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dc.contributor.authorMilakovic, Mishael
dc.contributor.authorAlfarano, Simone
dc.contributor.authorLux, Thomas
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-08T16:49:50Z
dc.date.available2012-11-08T16:49:50Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationComputational and Mathematical Organization Theory (2010), 16, 2, p. 201-215ca_CA
dc.identifier.issn1381-298X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/51500
dc.description.abstractWe consider the bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. The board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies appear to be the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany’s corporate network. Look Inside Other actions Export citations Register for Journal Updates About This Journalca_CA
dc.format.extent14 p.ca_CA
dc.language.isoengca_CA
dc.publisherSpringer USca_CA
dc.rights© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010ca_CA
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/*
dc.subjectBoard and director interlocksca_CA
dc.subjectNetwork coreca_CA
dc.subjectNetwork formationca_CA
dc.subjectMarket capitalizationca_CA
dc.titleThe small core of the German corporate board networkca_CA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleca_CA
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10588-010-9072-4
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccessca_CA
dc.relation.publisherVersionhttp://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10588-010-9072-4ca_CA


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