Audience effects and other-regarding preferences against corruption: Experimental evidence
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INVESTIGACIONMetadata
Title
Audience effects and other-regarding preferences against corruption: Experimental evidenceDate
2020-10-22Publisher
ElsevierISSN
0167-2681Bibliographic citation
GARCÍA-GALLEGO, Aurora, et al. Audience effects and other-regarding preferences against corruption: Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 180, p. 159-173.Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-economic-behavior-and-organizationVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionSubject
Abstract
We report results from an experiment in which two firms compete for a public project by submitting offers of quality and bribery to a public official. We study the impact of audience effects (transparency) and other ... [+]
We report results from an experiment in which two firms compete for a public project by submitting offers of quality and bribery to a public official. We study the impact of audience effects (transparency) and other regarding preferences (accountability) on corruption by introducing a citizen who either observes, or is affected by the transactions, or both. The results suggest that transparency and accountability lead, independently, to lower bribe placement and acceptance. However, the conjoined effect does not promote prosocial behaviour further, indicating potential ceiling effects. [-]
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Volume 180, December 2020, Pages 159-173Rights
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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- ECO_Articles [696]
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