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Green trade unions. Structure, wages and environmental technology

dc.contributor.authorAsproudis, Elias
dc.contributor.authorGil Molto, Maria Jose
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-15T12:56:32Z
dc.date.available2024-01-15T12:56:32Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationAsproudis, E., Gil-Moltó, M.J. Green Trade Unions: Structure, Wages and Environmental Technology. Environ Resource Econ 60, 165–189 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9768-xca_CA
dc.identifier.issn0924-6460
dc.identifier.issn1573-1502
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/205436
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the effect of trade union structure on firms’ technological choices when the unions care about environmental protection. We compare a decentralized with a centralized union structure in a Cournot duopoly. Our results suggest that a decentralized structure provides higher incentives for the investment in cleaner technologies, although emissions may be lower under a centralized structure. The effect of the environmental damage parameter on wages and output may be non-monotonic.ca_CA
dc.format.extent43 p.ca_CA
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca_CA
dc.language.isoengca_CA
dc.publisherSpringerca_CA
dc.relation.isPartOfEnvironmental and Resource Economics 60, 165–189 (2015)ca_CA
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ca_CA
dc.subjecttrade union structureca_CA
dc.subjectenvironmental concernsca_CA
dc.subjectemissionsca_CA
dc.subjecttechnologyca_CA
dc.subjectwagesca_CA
dc.subjectemploymentca_CA
dc.titleGreen trade unions. Structure, wages and environmental technologyca_CA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleca_CA
dc.subject.jelJ51ca_CA
dc.subject.jelL13ca_CA
dc.subject.jelQ5ca_CA
dc.subject.jelO31ca_CA
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9768-x
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca_CA
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionca_CA


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