Investment Incentives Under Emission Trading: An Experimental Study
comunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONMetadades
Títol
Investment Incentives Under Emission Trading: An Experimental StudyData de publicació
2012-10Editor
Springer VerlagISSN
0924-6460; 1573-1502Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10640-012-9560-8Versió
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
This paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology under emissions trading. Our experimental design mimics an industry with small asymmetric polluting ... [+]
This paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology under emissions trading. Our experimental design mimics an industry with small asymmetric polluting firms regulated by different schemes of tradable permits. We consider three allocation/auction policies: auctioning off (costly) permits through an ascending clock auction, grandfathering permits with re-allocation through a single-unit double auction, and grandfathering with re-allocation through an ascending clock auction. Our results confirm both dynamic and static theoretical equivalence of auctioning and grandfathering. We nevertheless find that although the market institution used to reallocate permits does not impact the dynamic efficiency from investment, it affects the static efficiency from permit trading. [-]
Publicat a
Environmental and Resource Economics. October 2012, Volume 53, Issue 2Drets d'accés
© Springer, Part of Springer Science+Business Media
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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