Investment Incentives Under Emission Trading: An Experimental Study
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comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
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INVESTIGACIONMetadata
Title
Investment Incentives Under Emission Trading: An Experimental StudyDate
2012-10Publisher
Springer VerlagISSN
0924-6460; 1573-1502Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10640-012-9560-8Version
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionSubject
Abstract
This paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology under emissions trading. Our experimental design mimics an industry with small asymmetric polluting ... [+]
This paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology under emissions trading. Our experimental design mimics an industry with small asymmetric polluting firms regulated by different schemes of tradable permits. We consider three allocation/auction policies: auctioning off (costly) permits through an ascending clock auction, grandfathering permits with re-allocation through a single-unit double auction, and grandfathering with re-allocation through an ascending clock auction. Our results confirm both dynamic and static theoretical equivalence of auctioning and grandfathering. We nevertheless find that although the market institution used to reallocate permits does not impact the dynamic efficiency from investment, it affects the static efficiency from permit trading. [-]
Is part of
Environmental and Resource Economics. October 2012, Volume 53, Issue 2Rights
© Springer, Part of Springer Science+Business Media
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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- ECO_Articles [696]