comprising extensive news packages such as virtual timelines of the financial crisis in the Eurozone during 2010-2013 in several news media. The videos and captioned picture galleries analyzed in this paper appear as parts of such overview presentations.

The analytical process was begun by identifying recurring visual themes of representing citizens in the complete dataset. These themes included, for example: Protestors clash with police; Pedestrians in front of important buildings; Demonstrators with banderoles; Sale or shop closedown; People in the employment office; Traders in front of curves; People at cash machines; People interviewed in the street; Supporters of parties and politicians; Voters at the polling station. Of these themes, we chose to focus on representations of demonstrations and clashes, partly due to their prominence in our dataset, and partly because of their notably strong emotional atmosphere.

News material analyzed in this article concerns demonstrations and protests against austerity measures, government-imposed wage cuts and tax increases in Athens. These measures were based on the requirements by foreign lenders (i.e. European Union, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) in order to qualify Greece for bailout packages aiming to ease the economic crisis in the country and to prevent default. Articles, video reviews and photo slide shows illustrate events at the time of strikes in Athens in June and October 2011. In these protests, peaceful demonstrations eventually turned violent, led by various hard-line interest groups clashing with riot policemen, vandalizing the city. The final material includes four videos and four sets of photo galleries addressing demonstrations in Athens published in the online versions of *The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and CBS Evening News (Table 1).

Table 1, the caption: The research material analyzed in the article

Date	Media company	Headline	Sub-headline/ingress	Type	Length	Code (on AAMap)	Link
29.6.2011	New York Times	Clashes as Greek government passes austerity measures	–	slideshow	10 slides	NYT/SS/1-10	http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2011/06/29/world/europe/20110630-GREECE.html?ref=europe
30.6.2011	New York Times	Austerity plan passes (from the series time cast)	–	video	1,31 min	NYT/Video/1-11	http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/world/europe/30greece.html?_r=0
19.10.2011	Guardian	Violence erupts as Greece strike begins - in pictures	Anger over new austerity measures and layoffs erupts into clashes outside parliament as two-day general strike begins	photo gallery	20 slides	G/SS/1-20	http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2011/oct/19/greeceprotest

Date	Media company	Headline	Sub-headline/ingress	Type	Length	Code (on AAMap)	Link
20.10.2011	Guardian	Greece austerity plan draws thousands of protesters onto streets	Tens of thousands demonstrate outside the Greek parliament building in Athens to demonstrate against a new austerity package which politicians are expected to approve. The protest ended in ferocious street fighting on Wednesday after riot police fired tear gas into the crowd and youths responded with a volley of rocks and petrol bombs.	video	1,05 min	G/Video/1-11	http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2011/oct/20/greeceausterity-protesters-video
6.10.2011	Guardian Source: Reuters	Greek general strike becomes violent	A 24-hour strike in central Athens by public sector workers to demonstrate against government austerity measures turned violent after clashes with police. At least 12 protesters were detained and 9 arrested for provoking riots, while shop and officewindows were smashed, police said.	video	3,09 min	G2/Video/1-39	http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/oct/05/general-strikein-greece

Date	Media company	Headline	Sub-headline/ingress	Type	Length	Code (on AAMap)	Link
29.6.2011	Washington Post	In Greece, tumult in the government and on the streets	Cutbacks demanded by international lenders have led to a public backlash, with tens of thousands of Greeks flooding into the main squares of cities across the country.	photo gallery	20 slides (#71-90 out of 155 slides)	WP/SS/1-20	http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/thousands-protest-greekausteritymeasures/2011/06/06/AGoZuGKH_gallery.html#photo=4
19.-20.10. 2011	Washington Post	In Greece, tumult in the government and on the streets	Cutbacks demanded by international lenders have led to a public backlash, with tens of thousands of Greeks flooding into the main squares of cities across the country.	photo gallery	19 slides (#37-55 out of 155 slides)	WP2/SS/1-19	http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/thousands-protest-greekausteritymeasures/2011/06/06/AGoZuGKH_gallery.html#photo=4
2.11.2011	CBS Evening News (on Washington Post post tvsite)	Greece jeopardizing world economy	Greek Prime Minister George Papandreau's call for a surprise referendum to the bailout deal he's been offered to save his country from bankruptcy is infuriating world leaders.	video	2,23 min	CBS /SS/1-7	http://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/world/greece-jeopardizingworld economy/2011/11/02/gIQAqenmgM_video.html

A particular challenge in the analysis of multimodal texts is to account for the interplay of visual, written, and auditory attributes. In this study, analysis is a hermeneutical process where the examination of different attributes alternates with their interpretation in terms of discursive functions, and finally with their assessment with reference to cultural narratives and meanings. Another challenge in the analysis of complex (audio)visual texts concerns the inclusion of context. This study considers two contextual layers: first, the textual context, referring to the immediate connected or neighboring elements (such as other pictures in a slide show, headlines), which are likely to trigger internal resonance; and second, the wider cultural contexts that are evoked and made relevant.

The analysis proceeded as follows. We analyzed representations of citizens distinctively for each individual (captioned) photograph and each distinguishable shot of video, in terms of affective framing and argumentative framing. We used the list of attributes described above as a checklist while aiming at a holistic interpretation that would take into consideration the interplay of different markers. Evaluations of the emotional intensity and the level of argumentation and voice were placed on the analytical map and the representations of citizens were further interpreted with reference to cultural meanings and frames. At the second phase, we assessed the presentation (slide show or video) as a whole: its organization and narrative features. At this phase, we also reflected on the possibility and effects of meaning contamination. In the following sections, we present and discuss findings according to these two stages.

