The regulation of non-point source pollution and risk preferences: An experimental approach
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.10.019 |
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Title
The regulation of non-point source pollution and risk preferences: An experimental approachDate
2012Publisher
ElsevierISSN
0921-8009Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800911004484Abstract
Many environmental problems, notably arising from agriculture, can be classified as non-point source pollution problems. In this paper we present results of an experimental study on the performance of three mechanisms ... [+]
Many environmental problems, notably arising from agriculture, can be classified as non-point source pollution problems. In this paper we present results of an experimental study on the performance of three mechanisms designed to deal with such problems: collective fining, random fining, and a tax-subsidy scheme. We find that the fining schemes induce under-abatement, a feature being enforced with experience. We further elicit the participants' risk attitude and show that the performance of collective fining is not affected by the subjects' risk preferences. Under a system based on random fining the performance of the mechanism worsens in the presence of risk seeking subjects. However, coordination on over-abatement under the tax-subsidy can be alleviated if subjects are risk averse [-]
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Ecological Economics, 2012, Volume 73, 15Rights
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- ECO_Articles [696]