Gender differences in ultimatum games: Despite rather than due to risk attitudes
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Scholar |
Other documents of the author: García-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, Ainhoa
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Show full item recordcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.012 |
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Title
Gender differences in ultimatum games: Despite rather than due to risk attitudesDate
2012Publisher
ElsevierISSN
0167-2681Bibliographic citation
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Volume 83, Issue 1, June 2012, Pages 42–49 Gender Differences in Risk Aversion and CompetitionType
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268111001570Subject
Abstract
We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee–employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it ... [+]
We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee–employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining. [-]
Is part of
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, Vol. 83, Num. 1. Gender Differences in Risk Aversion and CompetitionRights
Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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This item appears in the folowing collection(s)
- ECO_Articles [696]