5. Placing representations of citizens on the map

After analyzing representations of citizens in each individual captioned photograph and shot of video in our material, we placed them on the Affect and Argument Map. The result is pictured in Figure 2. Our analysis shows that, overall, the level of argumentative voice remains relatively low throughout the sample of demonstration coverage that we analyzed. The vast majority of representations includes only a minimal amount of identity markers, such as visually discernible gender and age, leaving citizens anonymous, decontextualized, and silenced. The level of emotional intensity, by contrast, varies considerably more. The dimensions of the map create four fields or combinations of affective and argumentative framing.



the New York Times 29.6.2011, slides, NYT/SS/1-10
the Washington Post 29.6.2011, slides, WP/SS/1-20
the New York Times 30.6.2011, video, NYT/Video/1-11
the Guardian 19.10.2011, slides, 1-20, G/SS/1-20
the Washington Post 19.-20.10.2011, slides, WP2/SS/1-19
the Guardian 6.10.2011, video, G2/Video/1-39
the Guardian 20.10.2011, video, G/Video/1-11
CBS Evening News 2.11.2011, video, CBS/Video/1-7

Figure 2, the caption: Empirical materials placed on the affect and argument map

5.1. Floating referent + high affectivity – citizen as affective character

The majority of the (audio)visual representations of citizens in our material falls in the category characterized by high level of affectivity and low level of identification and voice. The prototypical example is the masked protestor depicted in a highly affective setting, marked particularly by ideational cues such as fire, smoke, and riot gear. In such imagery, we argue, the figure of the protestor does not appear as an identifiable or relatable person who would evoke a sense of connection (Silverstone, 2007) but rather as an affectively tuned symbol or index.

Emotional intensity, in our material, is most often constructed through ideational markers that cue into the emotionally charged atmosphere of the situation, and only marginally through interpersonal means of creating contact or proximity between the viewer and the referent. In many pictures, tight cropping excludes all signs of the ordinary or the everyday, tuning emotional intensity to the extreme. With reference to identification, in the most extreme cases there are no identity markers visible or audible; a citizen may, for example, appear as a mere silhouette against fire or smoke. In other cases, there are visual or verbal elements that work as weak indications of the possibility – if not the content – of the voice or message, for example untranslated, uncommented banderoles or placards, or a brief reference to the context of the protests in a written caption.

The «citizen as affective character» category is extremely popular especially in all four sets of still photographs that we analyzed. This observation resonates with a long-standing critique of the practice of «aesthetic dramatization», resulting in the (over)emphasis of the emotional affectivity above the ideational relevance in news photographs (Schwartz, 1992; Caujolle, 1995 in Salo, 2000: 28). Video reviews in our material include relatively less anonymous-affective representation; however, the video review of the CBS Evening News marks an exception, with its footage of the demonstrations in Athens falling entirely in this category. This video runs footage exclusively from the violent phase of the protests, with protestors throwing stones and police firing teargas, as background imagery without any reference to the motives or goals of the demonstration.

Our analysis suggests that cultural narratives through which events are told in such imagery – and furthermore through which they are interpreted – include elements from discourses of war, anarchy and chaos as well as simulations of war, anarchy and chaos through fiction and gamification. Preliminary observations on the social reinterpretation of this news material imply that in certain online communities, visual news coverage on demonstrations and protests during the Eurocrisis is in fact perceived within science-fiction, warrior or military saga frames (see e.g. http://gamingtrend.com/forums/off-topic/riot-police-gear).

5.2. Floating referent + moderateness – citizen as mundane character

Representations of citizens falling in this category include the images and footage of unidentified (peaceful) demonstrators and bypassers especially in the *New York* Times and *Guardian* video reviews. They depict ordinary people participating in familiar, institutionalized forms of political action: as demonstrators and strikers, forming a collective public. When these images represent large masses marching with banderoles, they evoke to some degree the cultural frames of mass power and uprising – however in a diluted form, since the message is missing. Another image type depicts members of the public confronting the financial turmoil at everyday errands, e.g. at cash machines, gas stations and employment offices. In terms of cultural framing, these pictures may be read as signifying especially the ways in which the ordinary has become extraordinary due to the financial turmoil and the accompanying political activity and unrest: cash is not available, the airport is empty, and the streets are filled with garbage.

Representations in this category lack the most blatant ideational emotion markers and effects; in addition, emotional intensity is leveled through the visual and auditory cues of ordinary everyday life. Consequently, these representations may be considered less distancing and alienating than those in the previous category. However, due to the low level of argumentation, they are also likely to fall short in terms of facilitating an active political and moral engagement. Members of the public are typically depicted in this category as generic representatives of civic activism or as indexes of the everyday effects of the crisis. As an image type in the news media these kinds of visuals may be even seen as falling somewhere between news photographs and illustrative symbolic images (Salo, 2000: 15-16).

