Catalog competition: Theory and experimental evidence
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Título
Catalog competition: Theory and experimental evidenceFecha de publicación
2022-07-06Editor
WileyCita bibliográfica
XEFTERIS, Dimitrios, et al. Catalog competition: Theory and experimental evidence. Economic Inquiry, 2022.Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
This paper compares the standard location-then-pricing Hotelling duopoly with a catalog competition game in which firms simultaneously decide locations and prices. We consider a three-location space and continuous ... [+]
This paper compares the standard location-then-pricing Hotelling duopoly with a catalog competition game in which firms simultaneously decide locations and prices. We consider a three-location space and continuous pricing and fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium. In both games, firms employ mixed strategies, producing a mainstream product more often than a specialized one. In the catalog game, prices are always above the marginal cost of production, whereas in the sequential model, prices converge to the marginal cost when firms produce the same variety. We experimentally test our theoretical predictions in the laboratory, finding strong evidence in favor of most of them. [-]
Publicado en
Economic Inquiry, 2022Entidad financiadora
Universitat Jaume I | Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, Spain | Agence Nationale de la Recherche | Generalitat Valenciana
Código del proyecto o subvención
UJI-B2021-23 | RTI2018-096927-B-100 | ANR-18-CE26-0018 | AICO/2021/005
Derechos de acceso
© 2022 The Authors. Economic Inquiry published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Western Economic Association International.
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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