The Small Core of the German Corporate Board Network
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comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
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Title
The Small Core of the German Corporate Board NetworkDate
2008Publisher
Institut für WeltwirstachISSN
18621155Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionSubject
Abstract
We consider the current bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of
directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among
themselves. To identify the ... [+]
We consider the current bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of
directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among
themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random
benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. It
seems that the board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies are the driving force
behind the existence of a core in Germany’s board and director network. Conditional on being a board
member, it is very improbable to obtain a second membership, but multiple board membership
becomes increasingly likely once this initial barrier is overcome. We also present a simple model that
describes board appointment decisions as a trade-off between social capital and monitoring ability [-]
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- ECO_Articles [696]