5.3. Identifiable referent + moderateness – citizen as deliberative person

Notably, the material that we analyzed does not include representations classified under high and very high level of identification. Such representations, according to our criteria, would mean that citizens are named or otherwise described, contextualized *and* get to express their arguments, opinions, or emotions at length. However, the material includes some representations with moderate or relatively high level of argumentation and voice, especially in the video reviews by *The Guardian* and *The New York Times.*

In the street interviews on these videos, citizens are given the possibility to articulate their thoughts and feelings concerning the immediate situation, as well as the economic turmoil more broadly. In practice, screen and audio time given to citizens is limited, which restricts an in-depth deliberation of causes, consequences and possible solutions, and directs argumentation towards brief, responsive overview comments. However, even brief citizen comments may express relatively multifaceted arguments in condensed and organized form, as the following example illustrates:

> Example G/Video/2-4. Video review *Guardian*, Male demonstrator interviewed in the midst of the demonstration
> Video: Footage alternates between close shots of the referent speaking and long, wide, the slightly high-angle overall shots of Parliament square full of demonstrators with banderoles.
> Audio: The background bustle of crowds, music playing from loudspeakers, creating a calm, slightly melancholy atmosphere; male referent speaks Greek in a calm, determinate tone.
> «There is no way that we will stop this battle until this government falls, which is one of our demands. Our second demand is an end to this monopolistic policy, which has created all these problems and creates a dead end for workers. Our message is: we will battle till the end.»

This example also illustrates the significance of auditive emotion markers in communicating the overall atmosphere of the situation. Especially in comparison with the mute – literally and figuratively – the messages of photographs, video footage with ambience sound, the bustle of crowds, and music, inevitably evokes the glimpses of the ordinary or the everyday, toning down the mute threat and emotional intensity that characterizes dramatic photographs.

In this category, citizens appear as deliberative actors capable of forming and expressing conceptual insights and opinions. Such representation, we argue, is likely to facilitate identification with the referents and evoke the processes of reasoning, thereby creating preconditions for political engagement. More specifically, they suggest political agency as a possibility, which may or may not be taken upon by the audience.

There are, notably, no still photographs in this category. There is of course no reason why captioned photographs could not display this combination, since identity and voice could in principle very well be communicated in the caption. The lack of argumentation and personal voice in the galleries of still photographs is thus not inherent to the genre; more likely, it reflects, at least partly, the conventionalized journalistic practices and processes, e.g. of separating images from their makers and the context of their making (Bock, 2012).

5.4. Identifiable referent + high affectivity – Citizen as compassionate person

No representation in our material depicts the combination of high level of argumentation and high affectivity. Principally, this category could in our context mean representations in which a named or contextualized person uses his/her voice in a heightened emotional state or setting. Ideally, such representations could potentially evoke a sense of compassion and connection by the viewer and thereby facilitate the emotional engagement.

5.5. Summary of the map

The levels of affectivity and argumentation within Eurozone crisis news seem to vary depending on applied semiotic resources. It appears that semiotic resources and narrative patterns used in audiovisual video reviews offer more versatile markers and cues for representing actors, the scenes of action, and especially articulated motivations and arguments of members of the public, when compared with captioned photo galleries. Hence, video reviews seem capable of representing coherent perceptions and stories with diversity at the levels of personal voice and reasoning as well as the atmosphere of the situations depicted. By contrast, photo slide shows often seem incapable of depicting referents as identified individuals with a personal voice. On the contrary, it seems that such visual news coverage downplays, ignores or is unwilling to emphasize individual characteristics of referents represented in the narrative, or giving them an opportunity to demonstrate their arguments and reasoning. Photo slide shows tend to focus on action, combat and confrontation, framing in only the abnormalities of «crisis reality» and thereby creating highly affective framings to impact and astonish viewers.

6. Narrative features and practices in representing citizens

Thus, it can be argued that the way in which the more aggressive and apparently violent rioters are equipped (face masks, tear gas masks, hoods, sticks) and represented (anonymously in surreal, emotionally intensive, affective imagery) tends to alienate them from mundane everyday life. Such anonymity, facelessness, and silence can naturally be considered, to a certain extent, the protestors' own choice. Nevertheless, we argue that the way in which the media choose to focus on this kind of (self-)representation, emphasizing the level of affect and ignoring or fully neglecting opportunities to include the personal voice and reasoning, has problematic implications.

6.1. Anonymity, muteness, alienation

All the photo galleries and one of the video reviews analyzed for this study represent citizens mainly as anonymous and mute. We argue that this kind of representation emphasizes the visual *idea* of demonstrations over specific demonstrations with particular arguments and identified voices. Images of demonstrators shouting slogans, mouths wide open, but silent, thus represent the *idea* of *demonstrators* with banderoles as symbols, carrying out no perceivable meaning (without translations and transcriptions in text). Citizens are muted and disguised in the way that some rioters prefer to perform in these setups, anonymously without revealing their motives and backgrounds. Thus, photo slide shows even seem to use auditive space, explicitly and implicitly, literally and symbolically, as an amplifier for emotional intensity and affective framing. Lacking the meaning potential of the auditive mode, photography derives its strength by cropping all sounds from the scenery, including the transcriptions of spoken argumentation in captions, and rebuilding the setting depicted based on the visual.

The photo gallery of *The Guardian* serves as an example. In addition to the headline («Violence erupts as Greece strike begins»), there is only one sentence (in the ingress) in the whole slide show presentation, which refers to the motives of action of the referents: «Anger over new austerity measures and layoffs erupts into clashes outside parliament as two-day general strike begins». This is an overly simplified verbal summary for the variety of actors and groups visible in the photo gallery. Bundling up all actors of a day like this is not only questionable journalism but also unpredictable. It is questionable especially in terms of the rights of the referent for his and her own identity, including visual and verbal markers, from physical appearance to his or her ideas and argumentative reasoning. Furthermore, it is unpredictable especially in terms of the audience as participants, the viewers and their perceptions and interpretations of the flows of events based on such representations.

