The Exclusion of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence in Civil Proceedings: A Comparative Analysis between the USA and Spain

Abstract

The Exclusionary Rule determines that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights cannot be used in trial. This theory was adopted in the United States of America in 1914 and has spread to other countries. The US Supreme Court expanded the Rule's scope through cases like Silverthorne and Mapp, but then limited it by creating various exceptions. In the United States the Rule has been applied mainly to criminal proceedings because its primary objective is considered to be police deterrence.Influenced by the American doctrines, Spanish courts have adopted not only the Exclusionary Rule, but also some of its exceptions. However, the Spanish Constitutional Court has defined a different rationale for the suppression of evidence. In Spain the Exclusionary Rule is viewed as a safeguard that derives implicitly from the system of fundamental rights. For this reason its scope is wider and it can also be implemented in non-criminal proceedings (civil, administrative and labor). Because the development of the Rule by the US Supreme Court has served as an example to other countries, like Spain, international scholars have continuously studied this topic. Nonetheless, the application of the Exclusionary Rule in the United States to civil proceedings has seldom been analyzed because it is less common and sometimes even thought of as impossible. This study shows that, as a matter of fact, the US Supreme Court has contemplated the possibility of applying the Rule to cases like One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, Janis and Lopez-Mendoza, which were forfeitures and deportation proceedings of civil nature. The study concludes that in the United States, exclusion of evidence in civil proceedings is exceptional and very limited when compared to the ampler application of the Exclusionary Rule that occurs in Spain, where it is effective in both criminal and non-criminal proceedings.