Error reporting and the performance of nursing management: a game-theoretic study
![Thumbnail](/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10234/187360/69625.pdf.jpg?sequence=4&isAllowed=y)
Ver/ Abrir
Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/36084
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/36085
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONMetadatos
Título
Error reporting and the performance of nursing management: a game-theoretic studyFecha de publicación
2020-01-15Editor
Institute of Mathematics and its Applications; Oxford University PressCita bibliográfica
BARRACHINA, Alex; GONZÁLEZ-CHORDÁ, Víctor M. Error reporting and the performance of nursing management: a game-theoretic study. IMA Journal of Management Mathematics, 2020.Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
https://academic.oup.com/imaman/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/imaman/dpz0 ...Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
The interaction between nurses and their managers is a very important factor in nurses’ error reporting behaviour, which is crucial to improving patient safety in healthcare organizations. However, little theoretical ... [+]
The interaction between nurses and their managers is a very important factor in nurses’ error reporting behaviour, which is crucial to improving patient safety in healthcare organizations. However, little theoretical work has been undertaken to analyse this interaction. This paper uses a game-theoretic principal–agent framework with asymmetric information to study this interaction. We suppose that the principal (the nurse manager) asks the agent (the nurse) to perform a task with a certain patient. In case a mistake is made while treating the patient, the nurse has to decide whether to report it to the manager, who can observe whether the patient suffered an accident. We consider different manager’s leadership styles and analyse their performance in obtaining error notification from nurses in this framework. [-]
Proyecto de investigación
Universitat Jaume I (project P1-1B2015-48) ; Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (project ECO2015-68469-R).Derechos de acceso
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications. All rights reserved.
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Aparece en las colecciones
- INF_Articles [281]