Our analysis indicates that the relatively open meaning structure of photo slide shows may increase the semantic weight or impact of overly affective elements within the presentation, thereby enhancing the possibility of meaning contamination, the alienation of floating referents, and oversimplification of portrayed individuals and events. For example, particular photographs within a slide show may mediate emotionally decisive moments and, thus, create affective thematic cues and impacts, which guide interpretations also of the neighbouring images within the photo gallery as a whole. Whether intentional or unintentional, this kind of visual news coverage may have a tendency of producing particular «desktop editorial realities».

6.2. (Im)potentializing citizens

The preceding discussion gives reason to suggest that the journalistic choice to focus on affective representations of anonymous demonstrators, together with the flexible and contagious meaning structure of multimodal story types, is likely to affect also the representations of those citizens and demonstrators who would be more than willing to express their views. As demonstrators shouting possibly well thought-out slogans and carrying written banderoles are represented basically the same way as anonymous hooded rioters, without any level of personal voice, there is a risk that they, too, are distanced and alienated in a similar way.

From the perspective of democratic participation and considering the role of media in facilitating it, such representation does injustice to demonstrators and undermines their freedom to be heard (Silverstone, 2007: 40). Most likely, the primary reason for citizens to go out demonstrating would be the possibility to have their say and to be heard, read, and listened to. Furthermore, the motives, contents and nature of their actions during a demonstration are likely to have been very different from the ones that inspire more violent protestors and rioters. However, this distinction between the motives, arguments, opinions, and nature of action between different groups is not apparent, noticeable, or readable in the collections of photographs that we analyzed.

It may thus be argued that, especially, photo slide shows and galleries dominated by anonymous, affective characters tend to incapacitate members of the public and deprive them of political potential, which is ultimately based on the possibility of real, effective communication that includes the right of being heard. Such muted representations invalidate referents, including those who would most possibly like to have their say, compressing and framing them as floating referents, generalized symbols, illustrations or ideas of protesting citizens rather than as individuals, groups and collectives with relevant opinions and arguments.

To conclude in a more optimistic note, video reviews in our material seem to illustrate the possibility that meaning contamination in Eurozone crisis discourses may also work in the opposite direction of potentialization and personification. There is a level of internal resonance within video reports that creates a narrative fit between identified, deliberative, expressive citizens with a personal voice, and the other, anonymous referents. As a preliminary notion, it seems that comments and statements depicted and represented in the interviews by referents as well as their unprompted verbal messages from posters, banderoles and slogans may have a tendency of projecting potentiality and expectations for similar kinds of thinking, behavior and activity towards other referents in the representation as well. Further research and analysis of this kind of pre-personification and potentialization is one of the future objectives of this study.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, we set out to study media representations as the conditions of possibility for moral and political action. A special aim was to evaluate how different multimodal narrative and representational practices guide and constrain the potential forms and practices of economic citizenship in the context of Eurozone crisis discourses.

In current politically oriented media and discourse studies it is broadly acknowledged that both «reason» and «emotion», i.e. both logico-discursive and affective signification constitute important sources of moral and political action and that they are, in effect, indissociable in such discursive work (ten Bos & Willmott, 2001; Laclau, 2005; Massumi, 2010). Gilbert (2011), in an insightful essay on what democracy «feels like», connects democracy to an exciting, emancipatory, and even terrifying sense of potential, a realization that social relations are contingent and may actually be subject to dislocation and transformation through collective action.

However, this study gives reason to question the capability of certain established practices of signification in multimodal online journalism to evoke such political potential. Our analysis of the representation of demonstrations in online financial crisis news indicates that affective intensity and argumentative depth do not often meet in a productive way in multimodal representations of economic and political activity. Quite the contrary, highly affective representations, epitomized in our study by the archetypal still photograph depicting anonymous rioters, tend to be so strongly disconnected from everyday realities, concrete events, and political reasoning, that they incline towards simulation and the creation of an empty sense of threat and chaos (Baudrillard, 1994; Massumi, 2010). By contrast, representations of citizens with a more personal voice and argumentation, exemplified in this study especially by video interviews, frequently miss their chance to enhance an emotional engagement.

Our analysis and findings indicate that the analytical tool that we developed for this study, the Affect and Argument Map, is helpful in creating structured and nuanced understandings of the interplay of affective and argumentative framing in representations of social actors. As a special advantage, the tool is flexibly adjustable for the analysis of linguistic, (audio)visual as well as multimodal texts. The next challenge developing the tool will be to relate the interplay of affect and argumentation in a more systematic and theoretically justified manner to the question of the moral power of media and the potential of media texts to facilitate ethical and political action.

The material analyzed in this study focuses on strikes, demonstrations and protests in the face of austerity measures and represents, as such, a limited sample of the practices of representing economic citizenship in the online news about the financial crisis. The theme may be considered relevant to our study because of its prominence, and because it offers insights into the intersection of traditional means of public participation and current challenges of economic citizenship in the globally interconnected world. However, examination of additional visual and textual themes and materials is needed to give further indication of the usefulness of the map and to complement the picture of the affective and argumentative construction of economic citizenship in online environments.

The two story types that we examined – video reviews and the organized galleries of still photographs – seem to serve to some extent specialized functions in the meaning-making work of multimodal news packages. From the perspective of democratic participation and the representation and facilitation of citizenship, we identified both encouraging and discouraging examples of compiling and using these story types. However, our analysis indicates some differences, which may be normalizing and therefore require critical attention. First, it seems that galleries of still photographs, while providing the opportunity to present a large amount of selected images in a semi-organized manner, tend to overemphasize affect and emotional impact at the cost of adequate contextualization and anchoring to everyday reality, thereby creating internal «editorial realities» of their own and potentially gliding towards simulation. This is a risk especially when captions attached to photographs are very short and merely state the surface level elements visible in the picture. With regard to representing civic action and activism, such practices may be considered particularly harmful, as they often result in the silencing and alienation of the referents.

The use of more elaborate captions, which provide more background and more in-depth interpretations of the meaning of depicted events, emerges as one possible way of anchoring emotionally intensive pictures more closely to local social and political realities. However, such anchoring remains limited as long as the news media favors photographs with framings that exclude all elements of the ordinary or the everyday from the dramatized pictures. Enhancing the politicizing potential of organized photo galleries as a story type would therefore necessitate revision also in the visual culture and practices of photojournalism.

Video reviews embedded in news packages, by contrast, seem to lend themselves relatively well for constructing news narratives that incorporate both affective and argumentative elements, representing both the dramatic and the deliberative, and appealing to both reason and emotion. This capacity arguably stems from several sources, particularly the seamless multimodality of the audiovisual presentation, resulting from a more unified journalistic production process where textual and visual journalistic phases are not strictly separated; and the signifying potential of the audio layer, including e.g. the ambience sound and tone of the voice, which play an important role in admitting the familiar and the ordinary to slip into the representation of also more extraordinary situations. Even though audiovisual material as such does not guarantee these advantages, it seems that in video footage, it is harder to shut out the everyday or the real completely, or to create symbolically strong and affective interpretations as in still photographs.

Overall, it is argued in this paper that together with verbal messaging, visual choices and patterns create the general structure and intensity of news stories, evoking cognitive reasoning, mundane observations, conceptual insights, and affective impassioned interpretations. Audio landscape, in turn, plays a role especially in affective framing, creating the meaning and atmosphere of the situation in complex ways.

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Reseñas / Reviews

La construcción discursiva de la masculinidad. Un estudio de consultorios en revistas para hombres del Reino Unido. By Eduardo de Gregorio-Godeo. Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM, 2009. Pp. 536. ISBN: 978-3-639-13799-6.
Reviewed by María Isabel Romero Ruiz, Universidad de Málaga

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Following the well-established interest in the study of men and masculinities dating back to the seventies within disciplines like sociology, psychology or anthropology, it was only in the late nineties that linguistics started to become fully concerned with the study of the masculine *per se*. The publication of Johnson and Meinhof's *Language and Masculinity* (1997) represented a turning point in the long-standing feminist linguistics tradition within language and gender research, where the masculine had been considered as a taken for granted category in the study of femininities and women's oppression in / through language, yet never actually explored as such. With an interdisciplinary approach, the book draws upon CDA as a methodology for the study of issues of language and masculinity within a broader men's studies orientation. With an agenda greatly in common with Cultural Studies (Barker, 2003: 443; Baldwin et al., 2004: 17-18), men's studies are involved in the scrutiny of men's identities and concerns, making them visible in public forums of contemporary scholarship. Men's studies have been active for more than twenty years now and different masculinities have been acknowledged, following a non-essentialist approach which gives recognition to the existence of a plurality of identities. Although there has been some controversy over how to name the field, notions like «studies of men and masculinities» and «critical studies of men» reflect in a more accurate way the work that has been done in recent years, mostly inspired by feminist research on women (Kimmel, Hearn and

Connell, 2005: 1-3). In the context of work on language and masculinity conducted through CDA, de Gregorio-Godeo's work is fully representative of research in men's studies through its examination of how language and discourse contribute to the representation and construction of masculinities in print media. Given the fundamental concern of Cultural Studies with gender issues—and indeed with masculinity—(Baldwin et al. 2004: 17), the volume may be more broadly read as substantiating the potential of discourse analysis-oriented research for Cultural Studies as «an interdisciplinary […] field of enquiry that explores the production and inculcation of maps of meaning» (Barker, 2003: 437).

Specifically, this publication is divided in seven chapters, including an appendix at the end with the textual samples examined in the study. The first chapter consists of an introduction to what the author considers the basic motivation for the writing of the volume and its hypotheses when it comes to the analysis of how the idea of masculinity is articulated discursively in men's magazines in the United Kingdom, focusing concretely on the problem pages that are very common in these types of publications. Chapter II is devoted to the contextualization of the work within the tradition of studies about language and gender in the Anglo-speaking world, with a special emphasis on what has been done till now in relation to the issue of language and masculinity. Despite the fact that the non-discursive levels of analysis are also taken into consideration, the book focuses on the relation between language and masculinity at the level of discourse production, for example, in speech acts, politeness and conversation. In its overview of work on men's studies, Chapter III pays attention to important aspects such as the existence of multiple masculinities, the so-called masculinity crisis and the emergence of new models of masculinity in media-discourse vehicles of the UK. These images include the «new man» and his incorporation of dimensions traditionally associated with feminine universes (e.g. a closer contact with emotions and greater aesthetic concerns), and the «new lad» and his recreation of patriarchal values (e.g. women's sexual objectification and homophobia). In the same fashion, Chapter IV contains a detailed description of the process of discursive construction of identities, giving emphasis to the discursive construction of gender and the particularities of journalistic discourse in the process. In a study about the role of discourse in the construction of gendered ideologies in social life, CDA is subsequently justified as a methodological tool for the study of language, ideology and power. Hence, Norman Fairclough's

(2001) CDA model for the analysis of «socio-cultural change and change in discourse» (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) is presented through its consideration of discourse at three different levels: textual, interactional and socio-cultural. Fairclough's three-level analytical framework is employed methodologically in the volume to study discourse in three stages: the description of the textual, the interpretation of the interactional, and the explanation of the socio-cultural. In Chapter V, the corpus of data is presented and its selection criteria are established, doing a detailed genre and register analysis of the problem pages in men's magazines. Chapter VI shows the results of the empirical analysis of twenty textual samples, demonstrating that the choice of specific textual features (lexis, verbal processes, negations, modality, discourse markers, macrostructures, etc.) is determined by the power relations of the social formation where the magazines are published, for instance, the changing gender relations or the impact of consumerism upon men. Furthermore, the results substantiate that such textual options also contribute actively to shaping the masculinity ideology articulated in the reader-counsellor interaction, characteristic of problem pages in contemporary Britain. Chapter VII shows the conclusions and contains more general reflections from a men's studies perspective, in particular about the process whereby magazines' readers come to negotiate their masculine identities with the ideological repertoires of the «new man» or the «new lad» by taking up or rejecting such subject positions in the act of reading the magazines.

The volume might be criticised for being somehow limited, concentrating only in problem pages and failing to consider other sections of men's magazines. However, the results of the study are revealing in themselves and provide major insights into the study of the genre explored. Alternatively, the detailed application of Fairclough's CDA model over each of the textual samples of the corpus is perhaps a bit too repetitive for the reader, so in future studies this type of analysis could be replaced with a thorough examination of just one or two texts, followed by a broader discussion of the rest of textual samples as a whole, thereby laying a stronger emphasis on the Cultural Studies overall implications of the discourse analysis-oriented examination of texts. In any case, the procedure employed may also be regarded as positive given the pedagogic dimension of the research experience conducted, which may methodologically inspire similar studies on the discursive construction of gendered subject positions in various print media genres.

All in all, in addition to the analysis of culture and power issues in the construction of masculinities in media vehicles like men's magazines, the attempt to study the role of language and discourse as constitutively determined by and shaping socio-cultural phenomena like gender ideology is consistent with further theoretical work on the possibilities of discourse analysis as a tool for Cultural Studies research (Barker and Galasinski, 2001), as far as the study of various masculinities in media discourse is concerned. Thus, the study succeeds in shedding light on the role of text and discourse in the construction of masculine ideological constructs, which is illustrative of the major interest in men and masculinities, not only in the frame of the Social Sciences, where publications on this topic have proliferated, but also in the different disciplines in the Humanities, where not only Applied Linguistics, but also literature, visual arts, dance, music and many other cultural and aesthetic fields have made of men's issues their object of concern (Kimmel, Hearn and Connell, 2005: 3). In this respect, the volume incorporates a view of men and masculinities understood as socially constructed and reproduced in a Butlerian sense, and hence considered as variable through time and space within societies. Similarly, through its consideration of the socio-cultural dimension of discourses on masculinity in magazines, the volume makes it clear that men's relations are seen as power relations following Foucault's theories both at the discursive and material levels, so that the interconnection between gender and other socio-cultural divisions becomes relevant.

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CULTURA, LENGUAJE Y REPRESENTACIÓN / *CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND REPRESENTATION* · ISSN 1697-7750 · VOL. XII \ 2014, pp. 159
REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS CULTURALES DE LA UNIVERSITAT JAUME I / *CULTURAL STUDIES JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITAT JAUME I*
DOI: HTTP://DX.DOI.ORG/10.6035/CLR.2014.12.10

Estadísticas / Statistics

Artículos recibidos / Article submissions: 14
Artículos aceptados / Accepted articles: 8
Artículos internacionales / International submissions: 12
Artículos nacionales / Domestic submissions: 2

Normas de publicación CLR

0. Consideraciones generales. Política editorial

Cultura, Lenguaje y Representación. clr es una publicación de carácter científico-académico, de periodicidad anual, dedicada a la investigación en el área de los Estudios Culturales. Cada número aborda de manera monográfica alguno de los espectros relevantes de las representaciones de la cultura en sus diferentes manifestaciones (social, política, educativa, artística, histórica, lingüística, etc.), poniendo un especial énfasis en los acercamientos interdisciplinares e innovadores en el análisis de las mismas.

Su objetivo consiste en la divulgación de propuestas relevantes para la comunidad científica internacional dentro de la disciplina de los Estudios Culturales, para lo cual expresa su compromiso con la publicación de contribuciones originales y de alto contenido científico, siguiendo los parámetros internacionales de la investigación humanística.

La aceptación de artículos para su publicación estará condicionada al dictamen positivo de dos evaluadores externos. La presentación de un trabajo para su evaluación implica que se trata de material no publicado previamente y que no se encuentra en fase de evaluación para otra publicación.

En el caso de que un artículo previamente publicado en *Cultura, Lenguaje y Representación* quisiese ser publicado por su autor en otro medio, el mismo deberá mencionar a esta revista como lugar de publicación original. Para cualquier duda al respecto se recomienda consultar con la Dirección de la Revista.

1. Presentación de originales

- Los originales podrán presentarse en español o inglés.
- La extensión de los artículos no sobrepasará las 25 páginas (6000-8000 palabras aprox.) a doble espacio.
- Se deberá incluir un resumen de un máximo de 150 palabras y entre 4 y 8 palabras clave.
- Las reseñas de publicaciones relevantes tendrán 3-5 páginas (900-1500 palabras aprox.).
  - La reseña deberá incluir: título completo del libro; los nombres completos de los autores en el orden en que aparecen citados en el libro; lugar de publicación; editorial; año de publicación; número total de páginas (ej. xii + 234); isbn; precio (si se conoce).
  - El autor de la reseña debe enviar 2 copias de la misma a la editorial del libro reseñado.
- Las contribuciones se realizarán de manera electrónica en documento de word o rtf.

2. Información personal

La información personal y de contacto del autor aparecerá en una hoja aparte. Se incluirá la siguiente información: *a*) Título del artículo; *b*) Nombre y apellidos del autor; *c*) Institución de trabajo; *d*) Dirección postal de contacto; teléfono; fax.; dirección de correo electrónico.

3. Formato

- Los originales deberán estar mecanografiados a doble espacio, justificados, con letra Times New Roman, 12.
- Para las notas se utilizará la letra Times New Roman, 10 e interlineado sencillo. En ningún caso se utilizarán las notas al pie para acomodar las citas bibliográficas.

4. Citas

- Se utilizarán comillas españolas en la siguiente gradación (« " ' ' " ») cuando el texto citado no supere las cuatro líneas.
- Para las citas de cuatro líneas o superiores se deberá indentar el texto y separarlo del resto del texto mediante un retorno.
- Se utilizará el sistema de citas abreviadas, incorporadas en el cuerpo del texto, utilizando el siguiente formato: Said (1993: 35); (Bhabha, 1990: 123).
- Cuando existan referencias a más de un autor dentro de un paréntesis, las mismas deberán ir separadas por un punto y coma y ordenadas cronológicamente.
- Las omisiones textuales se indicarán por puntos suspensivos entre corchetes [...]; igualmente, los comentarios del autor dentro de una cita irán entre corchetes.

5. Referencias bibliográficas

- En el apartado de «Referencias bibliográficas» deberán aparecer obligatoriamente todas las obras citadas en el texto.
- Los apellidos e inicial del autor/es irán en negrita y letra versal.

a) Libros

SAID, E. W. (1978): *Orientalism*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.

b) Dos o más autores

DU GAY, P.; S. HALL; L. JANES; H. MACKAY; K. NEGUS (1997): *Doing Cultural Studies: the Story of the Sony Walkman*, London, Sage / The Open University.

c) Libros con editor

HALL, S.; D. HOBSON; A. LOWE; P. WILLIS (eds.) (1980): *Culture, Media, Language*, London, Hutchinson.

d) Artículos en publicación periódica

NADIN, M. (1984): «On the Meaning of the Visual», *Semiotica*, 52: 45-56.

BURGESS, A. (1990): «La hoguera de la novela», *El País,* 25 de febrero, 1-2.

e) Capítulo de libro colectivo

HALL, S. (1980): «Encoding/Decoding» en HALL, S.; D. HOBSON; A. LOWE; P. WILLIS (eds.) (1980): *Culture, Media, Language,* London, Hutchinson. 128-138.

Cuando el libro colectivo aparece citado en la bibliografía es suficiente con hacer la referencia abreviada:

HALL, S. (1992): «The West and the Rest» en HALL, S.; B. GIEBEN (eds.) (1992: 25-37).

f) Año

Cuando exista más de una publicación del mismo autor y del mismo año, se indicará por medio de una letra minúscula en cursiva, separada del año por un espacio.

Lukács, G. (1966 *a*): *Problemas del realismo,* México, FCE.

— (1966 *b*): *Sociología de la literatura,* Barcelona, Península.

Guidelines for publication CLR

0. Notes to contributors. Editorial Policy

CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND REPRESENTATION. CLR is an annual scholarly publication devoted to the discipline of Cultural Studies, whose scope is aimed at the international academic community. Each issue deals monographically with a relevant aspect of the representation of culture in its various manifestations (social, political, educational, artistic, historical, linguistic, etc.), encouraging interdisciplinary and innovative approaches in the field of cultural research. The Journal is committed to academic and research excellence by publishing relevant and original material that meets high scientific standards.

Submission of a paper will be taken to imply that it is unpublished and is not being considered for publication elsewhere. Articles will undergo an independent evaluation by two external referees, who will advise the Editors on the suitability of their publication.

Publication elsewhere of an article included in *Culture, Language and Representation* requires that the author acknowledge that it has first appeared in the Journal. If in doubt, authors are advised to contact The Editors.

1. Manuscript submissions

- Contributions may be written in English or Spanish.
- The length of the articles should not exceed 25 pages, 6000-8000 words approximately.
- Include an abstract of maximum 150 words and 4 to 8 descriptive keywords.
- Book reviews will be 3-5 pages (900 to 1500 words aprox.).
  - Reviews should include: full title of book; full name of author(s) in the same order as they appear in the book; place of publication; publisher; year of publication; number of pages (e.g. xii + 234); ISBN; price (if known).
  - Reviewers are encouraged to send two copies of their review to the Publishers of the book reviewed.
- Submissions should be made electronically (WORD or RTF document for PC).

2. Personal information

Personal and contact information of the contributor must appear on a separate sheet, including the following: *a*) Article title; *b*) Full name of contributor; *c*) Institutional affiliation; *d*) Contact address; telephone number; fax.; e-mail address.

3. Layout

- Manuscripts should be double-spaced and justified throughout, using Times New Roman, 12 points fonts.
- Footnotes will be single-spaced, using Times New Roman, 10 points fonts.
  Avoid the use of footnotes to accommodate bibliographical references.

4. Quotations

- Use quotation marks in the following sequence (“ ‘ ’ ”) for quotes not exceeding 4 lines.
- Quotations longer than 4 lines should be indented in a new paragraph.
- References must be incorporated in the body of the text, using the following model: Said (1993: 35); (Bhabha, 1990: 123).
- When reference is made to more than one author in a parenthesis, these should be separated by a semicolon and arranged chronologically.
- Textual omissions will be indicated by suspension points within brackets [...]; authorial commentary in a quoted text will also appear within brackets.

5. Bibliographical references

- All works cited in the text must appear in the “Works cited” section.
- Surname and initial of the author(s) should appear in SMALL CAPS and BOLD type.

a) Books

SAID, E. W. (1978): *Orientalism*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.

b) Two or more authors

DU GAY, P.; S. HALL; L. JANES; H. MACKAY; K. NEGUS (1997): *Doing Cultural Studies: the Story of the Sony Walkman,* London, Sage / The Open University.

c) Book by an editor

HALL, S.; D. HOBSON; A. LOWE; P. WILLIS (eds.) (1980): *Culture, Media, Language,* London, Hutchinson.

d) Article in a Journal or Periodical

NADIN, M. (1984): «On the Meaning of the Visual», *Semiotica*, 52: 45-56.
BATE, J. (1999): «A genious, but so ordinary», *The Independent,* 23 January, 5.

e) Chapter or section in a collective book

HALL, S. (1980): «Encoding/Decoding» in Hall, S.; D. HOBSON; A. LOWE; P. WILLIS (eds.) (1980): *Culture, Media, Language,* London, Hutchinson. 128-138.
When the collective book already appears in the “Works cited”, a short reference might be used:
HALL, S. (1992): «The West and the Rest» in HALL, S.; B. GIEBEN (eds.) (1992: 25-37).

f) Year

When there are two or more works by the same author with the same publishing year, they should be listed adding a correlative letter in italics, separated by a space from the year.
Eagleton, Terry (1976 *a*): *Criticism and Ideology,* London, New Left Books.
— (1976 *b*): *Marxism and Literary Criticism,* London, Methuen.

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Contribuciones para CLR

Volumen 13

Cultura, lenguaje y representación acepta propuestas para su próximo volumen de mayo de 2015.

El volumen 13 es una convocatoria abierta de artículos que se encuadren dentro de los parámetros de estudio cultural de la revista.

CLR es una revista dedicada al análisis de los fenómenos culturales que definen el estado presente. La revista valora tanto los trabajos teóricos como empíricos. Sus ámbitos de estudio incluyen las artes, cine, literatura, periodismo, lingüística, la comunidad, así como las dimensiones socioeconómicas, políticas del hecho cultural.

Los artículos de aproximadamente 6000-8000 palabras deberán ser enviados a través de la plataforma OJS en la que se publica la revista.

http://www.e-revistes.uji.es/index.php/clr

Alternativamente, se podrán enviar los artículos por adjunto a los directores:

José Luis Blas
blas@fil.uji.es

Fecha límite de entrega de originales: 31 de octubre de 2014.

Las propuestas serán sometidas a un proceso de evaluación por pares cuyo resultado se notificará a los interesados en el plazo aproximado de tres meses.

Para cualquier consulta, por favor, pongánse en contacto con la Dirección.

José Luis Blas
blas@fil.uji.es

Call for contributions CLR

Volume 13

Culture, Language and Representation seeks contributions for its next volume to appear May 2015.

Volume 13 will be an open call for contributions falling under the cultural range of the journal.

CLR is a peer-reviewed journal devoted to the analysis of the current state of cultural phenomena and artefacts. The journal encourages both theoretical and empirical works that tackle specific works or authors, and adopt a cultural perspective in the areas of the Arts, film, literature, journalism, sociology, history, media, linguistics, as well as, socio-economic, political, community, or other dimensions.

Contributions of approx. 6000-8000 words should be submitted through the OJS platform where the journal is published.

http://www.e-revistes.uji.es/index.php/clr

Alternatively, submissions may be sent to the Editors as an attachment:

José R. Prado
prado@ang.uji.es

Deadline for submissions: 31 October, 2014.

All submissions will undergo a peer-review process and authors will be notified acceptance or rejection of articles in the average time of three months.

For any questions or queries regarding this Call for papers or the journal, please do not hesitate to contact the Editors.

José R. Prado
prado@ang.uji.es

CULTURA, LENGUAJE Y REPRESENTACIÓN

Revista de Estudios Culturales de la Universitat Jaume I – Volumen 12 – Mayo 2014

CULTURE, LANGUAGE & REPRESENTATION

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